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The focus of this study is the protection of creditors’ rights in South Africa’s statutory business 
rescue regime provided for in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. In this analysis, 
three issues in particular are addressed in depth.  
 
The first is the creditors` power to initiate the business rescue process. The second is the 
position of creditors between the commencement and the termination of the business rescue 
process. The third issue is to suggest (on the basis of experience drawn from reported case law 
and academic criticism of the current business rescue statutory provisions) an improved model 
that will more effectively safeguard creditors’ rights in South Africa’s business rescue regime.  
 
In exploring these issues, I give a critical review of pertinent literature. With respect to the first 
issue, I conclude that the legislative provisions granting creditors the right to seek a court order 
initiating the business rescue process are open to criticism. By contrast, a resolution of the 
board of directors for the commencement of business rescue is a simpler route.  
 
With regard to the second issue I conclude that the company’s creditors have considerable 
influence in the business rescue process. Overall, the current statutory business rescue regime 
is intended to give a voice to all major stakeholders in the company’s continued solvent 
existence. In the event of certain irresoluble disputes in the course of that process, the judiciary 
has the final say. A substantial number of judicial decisions have provided interpretations of 
the statutory provisions, and the trend has been to try to restore financial ailing companies to 
solvency and viability where there is a reasonable prospect for success in this regard.  
 
In my conclusion, I propose a legislative model that seeks to strike an optimum balance 
between the competing and sometimes conflicting interests of the various interested parties and 
I suggest reforms directed at enhancing the protection of creditors’ rights. 
 
This thesis takes account of South African legislation and legislative amendments as at 31 
December 2016 and of decisions of the South African courts up to and including those handed 
down during April 2017 and reported in the saflii on-line law reports. Since a substantial part 
of this thesis was written from outside South Africa, the author relied heavily on the safllii data 
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base of judgments of the South African courts, rather than on hard copy law reports which take 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter the 2008 Act) came into force on 1 May 
2011.1 Chapter 6 of the Act introduced a statutory ‘business rescue’ regime as a means of 
restoring financially distressed companies to solvency and viability where there is a reasonable 
prospect of success in this regard. The statutory business rescue regime marked a significant 
evolution from the previous and now-repealed judicial management process.2 In Richter v Absa 
Bank Limited,3 the Supreme Court of Appeal gave a short history of South Africa’s corporate 
rescue mechanism as follows:   
 
“A review of the background to the introduction of the business rescue process into 
our law gives an insight as to the intention of the legislature in introducing the 
procedure. Our business rescue regime is adapted from similar concepts in other 
jurisdictions such as the United States and Great Britain. In South Africa it was 
introduced against the background of general acceptance that the judicial management 
process provided for under chapter XV of the 1973 Act was failing the local economy 
because only few, if any, judicial management orders resulted in the saving of 
companies experiencing financial difficulties.” 
 
Section 128 (1) (b) of the 2008 Act now defines ‘business rescue’ as follows:  
 
“Business rescue means proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that 
is financially distressed by providing for: 
                                                          
1 This legislation was driven inter alia by the need to overhaul South Africa’s corporate law to bring it into 
harmony with certain global trends. This was articulated by the then Minister of Trade and Industries in the 
foreword to South African Company Law for the 21st Century, Guideline for Corporate Law Reform, GN 1183 GG 
26493 of 23 June 2004 page 3, available at http://www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=169430 accessed 
in 1.06.2014 
2 The concept and objective of ‘judicial management’ was expressed thus in Section 427 of the Companies Act 
61 of 1973: 
“When any company by reason of mismanagement or for any other cause, is unable to pay its debts 
or is probably unable to meet its obligations; and has not become or is prevented from becoming a 
successful concern, and there is a reasonable probability that, if it is placed under judicial 
management, it will be enabled to pay its debts or to meet its obligations and become successful 
concern, the Court may, if it appears just and equitable, grant a judicial management order in respect 
of that company.” 
3 (20181/2014) [2015] ZASCA 100, para 13. 
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(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and of the management of its affairs, 
business and property; 
(ii)  a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect 
of property in its possession; and 
(iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the company 
by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity 
in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on 
a solvent basis or, if it is not possible for the company to so continue in existence, 
results in a better return for the company`s creditors or shareholders than would result 
from the immediate liquidation of the company.”4 
  
In addition to defining business rescue and laying down the process to be followed in an 
attempted rescue, the 2008 Act explicitly recognises and affirms the role of companies in 
providing economic and social benefits.5  The legislation seeks to encourage the efficient 
rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights 
and interests of all relevant stakeholders.6 The need for the equal treatment of “affected 
persons”7 in the business rescue process is implicitly acknowledged, as is the need to recognise 
the rights of the company’s creditors before and during the corporate rescue process.8 
                                                          
4 This definition is referred to and commented on in numerous judgments including Industrial Development 
Corporation of SA Limited and Another v Schroeder NO and Others (1958/2015) [2015] ZAECMHC 65 para 20; 
Welman v Marcelle Props 193 CC and Another (33958/2011) [2012] ZAGPJHC 32, para 11; Griessel and Another 
v Lizemore and Others (2015/24751) [2015] ZAGPJHC 189; [2015] 4 All SA 433 (GJ) para 75 n 77; Ex parte: Target 
Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another v Cawood NO and Others (21955/14; 
34775/14) [2015] ZAGPPHC 740 para 26; Absa Bank Limited v Caine NO and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v 
Caine N.O. and Another (3813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46,para 19; AG Petzetakis International Holdings 
Ltd V Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd And Others (Marley Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd And Another Intervening) 2012 (5) SA 
515 (GSJ), para 10; Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden NO and Others (18486/2013) [2013] 
ZAGPJHC 148para 43.  
5Section 7 (d) of the 2008 Act. 
6Section 7 (k) of the 2008 Act. 
7 Section 128 (1) (a) of the 2008 Act defines an “affected person” as:  
(i) a shareholder or creditor of the company; 
(ii) any registered trade union representing employees of the company; and 
(iii) if any of the employees of the company are not represented by a registered trade union, each of 
those employees or their respective representatives. 
8 The 2008 Act does not define the term ‘creditor’. But Section 1of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 defines 
‘creditor’, when used as a noun to mean: 
 (a) a deferral of payment of money owed to a person, or a promise to defer such a payment; or 
(b) a promise to advance or pay money to or at the direction of another person;  
Section 130 (1) (c) of the Companies Bill 2007 defined the term “creditor” to mean: 
“a person to whom a company owes money under any arrangement immediately before the 
beginning of the company’s business rescue proceedings, and for greater certainty, does not include 




In the South African statutory business rescue regime, two particular issues impact directly on 
the company’s creditors. The first is the process for submitting their claims against the 
company and the second is the acceptance or rejection of those claims.9 Submission of claims 
is in the hands of the creditor; acceptance or rejection is a decision for the business rescue 
practitioner or, in the event of a dispute, a court of law. If a creditor has an interest in any of 
the company’s assets and wishes to dispose of or repossess the asset, an appropriate request 
must be made to the business rescue practitioner and, if the latter’s decision is negative,10  the 
creditor can apply to court for an order11 affirming or rejecting the creditors’ decision. If the 
business rescue practitioner or the court takes the view that sale or repossession of the assets 
by the creditor will jeopardise the prospects for the successful rescue of the company, then 
rejection is inevitable. 
 
Creditors may suffer a significant loss if an attempt at business rescue fails to achieve its 
primary objective, namely, to restore a financially distressed company to viability or to achieve 
its secondary objective of securing a greater return for shareholders and creditors than would 
have been achieved by immediate liquidation. The failure of an attempted business rescue may 
leave the creditors in a worse financial position than before the process started.12 Indeed, it has 
                                                          
138, except to the extent that such a person was a creditor of the company before providing that 
post-commencement finance;” 
However, this definition was omitted in the enacted version of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. The omission may 
have been because the definition was too narrow or because it failed to treat post-commencement financiers as 
creditors. The omission also implied that employees who had no prior claims against the company were not 
creditors of the company. Arguably, the legislation should have provided a different definition, given the 
importance of creditors in the process.  
See further, Lundgren, K., ‘Liability of a Creditor in a Control Relationship with its Debtor,’ (1984), 67, Marq. L. 
Rev., 523 who defines ‘creditor’ to mean:  
“Any person to whom a debt is owed, whether through a loan of money, sale of goods or otherwise 
and who, by virtue of the relationship, is in a position to exert control over the business affairs of a 
borrower” 
9 See Sections 133 and 134 of the 2008 Act. These two provisions deal with limiting of the enforcement of a 
creditor`s claims; the court and the business rescue practitioner are given power to accept or reject the 
creditor`s assertions. 
10Section 133 (1) (a) of the 2008 Act. Section 134 (2) gives the business rescue practitioner the right to reject a 
request by a creditor to exercise a right against property after taking into consideration the purpose of Chapter 
6 or the circumstances of the company or the nature of the property in question.  
11Section 133 (1) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
12 In African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others (GNP)  
[2013] ZAGPPHC 259, para 46, in regard to the constitutionality of a binding offer proposed to the dissenting 
creditor, Kathree-Setiloane, J. stated: 
“…Therefore, a party whose claim is taken over by a binding offer, contemplated in s 153(1)(b)(ii) of 
the Act, would be in no worse a situation than had the company been liquidated. In fact, in most 
circumstances such a person would be in a better situation than those creditors who go through the 
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been said that the business rescue process not only adds costs that are ultimately borne by 
creditors, but that the process lends itself to abuse on the part of directors and shareholders 
aimed at delaying, defeating or reducing the claims of creditors.13 Internationally, business 
rescue processes tend to leave creditors more vulnerable than other participants in the process.14 
                                                          
business rescue proceedings, only to find that the company cannot be rehabilitated and is then 
liquidated, at which point the dividend payable to creditors is substantially less…” [Emphasis 
supplied]. 
In these circumstances concurrent creditors may receive nothing after liquidation costs are paid; see section 135 
(4) of the Act 2008. 
13Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd (Four Creditors Intervening) 2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP) paras 27 and 
42. In this case, it was held that the applicant for business rescue had intended to abuse the process for the 
purpose of preventing the sale of corporate assets and stalling the winding-up procedure that had already been 
initiated against the company. The shareholders had engaged in this malpractice knowing that the company had 
neither a reasonable prospect of being revived, nor an prospect of enhancing the creditors’ returns on 
liquidation. In Cohen v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd and Another [2012] ZAGPJHC 144, the business rescue resolution 
initiated by the board of directors was found to have had the intention of delaying the payment of creditors’ 
claims rather than achieving either of the goals of the rescue process. 
See further. Michael, ‘The Insolvency Bill 2000: Rescue Culture in the new Millennium’, (2000), 15 J. Int’l Banking 
L., 62; A.Loubser, ‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 
1)’, (2010), 3 J. S. Afr. L., 505; and Delport, P., Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2012) page 446. 
14There is a debate as to whose interests the company’s management should serve where the company has 
embarked on a financial restructuring process. At common law the managers of a company owe the company a 
duty of loyalty and care; see Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421 and Multinational Gas Petrochemical Services 
Ltd [1983] Ch. 258and Brady v Brady (1987) 3 B.C.C. 535 (C.M.).  It is clear that, where the company is solvent, 
the directors should act to maximize the shareholders’ returns as they are, in economic terms, the owners of 
the company; see Cieri, R.M. and others, `The Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled Companies,’ 
(1994), 3 Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice, page 146 and Ngurli v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425, 238. Other 
writers have put forward the contrary view that creditors’ interests should be considered at all times during the 
company`s operations, regardless of its solvency; see Keay, A., `The Director`s Duty to Take into Account the 
Interests of the Company Creditors: When is it Triggered?,’ (2001), 25, Melbourne University Law Review, pages 
334-338; McConvill, J., Directors’ Duties Towards Creditors in Australia after Spies v The Queen (2002) 20 
Company and Securities Law Journal, 4; McConvill, J., ‘Geneva Finance and the Duty of Directors to Creditors: 
Imperfect Obligation and other Imperfections’ (2003) 11 Insolvency Law Journal 7; Davies, P., `Directors` -
Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, (2006), 7, EBOR, page 301; 
and Adler, B., ‘A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives’ (1995), 62 U Ch Law Review, page 
575. Other writers have proposed that the interests of creditors should come first where a company is in the 
process of business rescue or is undergoing any other insolvency procedures; see Asian Development Bank, 
Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Report of the office of the General Counsel on TA 5795-
Reg: Insolvency Law Reforms, Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank, 1, 2000, page 43. To the 
same effect, see Keay, A., ‘Formulating a Framework for Directors’ Duties to Creditors: An Entity Maximisation 
Approach,’ (2005), 64 (3), Cambridge Law Journal, pages 617-620; in Tomasic, R., `Creditors Participation in 
Insolvency Proceedings-Towards the Adoption of International Standards,’ (2006), 14, Insolvency Law Journal, 
page 179 it is argued that creditors’ interests in a company during financial crisis surpasses the interests of other 
parties and that their interests should prevail. There is judicial precedent that favours the supremacy of the 
interests of creditors during the insolvency of a company; see for example Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear 
v Dodd (1988) 4 B.C.C. 30; Re MDA Investment Management Ltd [2004] 1 B.C.L.C. 217, 245; Kinsela v Russell 
Kinsela Pty Ltd. (1986) 4 A.C.L.C. 215; Gwyer v London Wharf (Limehouse) Ltd. [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 153, 178; Re 
Pantone 485 Ltd. [2002] 1 B.C.L.C. 266, 285. In United States of America, some decisions have taken the same 
approach as in Geyer v Ingersoll Publications Co. 621 A 2d 784 (1992) (Delaware); see also Jones v Gun [1997] 2 
ILRM 245 in Ireland. In The Bell Group Ltd. v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 9) [2008] WASC 239 and in Walker 
v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1 the Australian courts took the same view with regard to the creditors’ interests 
during times of financial crisis. 
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Before a modern business rescue process became available under the 2008 Act, South Africa’s 
companies legislation offered a far inferior process that went by the name of judicial 
management.15 The latter process was characterised by the replacement of the company’s board 
of directors by a court-appointed judicial manager; by contrast, in business rescue under the 
2008 Act, the board remains in office, but must work with and under the business rescue 
practitioner.16 The outcome of judicial management was seldom positive.17 The legislation did 
not bar suppliers and other creditors from enforcing their claims against the company unless 
the court imposed a moratorium on such claims.18 Consequently, judicial management did not 
create a substantive opportunity for the company to recover financially and resume operations 
on a solvent basis. In Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd judicial 
management was described as a precursor to liquidation.19 Judicial management can be 
described as a creditor-friendly regime. Another business rescue process that was available 
before the 2008 Act was a “scheme of arrangement” which could take the form of a 
compromise with creditors, an amalgamation, or a take-over.20 
 
1.2 Outline of the Research Problem 
A statutory corporate rescue process can be essentially pro-creditor or pro-debtor. The former 
focuses on protecting the defaulting company’s creditors throughout the process from its 
commencement to its termination. The respective legislation of the United Kingdom and of 
Germany are pro-creditor corporate rescue regimes. By contrast, a pro-debtor regime 
emphasises the protection of the financially struggling debtor company at all stages of the 
rescue process. This is inevitably achieved by limiting the rights of the company’s creditors. 
The ‘Chapter 11’ process in the United States of America (introduced by the Bankruptcy 
                                                          
15First introduced in South Africa by the Companies Act 46 of 1926 and thereafter in terms of Sections 427-440 
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
16Section 137 (2) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
17 A Smith, ‘Corporate Administration: A Proposed Mode I’, (1999) De Jure 80. 
18Section 428 (2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 allowed the parties to apply for the leave of the court if they 
wished to enforce their claims during judicial management; see for example Lief NO v Western Credit (Africa) 
(Pty) Ltd 1966 (3) SA 344 (W); and Transkei Development Corporation Ltd v Oshkosh Africa (Pty) Ltd 1986 (1) SA 
150 (C). 
19 [2001] 1 All SA 233 (C), this decision provides a summary of problems in relation to judicial management 
proceedings in South Africa. 
20 See Section 331 of the Companies Act 1973.  
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Reform Act of 1978) and the business rescue provisions of French legislation are notable 
examples of corporate legislation which aim at salvaging a debtor company.21 
 
However, the USA and France are currently amending their corporate rescue procedures and 
have started moving toward a creditor-friendly model. By contrast, some creditor-friendly 
business rescue jurisdictions are now leaning toward a pro-debtor model that protects the 
struggling company. For instance, the UK, a prime example of a pro-creditor corporate rescue 
jurisdiction, has enacted the Enterprise Act 2002 which makes significant amendments to the 
existing Administration Rescue Procedure by allowing companies that are viable but are facing 
financial difficulties to be salvaged before any distribution to its creditors.22 By contrast, the 
USA’s Chapter 11, a federal law that governs corporate reorganisation, has been progressively 
amended and has become an avenue for the sale of a company as going concern or for the sale 
of the company’s assets, as distinct from saving the company from liquidation.23 
                                                          
21 These two countries offer minimum creditor protection according to the index provided in R La Porta, F 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes and RWVishny. ‘Law and Finance,’ (1998) 106(6) Journal of Political Economy 1113-1155; and 
as also observed by M Hunter ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture’, (1999) JBL 498. 
22 Nevertheless this legislation has failed to completely protect debtors after the inception of ‘pre-packing 
administration,’ also called a ‘pre-packaged sale’; this refers to an arrangement under which the sale of all or 
part of a company`s business or assets is negotiated with a purchaser prior to the appointment of an insolvency 
practitioner as administrator. This is discussed in M Haywood ‘Pre-pack Administrations’, (2010) 23 (2), 
Insolv.Int., 17-22; B Xie ‘Regulating Pre-package Administration-Complete Agenda’, (2011) 5 JBL 513; also V 
FinchCorporate Insolvency Law, (2009) page 452 and L Qi ‘The Rise of Pre-Packaged Corporate Rescue on both 
sides of the Atlantic’, (2007) 20 (9) Insolv. Int. 129, 131referred to a pre-packing administration as a mixture of 
formal and informal corporate rescue procedure.The change from a pro-creditor to a pro-debtor regime is also 
evident in the Netherland`s Insolvency law. 
23 This is discussed in DG Baird and RK Rasmussen ‘The End of Bankruptcy’, (2002) 55 S.L.R pages 786-788.This 
form of procedure as practised in Chapter 11 has been referred to as ‘pre-pack reorganisation’. The amendments 
to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 2005 which aimed at restoring responsibility 
and integrity to the bankruptcy system in the USA by curbing fraudulent, abusive, and opportunistic bankruptcy 
claims, is credited with this change. The legislation has made significant changes to the operation of Chapter 11, 
especially as regards small companies, as is observed in H Miller ‘Chapter 11 in Transition - From Boom to Bust 
and Into the Future’, (2007) 81 Am. Bankr, L.J. pages 387-388. This is also the view taken in  T Whitaker 
‘Congressional Changes to Business Bankruptcy,’ (2006) 54 USAB page 28,where it is said that: 
“Some small businesses will be forced into a procedurally more expedited, but flexible, plan process 
with mandatory disclosure requirements and increased oversight by the U.S. Trustee. Clearly, some 
debtors will have greater difficulty in achieving a successful reorganization”. [Emphasis added.] 
R Levin and A Ranney-Marinelli ‘The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,’ (2005) 79 Am. Bankr, L.J. page 603 
emphasise that:  
“In general, these changes reflect active lobbying by certain creditor groups to improve their positions 
in bankruptcy cases, particularly in Chapter 11,vis-a-vis debtors and other creditors and Congressional 
reaction (or overreaction) to the recent Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and other scandals. Ironically, the 
increased burden placed on reorganizing debtors in favour of particular groups of creditors will likely 
reduce overall recoveries for all creditors, including the favoured groups.”[Emphasis supplied]. 
Consequently, the amendments has made Chapter 11 to be dominated by creditors and to be regarded as a 




Franken (2004) proposes some features for a business rescue regime to be regarded as pro-
creditor, namely:24 
 
“(i) There should be a replacement of the management with a court-appointed trustee 
or creditor’s appointed rescue practitioner; 
(ii) It should not provide for a complete stay of the creditors’ enforcement rights, and 
also, permit senior secured creditors to enforce their claims against the debtor’s assets; 
and 
(iii) Its applicable distributive rule is the absolute priority rule which implies that the 
distribution to creditors and shareholders does not follow the priority ranking outside 
of bankruptcy.” 
 
Franken sets out the attributes of a jurisdiction’s corporate rescue legislation that will categorise 
it as a pro-debtor regime:25 
 
“(i) Leaving the management of the company in place as the debtor-in-possession;  
(ii) Providing for complete stay of the creditors’ enforcement rights; and  
(iii) Sharing of loss among the parties, which means that creditors and shareholders          
(company owners) are allowed to agree on a distribution that deviates from the priority 
ranking outside of bankruptcy.” 
 
The protection given to creditors in a pro-debtor corporate rehabilitation regime is limited, 
compared to that offered in a pro-creditor regime.26 The corporate rescue process of a particular 
                                                          
Governance in Chapter 11’, Research Paper NO.3-19, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 
(2003), pages 1-44; and ST Bharath et al, ‘The Changing Nature of Chapter 11’, Working Paper, Ohio State 
University, (2008), pages 1-46.   
24 S Franken ‘Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’,(2004) 5(4) European 
Business Organization Law Review, page 652; to the same effect, see J Qian and PE Straha ‘How Laws and 
Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Banks Loans’,  (2007) 62 (6) The Journal of Finance page 2804, 
which determined whether a country has strong creditor protection; the following were regarded as relevant 
characteristics in this regard: the corporate rescue legislation should not provide for an automatic bar on 
creditors’ enforcing their rights; a debtor should seek consent from creditors before applying for the 
restructuring procedure; also, the management of a distressed company should be removed once the 
proceedings start; lastly the secured creditors should be given priority in the distribution of the assets. 
25 Franken ‘Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’,(2004) 5(4) European 
Business Organization Law Review page 653. 
26 The actual lending process is a private matter between two or more parties, but the statutory protection of 
their interests should not be overlooked; see The South Africa Department of Trade and Industries, ‘Making 
Credit Markets Work: A Policy Framework for Consumer Credit’, (2004), page 6, accessible at 
8 
 
jurisdiction cannot be categorised as either pro-debtor or pro-creditor only on the basis of statutory 
provisions.27 Judicial decisions on corporate rescue in a particular jurisdiction are invaluable in 
determining the character of its business rescue regime. Moreover, the particular country’s political, 
economic, historical and cultural character influences the nature of its corporate rescue regime, 
regardless of what its laws provide. 
 
To determine the extent to which creditors’ rights are protected in the South African business 
rescue regime, regard must be had to its pro-debtor and pro-creditor features. To this end, the 
present study analyses each stage of the business rescue proceedings. This study commences 
with an analysis of the rights of creditors at the initiation of the business rescue process, and 
then proceeds to examine the rights of creditors during the statutory moratorium on their claims 
against the company. Thereafter the process for appointing the rescue practitioner and the 
implications of the appointment are considered. The role and responsibilities of the company’s 
management during the rescue period are critically examined, and a study is made of the overall 
influence of creditors in the attempted corporate rescue mechanism. The duties and 
responsibilities of rescue practitioners, particularly those that impact on the creditors’ well-
being are critically considered. Certain distinctive features of the business rescue process are 
critically evaluated, with particular regard for creditors` rights.28 
                                                          
http://www.ncr.org.za/documents/pages/background_documents/Credit%20Law%20Review.pdf , accessed on 
11.05.2014.This policy document states as follows regarding the regulation of the credit industry:  
“The credit market is not a risk-free arena. There is a considerable imbalance of power between 
consumers and credit providers, consumer education levels are frequently low, consumers are poorly 
informed about their rights and unable to enforce such rights through either negotiation or legal action.”  
South Africa’s National Credit Act 31 of 2005 attempts to regulate the lending relationship between the credit 
provider and the consumer by promoting the social and economic welfare of the citizenry, promoting a fair, 
transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
protecting consumers. In Sebola and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Another [2012] ZACC 11; 
para 40 (which was a case involving the debtor and creditor relationship) the Supreme Court of Appeal expressed 
its interpretation of this legislation as follows: 
 “The statute sets out the means by which these purposes must be achieved, and it must be interpreted 
so as to give effect to them. The main objective is to protect consumers. But in doing so, the Act aims to 
secure a credit market that is ‘competitive, sustainable, responsible [and] efficient’. And the means by 
which it seeks to do this embrace ‘balancing the respective rights and responsibilities of credit providers 
and consumers’. These provisions signal strongly that the legislation must be interpreted without 
disregarding or minimising the interests of credit providers…. I…agree that ‘whilst the main object of the 
Act is to protect consumers, the interests of creditors must also be safeguarded and should not be 
overlooked’”. [Footnote omitted.] 
This Act regulates the lending relationship prior to the commencement of a corporate restructuring process and 
aims at balancing and protecting the rights of these the parties. 
27 Franken ‘Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’, (2004) 5(4) European 
Business Organization Law Review page 672. 
28 The methodology adopted in this study is investigating the extent to which the South African corporate rescue 
legislation protects the rights of creditors has been influenced by the perspectives advanced in Franken 




Since modern legislation for business rescue is a new phenomenon in South Africa, and the 
judiciary has not yet authoritatively considered all its aspects, the position of creditors in the 
process, and issues of legislative interpretation in this regard are very important. In Natal Joint 
Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality29the Supreme Court of Appeal said as 
follows in regard to the principles of statutory interpretation: 
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, 
be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the 
context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the 
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. 
Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language 
used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the 
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known 
to those responsible for its production…A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one 
that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose 
of the document. . . . The inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision 
itself, read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the 
background to the preparation and production of the document. [Footnotes omitted]”  
This study puts forward an interpretation30 which attempts to give effect to the objectives of 
the legislation31 in harmony with those principles, and in which the language of the statutory 
                                                          
Organization Law Review, pages 652 – 653 and by S Claessens, in LF Klapper `Bankruptcy Around the World: 
Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), and in the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865 Control and 
Corporate Rescue, page 2, accessible at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/bwl/ieu/lehre/ss06/..../debtorinposseession.pdf , accessed on 23.11.2013. 
29[2012] ZASCA 13 para 18. 
30 The interpretation is in line with the decision in Panamo Properties (Pty) & another v Nel & others NNO [2015] 
ZASCA 76; 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA) para 27 where the court was called on to determine whether procedural non-
compliance with Section 129 (3) and (4) will result in the automatic termination of the business rescue 
proceedings. 
31 The proposed interpretation is in accord with the decision in FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business 
rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZASCA 50 where, in para 75, the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted such an 
interpretation. Section 5 (1) of the 2008 Act provides that in interpreting and applying the provisions of the Act 
account should be taken of the purposes set-out in Section 7, subsection (k) of which provides for the efficient 
rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all 
relevant stakeholders. The Constitution Court has in numerous decisions declared that the constitution of South 
Africa requires a purposive approach to be applied in statutory interpretation, see Du Toit v Minister for Safety 
and Security and Another [2009] ZACC 22 paras 37 and 38, Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for 
Safety and Security and Others [2009] ZACC 11 para 21;African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral 
Commission and Others [2006] ZACC 10 at paras 21, 25, 28 and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] ZACC 15 at para 91. 
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provisions is interpreted in accordance with commercial practice32 and with appropriate regard 
to context.33 This study also takes account of the history of and background materials in the 
interpretation of the business rescue provisions of the Act.34  The Constitution35 explicitly 
requires that the interpretation of legislation and the development of the common law and 
customary law must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.36 
1.3 Rationale of the Study 
In the business rescue process laid down in Chapter 6 of the Act, creditors are key players in 
any attempted rescue of a financially distressed company.37 The following are particularly 
significant aspects of the structure of the legislative scheme: 
(i) A deliberate transition from the unsuccessful pro-creditor judicial management 
mechanism, to a significantly pro-debtor regime.38 In Southern Palace Investments 
265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd39 the court suggested that, as 
part of an application to enter the business rescue regime, the applicant should 
                                                          
32 In Society of Lloyd’s v Robinson [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 545, 551, an English court acknowledged the 
importance of contextual setting in interpreting commercial documents and held that the words should be 
construed as a reasonable commercial person would have done. This approach was later endorsed by the Justice 
Lord Clarke in Rainy Sky SA and others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50 ([2012] Lloyds Rep 34 (SC)) para 21. In 
Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another [2014] ZACC 16 at para 28 the Constitutional Court stated that giving 
the words of the legislation their ordinary grammatical meaning is a fundamental principle of statutory 
interpretation, unless doing so will lead to an illogical outcome. To the same effect, see South African Airways 
(Pty) Ltd v Aviation Union of South Africa & others 2011 (3) SA 148 (SCA) paras 25-30. 
33 See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] ZACC 15 
para 90..  
34 This includes Policy Documents, Parliament Bills and debates and Government-commissioned studies see De 
Waal, J. and Currie, I., The Bill of Rights Handbook, Juta Cape Town, (2013) 6th Edition, page 143.  
35 Section 1 (c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 affirms the supremacy of the Constitution 
and the rule of law. Section 2 states that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic, that law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid and that the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. This provision must be read 
with Sections 7, 8 and 237. 
36Section 39 (2) of the 1996 SA Constitution. 
37 See Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Ply) Ltd and Another; Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited v West 
City Precinct Properties (Ply) Ltd and Another (19075/11, 15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33 para 8. In this decision, 
the High Court stated that creditors have the major financial interest in the outcome of a proposed business 
rescue. Claessens and Klapper, `Bankruptcy Around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865 Control and Corporate Rescue, page 1, state as follows: 
“This literature finds that greater investor protection encourages the development of capital markets 
and that countries that better protect creditors have more developed credit markets. Important aspects 
of the strength of creditor rights are the specific features of a country’s insolvency regime and its 
enforcement.” [Emphasis supplied] 
It is trite that credit is the lifeblood of many businesses in the modern world; see the United Kingdom Report of 
the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, (the Cork Report) (1982)  para 10. 
38 Luthuli Power Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Transfix Transformers SA (Pty) Ltd [2016] ZAFSHC 220 at para [32];  A 
Loubser `Tilting at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law,’ 
(2013) 25 SA Merc LJ at 444. 
392012 (2) SA 423 (WCC). 
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provide a viable rescue plan showing that, if the attempted resuscitation of the 
company should fail, the creditors would not be worse off than if the company had 
been immediately liquidated;40 this approach has an implicit pro-creditor bias. But 
in Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd41 the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected 
this view and held that an applicant should not be required to provide a detailed 
rehabilitation plan in order to be granted a business rescue order; all that was 
necessary was to establish grounds for a reasonable prospect of achieving one of 
the two goals in s 128(1) (b); in short, a pro-debtor approach that lays a lesser burden 
on the company seeking to be permitted an attempt at business rescue. The latter 
interpretation sets a lower bar for an applicant than was required to secure an order 
for judicial management; but a lower bar in this regard makes it easier for a debtor 
company to use the process as a delaying tactic 
Internationally, one view is that the successful corporate rescue regimes are those 
that favour the company’s creditors. 42 Examples are administration in the UK under 
                                                          
40 The supremacy of creditors’ interests was confirmed to have been compromised in Absa Bank Ltd v Newcity 
Group (Pty) Ltd, Cohen v Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd [2012] ZAGPJHC 144;para 31 where Sutherland J. said: 
“In plain terms, it seems now to be incorrect to speak of an "entitlement" to a winding up order simply 
because the applicant is an unpaid creditor. The rights of creditors no longer have pride of place and 
have been levelled with those of shareholders, employees, and with the public interest too.” 
To similar effect, in Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf & Country Estate (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC)para 14, 
the High Court said that: 
“It is clear that the legislature has recognised that the liquidation of companies more frequently than 
not occasions significant collateral damage, both economically and socially, with attendant destruction 
of wealth and livelihoods. It is obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such adverse 
socio-economic consequences should be avoided where reasonably possible.” 
In discussing the operation of a Chapter 11 reorganisation, which bears some similarity to South Africa’s 
business rescue legislation , MS Scarberry et al in Business Reorganisation in Bankruptcy: Cases and Materials, 
2nded (2001) page 1 say : 
“Chapter 11 of the federal Bankruptcy Code gives financially distressed businesses an opportunity to 
reorganize and avoid liquidation. Liquidation of a business’s assets can be very costly to the persons 
directly involved and to society. Keeping the business in operation will often be much more desirable 
than liquidating it. The fundamental premise of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is that 
reorganization is desirable.” 
This approach is in line with the view expressed in R Jordan et al Bankruptcy, 5th Ed (1999 )page 633: “Society 
is better off also when a firm that is worth more alive than dead is successfully rehabilitated.” 
41 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) at para 31. 
42 In Richter v Absa Bank Limited (20181/2014) [2015] ZASCA 100;para 13, the Supreme Court of Appeal observed 
that South African’s business rescue process borrows some concepts from the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom. This was also noted by a member of the team engaged in advising on the reform of South 
Africa’s company law; see T Mongalo ‘An Overview of a Company Law Reform in South Africa: From the 
Guidelines to the Companies Act 2008,’ 2010 Act Juridica, page 16. This article names the international reference 
team which included four experts from the USA, three from England and two from Australia and Canada. It is 
not surprising that some of the concepts that were adopted in the legislation were inspired by the corporate law 
systems of these countries. 
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Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986,43 Debtor in Possession in Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code of the United States of America44 and Voluntary Administration 
in Part 5.3 A of Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 are examples of flourishing pro-
creditor corporate rescue regimes.  
The contrary view is that corporate rescue regimes have a better rate of success 
where they are debtor-friendly, rather than creditor-friendly.45 This view is rejected 
in the UNCITRAL Guide46 in proposing the design of corporate reorganisation 
legislation. 
(ii) The wide statutory powers accorded to the business rescue practitioner47 and to the 
courts,48 respectively, and the impact of those powers on creditors’ rights and 
creditors’ voices.49 .  
 
1.4 Research Objectives and Key Questions  
The central objective of this study is to analyse the protection of creditors in South Africa’s 
business rescue process, as provided for in Sections 127-154 of the 2008 Act. This will involve 
a critical evaluation of the relevant provisions of the legislation and its judicial interpretation. 
Some international comparisons will be drawn to throw further light on this question. 
 
                                                          
43 Amended by the Enterprise Act 2002 and introduced as Schedule B1 in the Insolvency Act 1986. 
44 Although the American system appears, on paper, to be debtor-friendly, it has been argued that in practice it 
is a pro-creditor system.  
45 RW Harmer ‘Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim,’ (1997) 1 Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law, page 147.  
46 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), page 
15, footnote 3 which states that: 
“While the rate of successful reorganizations varies considerably between those regimes classified as 
creditor-friendly, research appears to suggest that the assumption that creditor-friendly regimes lead 
to fewer or less successful reorganizations than debtor-friendly regimes is not necessarily true.” 
47Sections 132 (1) (a), 134 (1)(a) (ii), 134 (1)(c), 136 (2), 137, 140 (3) (1) (i), 142 (4), 143 (5), 145 (5), 149 (1) (a) 
and 153 (1) (ii) of the 2008 Act. 
48 Sections 129 (5) (b), 130, 131, 132 (2) (a) (3), 133 (1) (b) (2), 136 (2) (b) (2A) (b), 137 (1) (b) (5) (6), 139 (1) (a) 
(1), 140 (2) (3) (a), 141 (2) (a) (i) (ii) (b) (i) (3), 142 (3) (b), 143 (4), 145 (6), 150 (5), 153 (1) (a) (ii) (b) (i) (bb) (6) (7) 
of the 2008 Act. 
49 In developed commercial jurisdictions, the business rescue process involves what amounts to a consensus 
between the company and creditors, particularly secured creditors. This has led to what is known in the UK as 
‘pre-pack administration’. See in this regard M Haywood ‘Pre-pack Administrations’, (2010) 23 (2), Inslv.Int., 17-
22; B Xie ‘Regulating Pre-package Administration-Complete Agenda’, (2011) 5 JBL 513; V Finch Corporate 
Insolvency Law, (2009) page 452; and L Qi ‘The Rise of Pre-Packaged Corporate Rescue on both sides of the 
Atlantic’, (2007) 20 (9) Insolv. Int. 129, 131. As to-packing reorganisation in the United States of America, 
seeBaird, D.G. and Rasmussen, R.K., ‘Control Rights, Priority Rights and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate 
Reorganisations’, (2001), 87, V.L.R, page 941, and Baird, D.G. and Rasmussen, R.K., The End of Bankruptcy, 
(2002), 55, S.L.R., page 786-788. 
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More specifically, this study seeks to: 
i. Determine the attitude of the court in relation to the initiation of business rescue 
proceedings in South Africa particularly since the enactment of the 2008 Act.  
ii. Explore the legal implication of the shift from the culture of liquidation (pro-
creditor) to a rescue culture (pro-debtor) during the operation of South Africa’s 
business rescue proceedings.  
iii. Suggest an optimal model for the protection of creditors’ rights in South Africa’s 
business rescue regime.  
 
These specific objectives will involve addressing the following questions:  
i. What is the attitude of the court in relation to the initiation of business rescue 
proceedings in South Africa particularly since the enactment of the 2008 Act?  
ii. What is the legal implication of the shift from the culture of liquidation (pro-
creditor) to a rescue culture (pro-debtor) during the operation of South Africa’s 
business rescue proceedings?  
iii. What is the optimum model that can guarantee for a protection of creditors’ rights 
in the South African business rescue procedure? 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This has been entirely a desktop study. The research materials were drawn from both primary 
and secondary sources. The primary data sources include legislation, case law and international 
instruments. Secondary sources included journal articles, textbooks, commercially-oriented 
newspapers and magazines, Government reports, dissertations and theses. 
 
Most of these materials were researched through the full text academic database system to 
which the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) subscribes. These include LexisNexis 
Butterworths (South Africa), Sabinet Legal, Hein online, Juta`s Unreported Judgements, 
JSTOR, Netlaw South Africa legislation, Saflii, Westlaw and Google Scholar. 
 
The research methodology included keyword searches inter alia of the following terms: 
business rescue in South Africa; judicial management; creditor protection; creditors under 
business rescue; creditors under judicial management; creditors; corporate rescue; creditor 




I was able to identify a large volume of case law from the contents and footnotes of journal 
articles, textbooks, theses and dissertations, and the full text of the relevant cases was 
downloaded from a full text database system.  The bibliographies of the aforementioned 
materials also provided extensive references to primary and secondary sources. 
 
The law library of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (Pietermaritzburg Campus) was my major 
physical research base.  
 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 
This chapter sets out the scope of the study by articulating specific research issues. The 
background to the study as well as an outline of the research problem will now be discussed. 
A justification for the study is presented, the objectives of the study as well as the associated 
research questions are laid down. This chapter sets out the structure of the thesis and its division 
into six chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 
Provides a comprehensive analysis of the concept of corporate rescue. This includes a critique 
of the underlying logic of the process in order to shed light on how the corporate rescue process 
can be used in an attempt to salvage a financially distressed company. Consideration is given 
to the influence of various interested parties in the process. Some alternative processes are 
discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the historical evolution of corporate 
rescue in South Africa.   
 
Chapter 3 
Examines the role of creditors in the initiation of business rescue proceedings in order to 
analyse the impact of the various commencement routes for business; vis-à-vis the rights of 
creditors and the role of creditors in the activation of the process. The competing objectives 
governing the initiation of business rescue proceedings are analysed in depth. The business 
rescue practitioner’s powers and their impact on creditors are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 
Assesses the manner in which the statutory provisions involve the creditors in the business 
rescue process and discusses their responsibilities. An analysis is provided of the impact of a 
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business rescue plan on creditors’ rights from the commencement of the process to its 
conclusion. The rights of creditors who dissent from the business rescue plan, as well as the 
rights of creditors in challenging the approved rescue plan and the legal provisions governing 
the principle of inappropriateness are critically analysed.  
 
Chapter 5 
Examines key issues in the business rescue process with particular regard to creditors’ rights. 
The issues analysed include the statutory moratorium and its impact on creditors’ rights and 
powers. The position of sureties and the impact of business rescue on suretyship agreements 
are analysed. The status of post-commencement financiers and their  ranking for payment under 
business rescue proceedings are critically examined. The concept of a binding offer in the 
context of business rescue is discussed in the context of the protection of creditors’ rights.  
 
Chapter 6 
Concludes the study with a summary of the research findings and offers answers to the central 
questions posed in the thesis. This chapter indicates the contribution of the study to knowledge 
and to the literature on this topic. Finally, the chapter proposes reforms to South Africa’s 






DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK OF THE CORPORATE RESCUE MECHANISM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A significant number of countries have accorded great importance to corporate rescue in the 
reform of their companies’ legislation, regulations and policies. The major impetus for reform 
is recognition that, from a macro and a micro-economic viewpoint, and from a societal point 
of view, the solvent survival of financially struggling companies is preferable to their 
liquidation.50 This broad policy must however take account of the interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders. 
  
This chapter provides an overview of corporate rescue and its underlying logic and objectives 
so as to shed light on the use of corporate rescue process in the attempted salvage of a 
financially distressed company and the influence of interested parties throughout the process. 
This chapter will also identify alternative approaches in this regard. Lastly, this chapter will 
discuss the evolution of corporate rescue legislation in South Africa to the present day.   
 
2.2 A History of Corporate Rescue 
Historically, South Africa’s companies legislation was based on and remains significantly 
influenced by English company law, but its current corporate rescue legislation has features 
that in some respects resemble a reorganisation under Chapter 11 in the USA. The historical 
outline provided in this chapter is in the main limited to South Africa and England..   
 
In past eras, the failure to pay a debt when it fell due was considered to be an criminal 
infraction,51 punishable in some jurisdictions with imprisonment.52 A defaulting debtor was 
regarded as a thief and the failure to pay was categorised as a felony. England, for instance, 
                                                          
50 See DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others (3878/2013) [2013] ZAKZPHC 56; para 1 where 
Gorven J said:  
“Goods and services are the lifeblood of an economy. Business entities, in providing goods and 
services, generate this lifeblood. Regulatory provisions are geared to assist the lifeblood to flow as 
efficiently as possible. Companies are the main business entities which provide the goods and services 
in the South African economy”. 
51 V Finch Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd ed (2009) page 9. 
52 M Hunter ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture,’ 1999 J.B.L., page 494. The Debtors Act 1869 in 
England provided for the imprisonment of defaulting debtors. The most severe legislative regime was the 
Napoleonic Commercial Code of 1807 which treated debtors as criminals, even if default was not fraudulent, 
and its focus was on the repayment of debt. 
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which was one of the first jurisdictions to enact insolvency legislation, used to imprison people 
who failed to pay their debts.53 Insolvency laws were originally draconian, but started to ease 
around the beginning of the eighteenth century when the concept of rescue gained acceptance. 
In England, the industrial revolution resulted in a rapid growth of commerce, and lending and 
borrowing in the business world became the norm. Bankruptcy legislation enacted in 1825 to 
deal with insolvency matters gave priority to creditors’ interests, and the legal protection 
afforded to creditors remains to this day a feature of current English corporate rescue 
legislation,54 inter alia by allowing creditors a large measure of control of the rescue process. 
 
Chapter 11 of the USA legislation, which has been very influential in the enactment or reform 
of various countries’ corporate rescue legislation, originated in the crisis in that country`s 
railroad sector in the 19th century.55 Each creditor held a security interest in a certain segment 
of a railway line which, if sold alone, was worthless; hence, it was prudent for the creditors to 
act collectively to save the business rather than liquidate it.  
 
The particular circumstance that inspired Chapter 11 is seldom relevant today,56 but modern 
variants of such circumstances may well be. For example, a software application, invented and 
owned by an information technology corporation that is on the verge of financial failure could 
be worth more if sold to another company in the same line of business than if the software were 
to remain with its current, struggling owner. The selling company could then use the proceeds 
to pay creditors and then be wound up or, if there was a surplus after the sale, the company 
could continue with other aspects of its business.57 In the modern era, the grouping of a 
company’s creditors in order to sell its property is seldom necessary and this is one reason for 
the increased popularity of so-called “pre-packing” by financially struggling companies, 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 
                                                          
53 Under the Bankruptcy Act 1542.  
54Efforts to reform the United Kingdom corporate reorganisation legislation, such as amendments to the 
Insolvency Act of 1986 and the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2002 governing administration, receivership and 
company voluntary arrangement, encountered fierce opposition. 
55 This was called Federal equity consent receivership. See DG Baird and RK Rasmussen’ Boyd’s Legacy and 
Blackstone’s Ghost’, (1999) 393 Sup. Ct. Rev. pages 402–406 and D Skeel Debt`s Dominion: A History of 
Bankruptcy Law in America (2001), pages 48-69.  
56 G McCormack ‘Corporate Rescue Law in Singapore and the Appropriateness of Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code as a Model,’ (2008) 20, SAcLJ, page 398. 
57 See McCormack ‘Corporate Rescue Law in Singapore and the Appropriateness of Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code as a Model,’ (2008) 20 SAcLJ, page 399. 
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In the history of the development of corporate rescue, the culture of  the particular jurisdiction 
plays a significant role in its conception, form and implementation. In a country such as China, 
with its complex political, economic and social structure,58 a debt could pass from generation 
to generation. This notion had its roots in Confucian theory.59 On the basis of that model and 
the way of life of its people, the country did not have insolvency legislation, let alone rescue 
provisions.60 The reluctance to enact insolvency legislation was also influenced by the form of 
ownership of the means of production in China prior to its economic reforms.61 China is, 
therefore, a striking example of the role played by culture in a corporate rescue statute. 
 
The literature indicates that, under influence of their particular legal systems, most countries in 
East Asia have been unenthusiastic about adopting any of the international models of 
insolvency legislation.62 Instead, what occurs in that part of the world is mere debt 
rescheduling, with no impact on the mode of operation of the business entity.63 Thus, even if a 
company recovers from financial distress,  the probability of its collapsing in the future is high 
because the underlying structural causes have not been addressed. In particular, the 
management of the company, whose shortcomings are often responsible for its financial plight, 
remains unreformed.  
 
The lesson to be learned is that, in devising corporate rescue legislation, a jurisdiction should 
take account of the country’s unique culture, history and economic milieu.64 Corporate rescue 
                                                          
58 J Fan and J Wang Bankruptcy Law. (2008), page 26.  
59 R Parry et al (eds) China`s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: Context, Interpretation and Application (2010), 
page 4. Confucian theory deals with morality and values human beings above property; it is effectively a religion 
for its disciples.  
60 A Tang Insolvency in Hong Kong, Hong Kong (2005) para 1.07. 
61 Prior to the 21st century. China established itself as a socialist state; its market economy was a later 
development. During that earlier epoch the working class controlled the machinery of the government and 
bankruptcy involving the retrenchment of employees was unthinkable. H Zhang ‘Long March towards an China 
and Entirely New Bankruptcy and Corporate Rescue Legal Framework in China,’ (2012) 27 (4), J.I.B.L.R. page 167 
observes that all the enterprises in China at that time were state owned and that winding up a distressed 
corporation would be tantamount to admitting that the state was insolvent.  
62 MJ Blazic ‘In Search for Rescue Culture: A Review of the Australian Part 5.3A Legislation’, (2010), SBS HDR 
Student Conference Paper 8, page 12 available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/sbshdr/2010/papers/8  accessed on 
11.05.2014. 
63 L Vassiliou `The Restructuring Revolution in the Asia-Pacific Region,’ (2006), Restructuring and Insolvency 
Guide, page 24. 
64 M Yang and X Li ‘The History of Corporate Rescue in the UK,’ (2012) 8 (13) Asian Social Science, page 23;  H 
Rajak and J Henning, ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999) 116 S. African L.J. page 269. 
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legislation cannot be imposed in disregard of these influences.65 It is, moreover, vital for the 
given jurisdiction to take account of the impact on business of the technological revolution that 
has swept the world.  Failure to take cognisance of these factors will impact adversely on any 
attempt to introduce appropriate corporate rescue legislation.66  
 
2.3 The Evolution of Corporate Rescue  
In the past few decades, a corporate rescue culture has taken root in a number of jurisdictions 
across the world67 often under influence of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 in the USA, 
incorporating the well-known Chapter 11.  
 
South Africa is amongst the jurisdictions that began giving attention to the reform of its 
corporate rescue legislation around this time. Corporate rescue has become the subject of 
extensive academic debate.68 Major issues in the scholarly literature are the question of what 
constitutes “rescue”, the mode of the attempted rescue operation, and how the interests of the 
affected parties should be protected.69 Changes to corporate insolvency law have been 
influenced by advancements in technology, economic reforms, the prospering of the service 
sector in national economies, and the impact of globalisation.70 
 
                                                          
65 The attempt to do has been dubbed “parachuting”;  N Martin `The Role of History and Culture in Developing 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation’, (2005) 28 (1) Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. page 
12. 
66 RW Harmer `Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim,’ (1997) 23 BJIL page 140. 
67 In South Africa, the Companies Act 71 of 2008, US Chapter 11, Australia (Part 5.3 ) German Isolvenzordnung, 
Belgium Concordat Judiciaire, Finnish Saneerauslaki, The UK Enterprise Act 2002, Netherlands (Act of November 
24, 2004), Spain (Ley Concursal 22/2003), Italy (Decreto-legge 35/2005 and Legge 80/2005), France (Act of July 
26, 2005). This trend reached the Asia-Pacific geographical region, see Blazic, M.J., In Search for Rescue Culture: 
A Review of the Australian Part 5.3A Legislation, (2010), SBS HDR Student Conference Paper 8 available at 
http://ro.uow.edu.au/sbshdr/2010/papers/8 accessed on 27.04.2015 
68 Kloppers, P., `Judicial Management-A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?,’ (1999), 10 
Stellenbosch LR, page 368, Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African 
L.J. page 268 , Burdett, D.A., ‘The Introduction of a Truly Unified Insolvency Act: Ancillary Matters,’ PART 4 C, 
(2002), page 48-49, Keay, A., `To Unify or not to Unify Insolvency Legislation: International Experience and the 
Latest South African Proposal,’ (1999), De Jure 73-74 
69 Kloppers, P., ‘Judicial Management - A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform’, (2010) 10 
Stellenbosch L. Rev. 423; Sandra, F., ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002,’ (2004), 67 (2) MLR 
page 248; Phillips, M. and Goldring, J., ‘Rescue and Reconstruction’, (2002), Insolvency Intelligence, London, 
HMSO, page 75 and 76; and Baird, G.D. and Rasmussen, R.K., `The End of Bankruptcy,’ (2002) 55, Stan L Rev, 
page 758. 
70 Graham, D.A., ‘A Dark and Neglected Subject: Landmarks in the Reform of English Insolvency Law,’ (2002), 




The burgeoning practice of attempted corporate rescue has impacted on the behaviour of other 
players. For instance, creditors usually no longer sit idly by when a company shows signs of 
increasing financial distress; but intervene at an early stage to try to protect their interests.71 
Early action gives creditors the option of injecting funds, before it is too late, to assist the 
company if they think it commercially wise to do so.72  
 
The issue of funding in relation to a company showing signs of financial distress is often of 
paramount importance73 and critical to its survival. It has been noted that the lack of funds to 
facilitate the revival of a financially distressed company often renders a corporate rescue 
attempt futile, and reduces it to mere academic theory.74 Business rescue legislation invariably 
tries to encourage such funding.75 The problem that struggling companies generally have 
inadequate security to offer potential lenders76 is addressed by statutory provisions that 
facilitate and give special protection to post-commencement finance,77 and this encourages 
interested parties to try to assist in salvaging the company, rather than simply scrambling to 
protect their interests in anticipation of liquidation.78  
 
In the modern era, the monitoring of commercial debt by institutions such as credit insurance 
firms, debt collectors and credit management firms plays an important role in identifying 
financial distress before it becomes overwhelming. Banks79 have specialised departments that 
monitor their debtors` financial and business affairs and can provide expert assistance. In short, 
banks and other financial institutions now embrace and contribute to a corporate rescue culture.  
  
                                                          
71 Finch, V., ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law,’ (2008), 68 M.L.R, 713. 
72 But of course not without addressing managerial deficiency , fraud or corruption 
73 Martin, N., `The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of 
Legal Transplantation, (2005) 28 (1) Int’l & Comp .L. Rev., page 55 and R3`s Ninth Survey (2001). 
74 Hunter, M., ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture,’ (1999), J.B.L., page 512 
75 Section 128 (1) (f) (i) and (ii) of the 2008 Act defines “financially distressed”.  
76 McKnight, A., `The Reform of Corporate Insolvency Law in Great Britain-The Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law,’(2002), 17(11), JIBL, page 328 
77 Post-commencement finance is accorded preference; see s 135 of the 2008 Act. 
78 In this regard ex ante approach yields better results than an ex post approach;  Finch, V., ‘Corporate Rescue in 
a World of Debt,’(2008), 8, JBL, page 758 
79 Wood, P.R., Law and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency,’ 2nd Edition, 




2.4 The Concept of Corporate Rescue 
2.4.1 Corporate Rescue 
There is now an extensive scholarly literature regarding a ‘rescue culture’80 in relation to 
corporate entities, and there is evidence that a country’s legislature, judiciary, financial 
institutions and government departments all now recognise the importance of trying to salvage 
entities that are in financial distress, rather than making liquidation the knee-jerk response.  
 
“It is a multi-aspect concept, having both a positive and protective role, and a 
corrective and a punitive role. On one level, it manifests itself by legislative and 
judicial policies, directed to the more benevolent treatment of insolvent persons, 
whether they be individuals or corporations, and at the same time to a more draconian 
treatment of true economic delinquents. On another level, it entails the adoption of a 
general rule for the construction of statutes, which is deliberately inclined towards the 
giving of a positive and socially profitable meaning (rather than a negative or socially 
destructive meaning), to the statutes of social-economic import. Of such statutes, 
insolvency legislation may justly be regarded as the paramount example.” 81 
[Emphasis supplied] 
 
It is now generally accepted that rescuing a corporate entity extends further than merely 
securing the survival of the company and should take account of the interests of other affected 
players. An influential inquiry into insolvency law and practice in England and Wales 
(culminating in the Cork Report) noted that: 
 
“The business or commercial insolvent presents an entirely different picture. The 
failure of such an insolvent has wider repercussions, not only upon those intimately 
concerned with the conduct of the business, such as directors, shareholders and 
                                                          
80 V Finch Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd ed (2009 ) page 245-251:  R Parry ‘United 
Kingdom: Administrative Receivership and Administration’ in  Broc, GK and Parry, R, (Editors) Corporate Rescue: 
An Overview of Recent Development from Selected Countries in Europe, Hague, Kluwel Law International, (2004) 
page 145: Harmer `Comparison of Trends in National Law: The Pacific Rim,’ (1973) 23 BJIL page 143-148: I 
Fletcher and G Squires ‘Nortel in the Court of Appeal - How Damaging is the Result to the Wider Interests of the 
Rescue Culture? Part 1,’ (2012) 25(5) Insolv.Int. page 78; Fletcher and Squires ‘Nortel in the Court of Appeal - 
How Damaging is the Result to the Wider Interests of the Rescue Culture Part 2,’ (2012) 25(6) Insolv.Int. page 93 
and M Blazic ‘In Search of a Corporate Rescue Culture: A Review of the Australian Part 5.3A Legislation’ (2010) 
SBS HDR Student Conference Paper 8, page 6, available at http://ro.ouw.edu.au/sbshdr/2010/papers/8 
accessed on 12.01.2013. 
81 Hunter ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture,’ (1999) J.B.L. page 498. 
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employees, but on other interests, such as suppliers, etc. The effect of failure upon 
the realisable value of stock, plant and goodwill can be disastrous, and not infrequently 
there is a general feeling of desperation which needs to be resolved. A modern 
manifestation of this is a sit-in by workers seeking by their physical presence to ensure 
that their jobs will not be lost, by having some new organisation to carry on the 
business.”82 [Emphasis supplied] 
 
The Review Committee noted as follows the broader dimensions of rescuing a struggling 
company:  
 
“We believe that a concern for the livelihood and well-being of those dependent upon 
an enterprise which may well be the lifeblood of a whole town or even a region, is a 
legitimate factor to which a modern law of insolvency must have regard. The chain 
reaction consequent upon any given failure can potentially be so disastrous to 
creditors, employees and the community that it must not be overlooked.”83 [Emphasis 
supplied] 
 
These dimensions of corporate rescue are now generally acknowledged. The corollaries include 
the need to create a mechanism for corporate rescue in which creditors will be have a strong 
incentive to participate. As with other jurisdictions, South Africa recognises the broad 
economic and social benefits of restoring financially distressed companies to solvency and 
viability in a way that balances the rights and interests of a broad range of stakeholders.84  
 
In South Africa, the successful rescue of a financially distressed company involves the 
company’s creditors, the business rescue practitioner and, potentially, the High Court. 
 
2.4.2 Operation of Corporate Rescue   
The attempted rescue of a financially distressed company can proceed formally (that is to say, 
in a process governed by legislation) or informally, where the process is initiated voluntarily 
                                                          
82 United Kingdom Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, ‘Cork Report’, (1982)  
para 203.  
83 United Kingdom Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, ‘Cork Report’, (1982)  para 
204. 
84 Section 7 (d) and (k) of the 2008 Act. 
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by the company and proceeds outside of any legislative framework. .85 An informal process, 
based on consensus, is generally regarded as preferable and, internationally, has achieved some 
notable successes.86 In South Africa, the informal process is generally regarded as the norm87 
although, in the nature of things, no reliable statistics exist. 
 
2.4.2.1 Informal Corporate Rescue Procedure 
An informal business rescue can be effected entirely outside of a legislative regime by way of 
agreement between a company and its creditors.88 The process may involve assistance from 
corporate rescue experts.89 Such an informal process can involve a change in the company’s 
management, the revision of credit arrangements, a scaling down of the company’s operations, 
the injection of funds, or a combination of these.90 An informal rescue tends to preserve a 
company`s business reputation and avoids the stigma of a statutory rescue that ensues even 
where the rescue was successful.91 An informal rescue avoids the delays and costs of legal 
proceedings.92 An informal process is also very flexible.93 Even a statutory business rescue 
regime should be flexible enough to accommodate informal negotiations between the affected 
parties.94  
 
An attempted business rescue, whether formal or informal, carries no guarantee of success. 
Informal rescue is particularly susceptible to failure because the terms of the rescue plan require 
the agreement of all the creditors (except those who allow their claims to be bought out by 
other, assenting creditors) and this is often difficult to achieve. The involvement of independent 
expert negotiators or mediators may improve the prospects of success. Throughout the process, 
                                                          
85 PR Wood Law and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd ed (2007) page 
31. 
86 The informal process has enabled the rescue of large corporations such as Queens Moat (now QMH UK Ltd 
which was bought by Goldman Sachs in 2005).,  
87 DA Burdette `Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model 
for South Africa (Part 1)’, (2004) 16 S.Afr.Mercantile L.J. page 252. 
88 In England the situation is somewhat different in that the Financial Service Authority acts as a broker by 
attempting to convince reluctant parties to agree to attempt to rescue the company. This can be done via the 
Informal mechanism dubbed “the London Approach”. 
89 Such as Turnaround expert, Business Rescue Practitioner, Insolvency Practitioner or even Accountant Firm. 
90 V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd ed (2009) page 25. 
91 Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd ed (2007). 
92 D Brown, Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, Chichester (1996), page 11. 
93 Avoiding the involvement of the court allows the procedure to be more flexible and less adversarial, see, 
UNCITRAL Insolvency Guide (2005), para. 32. 
94 Finch, `Corporate Rescue in the World of Debt,’ (2008) 8 J.B.L page 776. 
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there is a risk that a dissenting creditor may apply to court for the liquidation of the company.95 
But creditors are likely to accept an informal rescue plan if they will or may derive a greater or 
more certain benefit than from the company’s immediate liquidation.96 One of the downsides 
of an informal rescue is that misconduct on the part of the company’s incumbent directors 
(which may be the root cause of the company’s woes) may be glossed over. Consequently, 
incompetent or unscrupulous directors who may caused the company’s difficulties in the first 
place may remain in office; there may then be a significant risk that the company’s financial 
problems will reoccur.    
 
2.4.2.2 Formal Corporate Rescue Procedure 
A formal corporate rescue process will be laid down in the companies or insolvency or 
corporate rescue statute of the particular jurisdiction. Commonly, a key aspect of the formal 
process is that once a rescue plan has been duly approved, it binds all parties, even those who 
have not assented to the plan, thereby solving the problem that would arise where the 
unanimous consent of creditors could not be obtained. Usually, the formal process allows 
companies a specific period of time to arrange their affairs and formalise the plan, under a 
temporary immunity from litigation by creditors seeking to prove and enforce their claims.97 
 
The commencement of a formal rescue process may, but does not in all jurisdictions, require 
an application to court, which of course adds to the costs of the process and may prolong it. In 
some jurisdictions the involvement of the court extends to acting as the supervisor of the rescue 
process.98 An over-reliance on the courts can be a factor in the failure of some corporate rescue 
processes.99  On the other hand, where there is no involvement by the courts, the credibility of 
the process may be diminished, with an increased risk that creditors may, from the outset, 
withhold consent to the process.100 Arguably, the optimal rescue model is one in which the 
                                                          
95 Burdette, `Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model for 
South Africa (Part 1)’, (2004) 16 S.Afr.Mercantile L.J. page 252. 
96 UNICTRAL Insolvency Guide, (2005), para 52. 
97 Most legislative models of business rescue that follow the UNICTRAL insolvency Guide (2005) provide for an 
automatic moratorium on creditors’ claims for the duration of the formal business rescue process. 
98 In South Africa’s now-repealed a judicial management process for corporate rescue, the Master of the High 
Court acted as supervisor of the process. 
99 The failure of South Africa`s now-repealed judicial management procedure has been attributed, inter alia, to 
excessive court involvement in the process. 
100 Thus, minor, unsecured creditors might take the view that the rescue process does not adequately protect 
their interests; see P Kloopers, ‘Judicial Management Reform -Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue’ (2001) 13 S. 
Afr. Mercantile L.J, page 368. 
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intervention of the court is required only to protect the parties’ interests when an infringement 
is threatened.101   
 
A formal rescue process tends to improve the protection accorded to unsecured creditors who 
may have been vulnerable in an informal rescue. The statutory protection may give unsecured 
creditors bargaining power to put forward demands to their advantage, thereby increasing the 
prospects of the attempted rescue going ahead on the requisite consensual basis. On the other 
hand, since secured creditors are invariably accorded a more substantial voting interest than 
unsecured creditors, the secured creditors tend to dominate the process.  
 
Usually, a legislative rescue procedure recognises and protects unsecured creditors by giving 
them the right to vote on the terms of the proposed rescue plan. In this way, a formal corporate 
rescue process attempts to recognise the rights of all creditors, even those with relatively small 
claims against the company.  
 
2.4.2.3 Analysis of Formal and Informal Corporate Rescue Procedures 
Formal and informal modes of corporate rescue have a common objective – to restore the 
financially distressed company to viability. If this can be achieved, all parties with an interest 
in the company will almost certainly be better off than they would have been if the company 
had been immediately liquidated.102 As was noted earlier, a successful outcome requires a bona 
fide effort by and the co-operation of all affected parties, particularly the company’s 
creditors,103 and often involves some compromise of creditors’ claims.  
 
The overall process of corporate rescue tends to be complex, not least because it involves 
parties who may only have conflicting interests vis-à-vis the company and who may have 
different views on what would qualify as a successful rescue of the particular company.104 
Usually, the affected parties are the company’s shareholders, creditors, directors, and 
employees. Indeed, society at large may be an affected party, for example, where the company 
is a major employer in its geographical area and its failure would impact an entire region. The 
                                                          
101 PG Dal Ponand L Gig, ‘A Principled Justification for Business Rescue laws: A Comparative Perspective (Part I),’ 
(1996) 5 (1) IIRV, page 76. 
102 N Martin, ‘The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of 
Legal Transplantation’, (2005) 28 (1) Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. page 2.  
103 R Tomasic, ‘Creditor Participation in Insolvency Proceedings-Towards the Adoption of International 
Standards,’ (2006) 14 ILJ page 184. 
104 Finch. ‘Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue,’ (2005) 25 Legal Stud. page 387. 
26 
 
company’s major creditors are usually its bankers and trade suppliers, and they are likely to be 
the first to experience the impact of the company`s financial distress by way of the non-
payment or late payment of debts due to them.  
 
Creditors always see the liquidation of a company that is unable to pay its debts as an option, 
in which they can make application to court for the company to be wound up as insolvent and 
then prove their claims and hope for that their claim, or at least part of it, will be paid in the 
course of the process. By contrast, the company’s directors will probably try to persuade the 
creditors to reschedule or compromise their debts, so that they can continue in office. The 
employees of the company have a strong incentive to preserve the company’s existence and 
safeguard their jobs and their income. The general public may lose twice from the extinction 
of a company, first as consumers of its goods or services and secondly as dependants of the 
company’s employees. All these parties will thus gain or lose to varying degrees from the 
rescue or failure of the company.  
 
Compromise is usually a component of business rescue.105 Thus, for example, creditors may 
agree to accept part-payment in full satisfaction of their claims in order to preserve the company 
as a customer.  
 
An optimal approach needs to be adopted in any attempt to salvage a distressed company.106 
This usually entails a hybrid of formal and informal methods. In other words, the company and 
the creditors must follow the procedure laid down in the legislation, but at the same time must 
be flexible enough to include any informal means107 that is not inconsistent with the legislation. 
Such a hybrid approach requires a high level of expertise on the part of the rescue practitioner 
and the goodwill of creditors. Some jurisdictions have already started to institutionalise a 
hybrid approach, with promising results.108 
 
                                                          
105 Tomasic, R., `Creditors Participation in Insolvency Proceedings-Towards the Adoption of International 
Standards,’ (2006), 14, Insolvency Law Journal, page 179. 
106 Martin `The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal 
Transplantation’, (2005) 28 (1) Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. page 148. 
107 This approach can be regulated by agreements between the interested parties that are not inconsistent with 
the applicable legislation.  
108 The UK`s pre-package administration is a mixture of formal and informal rescue mechanism, see Wood., Law 
and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd ed (2007) page 32. 
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2.5 Reasons for Corporate Failure  
Internal deficiencies and pressures from external factors are amongst the causes of company 
failure.109 Managerial inefficiency, which is considered an internal deficiency, includes 
imprudent or defective accounting, a lack of accountability, fraud, inappropriate planning, the 
production of substandard products, an excessive number of employees, a lack of innovative 
ideas and a low usage of technology.110 Endemic problems of this nature can threaten the 
viability of the company. Where such problems become evident, immediate action is required, 
usually including an independent audit of the company`s financial affairs in order to identify 
the nature, origin and seriousness of the problem. Other measure may include hiring an outside 
consultant to assess the company’s human resources and an independent assessment of the 
quality of its products and services. 
 
Currently, most companies legislation requires registered companies to make their solvency 
status publicly available on an annual basis,111 and this is therefore a source of information 
readily available to a company’s creditors. Where managerial error is concerned, not all poor 
decision-making can be branded as a managerial deficiency. Entrepreneurial risk-taking is of 
the essence of business; some risks pay dividends, others turn out poorly. From a legal point 
of view, directors usually enjoy considerable protection from such risk-taking in terms of a 
statutory or common law business judgement rule. 
 
External factors can be responsible for or contribute to a company’s financial distress. Such 
factors include the instability of the global financial system, loss of markets, economic 
recession and the withdrawal or tightening of credit facilities.112 According to the traditional 
macroeconomic theory of business cycles, such negative influences are inevitable over a period 
of time. Thus, there are cycles of general prosperity and financial growth, followed by a 
                                                          
109 Finch Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd ed (2009) page 152. This conclusion is 
supported by a study in South Africa by M Pretorius ‘Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, 
Business Rescue Status Quo Report Final Report’, (30 March 2015), page 22 available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/files/4714/2866/7900/Report_Number_3_ammended_30032015.pdf accessed on 11 
May 2014. This study records statistical results for the main reasons for a company’s financial failure, as follows. 
Pressure from creditors, thirty six percent, profitability issues, twenty percent; efficiency and professionalism of 
management, thirteen percent and unique circumstances ten per cent.  
110 The R3 Twelfth Survey, page 26. It is reported that sixty three percent of European corporate failures resulted 
from normal entrepreneurship risks; see R Meuwissen,et al Classification and Analysis of Major European 
Business Failures(2005).. 
111 The objective of such legislation is to promote transparency and accountability; cf Chapter 3 Part C and D of 
the 2008 Act. 
112 Bank of England, Financial Stability Report Issue 24 (2008). 
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widespread decline.113 The last major negative period in the international business cycle was 
the 2007/8 credit crisis.114 Such cyclical downturns are beyond the control of even the most 
capable company directors. During this particular crisis, some governments bailed out key 
companies115 to prevent a collapse that would have negatively impacted society and the broad 
economy. 
 
Government`s policies may contribute to the corporate failure. High corporate tax can be a 
factor, particularly where unexpected and unbudgeted additional assessments to tax are 
suddenly received, as can government policies aimed at suppressing certain industries, such 
policies aimed at discouraging cigarette smoking.116 However, government policies aimed at 
enhancing the health of the populace generally enjoy popular support, even where the policies 
adversely impact particular industries.117  
 
When a corporate entity fails, the following are amongst the possible adverse consequences 
beyond the impact on the company itself: a decline in confidence in the business sector; 
concerns regarding the creditworthiness of other similar companies; disruption to the supply 
chain which may impact on small suppliers; inconvenience to consumers; the loss of jobs with 
consequential financial hardship to communities that depended on the particular company; the 
impoverishment of a local community heavily dependent on the company; the breaking-up of 
teams of expertise at all levels in the company from the board of directors down.118 These 
consequences need to be borne in mind when weighing the expense of an attempt at business 
rescue.119 Changes to the company’s mode of operation and its structure are to be expected, as 
are amendments to agreements with suppliers.120  
 
                                                          
113 Hubbard and O`Brien, Macroeconomics, 2nd ed (2008) chapter 9. 
114 Other notable global economic crises were those in 1973-1974 and 1979-1981 which were caused by sharply 
rising oil prices, leading to the failure of number of companies.  
115 These included the Goldman Sachs Group, General Motors Corporation and Chrysler LLC in the USA, the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, and Halifax Bank of Scotland in United Kingdom and Morgan Stanley in Japan. 
116 Finch Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd ed (2009) page 164. 
117 Ministries of Health in many countries discourage the consumption of fast foods, and this impacts negatively 
on companies producing or marketing such products. The prohibition on the advertising of tobacco products 
naturally impacts adversely on companies in this industry and on the tobacco farming industry. 
118 Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd ed (2009) page 145. 
119 A Belcher Corporate Rescue (1997) chapter 3. 
120 Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African L.J. page 277 
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2.5.1 Identifying a Distressed Company 
There are two common early symptoms of a company in financial distress and in need of 
rescue.121 The first is the company’s inability to pay its debts as they fall due. The second is 
actual insolvency, where the value of the company’s aggregate liabilities exceeds the aggregate 
value of its assets.122 The former symptom often becomes manifest well before the latter, in 
that creditors will be immediately aware of the non-payment or late payment of their claims. 
The second symptom may not be immediately apparent to outside parties; however, the first 
symptom, in and of itself, constitutes a recognised form of insolvency, namely, commercial 
insolvency.123  
 
The board of directors is usually the first party to become aware that the company is in financial 
distress and, from that juncture, embarking on corporate rescue ought to be an option 
uppermost in their minds. An early response from the board is a key factor in a successful 
rescue.  
 
Embarking on a formal process of corporate rescue is not appropriate if the company has passed 
the point of no return and is non-viable and unsalvageable.124 In Powdrill v Watson125 the 
House of Lords said that only viable companies should be permitted to embark on rescue 
procedures.126  The threshold requirement for entry into a formal business rescue is whether 
the company is economically viable.127 If such viability is disputed by an interested party, it 
will fall to the court to determine whether viability and any other statutory criteria for entry 
                                                          
121 It is however difficult to pinpoint the juncture at which a company becomes factually insolvent; see the Report 
of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice-Cmnd 8558 (1982) paragraph 205.  
122 These two tests are commonly referred to respectively as the cash flow test and balance sheet test; see P 
Okoli ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for a Delicate Balancing Act’ (2012) 23(2) 
I.C.C.L.R. page 62. It has been suggested that a rescue process ought to be commenced immediately financial 
distress becomes apparent on the basis of either the balance sheet or the cash flow aspect. 
123 RM Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 4th ed (2011). Chapter 4 and A Keay. and P Walton 
Insolvency Law Corporate and Personal, 2nd ed(2008) chapter 2. 
124 Martin, `The Role of History and Culture in Developing Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal 
Transplantation, (2005) 28 (1) Int’l & Comp.L.Rev. page 10, and UNICTRAL para 52 endorses the criterion of a 
reasonable prospect of the company’s survival. To the same effect, see The Insolvency Service, A Review of 
Company Rescue and Business Construction Mechanism: Report by the Review Group,  HMSO (2000) para 198(j). 
125 [1995] 2 A.C. 394 (HL). 
126 JJ White, `Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit,’ (2004) 12(1) ABILR page 139; JJ White `Does Chapter 11 
Save Economically Inefficient Firms,’ (1994) 72(3) Wash U LQ, page 1319.  
127 HMSO The Insolvency Service: A Review of Company Rescue and Business Construction Mechanism: Report 
by the Review Group (2000) para 24. 
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into the business rescue process have been satisfied, and the inquiry will be premised on the 
desirability of rescuing financially distressed companies where this is reasonably possible.128  
 
It is the domain of the legislature to craft the statutory provisions governing corporate rescue 
and to lay down clear and practicable criteria to differentiate between potentially viable 
companies that should be allowed to attempt corporate rescue and those that fail the threshold 
criteria in this regard. 
  
2.6 Control of a Company during the Rescue Process 
Some statutory regimes provide for the company to remain under the managerial control of the 
incumbent board of directors whilst business rescue is in process; others place the company 
under the control of the business rescue practitioner. This is significant distinction.129 Empirical 
studies do not yet persuasively indicate which of the two models yields the better outcome.130 
The two dominant jurisdictions in corporate rescue regimes, England and the USA, differ in 
this regard. The English corporate rescue model emphasises the dominance of the practitioner, 
whilst the USA favours the incumbent management of the distressed company retaining 
managerial control during the rescue processes. 
 
The formal business rescue regime of many jurisdictions couples the appointment of a business 
rescue practitioner with the removal from office of the company’s board of directors.131 The 
underlying assumption is that the company’s management must have been primarily or at least 
significantly responsible for its financial woes and that the appointed business rescue 
practitioner ought to have free rein to do whatever is necessary to rescue the company. A further 
factor may be a tacit underlying concern that, if they were to remain in office, the incumbent 
directors would abuse the business rescue process to their own advantage. A further concern is 
that the company’s creditors, particularly the secured creditors, have the dominant voice in the 
                                                          
128 Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue Culture,’ (1999) J.B.L. page 512. 
129 Yang and Li, ‘The History of Corporate Rescue in the UK,’ (2012) 8(13) Asian Social Science page 23. 
130 Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, 3rd ed(2005) at page 328, argue that it is illogical to leave the 
incumbent management in control and expect the company to recover; Kloppers, ‘Judicial Management Reform 
-Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue’ (2001) 13 S. Afr. Mercantile L.J.page 368, states that it would be difficult to 
persuade creditors to defer payment of their claims while an attempted rescue is in process if they see that the 
same management is still in control. See also B Carruthers and T Halliday Rescuing Business: The Making of 
Corporate Bankruptcy Law in England and the United States (1998) at page 246.  
131 Inter alia Australia, Tanzania, Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda. 
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choice and appointment of a business rescue practitioner132 who may consequently feel 
beholden to them and may promote a business rescue plan that focuses on protecting the 
interests of the creditors to the detriment of other affected parties and without a central focus 
on salvaging the company.133  
 
There is, however, a clear case to be made for a business rescue process that retains and does 
not totally dispense with the institutional wisdom of the incumbent directors who, for all their 
shortcomings, at least know how the company’s business is run.134 A rescue practitioner who 
takes over the management of the business “cold” may find that even maintaining the routine 
day-to-day running of the company’s business is problematic, let alone undertaking major 
reorganisation or restructuring. Arguably, the incumbent directors have much to gain from a 
successful rescue of the company and are likely to make a genuine effort to secure such a result; 
by contrast, the business rescue practitioner will probably have earned a substantial fee even if 
the attempted rescue fails and the company goes into liquidation.135  
 
In short, the company’s directors, no less than its employees, will usually have a strong 
incentive to try to save the company and thereby save their positions. This is borne out by the 
fact that the reorganisation process under Chapter 11 in the USA is usually initiated by the 
directors of financially distressed companies.136 There are, of course, many more causes of 
corporate financial distress than directorial incompetence or mismanagement, and it would be 
wrong to assume that the directors are always primarily to blame.137 General market forces and 
economic downturns are outside the control of the directors. 
 
The optimal model of business rescue thus seems to be one that retains the incumbent board of 
directors, but puts the directors under the overarching control of the business rescue practitioner 
                                                          
132 S Frisby, ‘Report on Insolvency Outcomes’, A paper presented to the Insolvency Service, available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk accessed on 3.04.2014. 
133 J Day and P Taylor, ` Financial Distress in Small Firms: The Role Played by Debt Covenants and other Monitoring 
Devices’ (2001) 3 Insolvency Law page 110. 
134 Okoli, ‘Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Realities and the Need for a Delicate Balancing Act’ (2012) 
23(2) I.C.C.L.R. page 64. 
135 A tardy initiation of the rescue process is a major contributory factor to ultimate liquidation; see Yang, M. 
and Li, X., ‘The History of Corporate Rescue in the UK,’ (2012), 8 (13)Asian Social Science, page 23 
136 Wood, P.R., Law and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd Edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, (2007), page 42. 
137 Goode, R., Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law,  3rd Edition, Thomson (2005) page 328  
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with the power of summarily dismissal.138  In South Africa the rescue practitioner is appointed 
either by the company139 or by the court140 and in either case the directors remain in office and 
continue to exercise their functions subject to the authority of the practitioner.141 By contrast, 
in terms of the now-repealed judicial management legislative provisions, directors ceased to 
hold office once the process commenced.  
 
2.7 The Moratorium  
Most corporate rescue systems provide for an automatic moratorium that is to say, a stay of all 
legal and enforcement proceedings against a company, from the juncture when, in terms of the 
legislation, business rescue commences until its termination .142 Consequently, for the duration 
of business rescue, creditors are barred from enforcing their claims against the company, save 
with the consent of the practitioner or with the leave of the court.143 The rights most commonly 
affected by the moratorium are security rights, rights of sale, other contractual rights, rights of 
foreclosure, reciprocal rights arising from performance by creditors, and rights to set-off.144 In 
some jurisdictions, creditors are given the right to apply to court to institute legal proceedings 
against the company, notwithstanding the moratorium145 and notwithstanding that such legal 
proceedings may impact adversely on the attempted rescue of the company. In some 
jurisdictions, this is a decision to be made by the practitioner or by the court, who will have to 
weigh the considerations pro and contra allowing such proceedings.146  
 
A moratorium on legal proceedings against a company undergoing business rescue is a 
fundamental component of most statutory corporate rescue regimes and is supported 
                                                          
138 Yang, M. and Li, X., ‘The History of Corporate Rescue in the UK,’ (2012), 8 (13)Asian Social Science, page 23 
139 Section 129 (3) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
140Ibid s 131(5). 
141 Ibid s 137(2). 
142 In some jurisdictions a moratorium can be granted by the court on application by an interested party or by 
the company. This model is usually found in jurisdictions with a markedly creditor-friendly corporate rescue 
regime. 
143 Claessens, S. and Klapper, L.F., `Bankruptcy Around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865 Control and Corporate Rescue, page 2, available at page 6, 
http://www.univie.ac.at/bwl/ieu/lehre/ss06/..../debtorinposseession.pdf , accessed in 25.11.2013;  Tomasic, R., 
`Creditors Participation in Insolvency Proceedings-Towards the Adoption of International Standards,’ (2006), 14, 
Insolvency Law Journal, page 183 
144 Wood, P.R., Law and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency, 2nd Edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, (2007), page 37 
145 As in South Africa, England, and Australia. 
146 The aim of the moratorium is, inter alia, to enable the company to continue deploying its assets, without 
depletion by attachment and sale in execution at the instance of creditors; Haselman, R., and others, `How the 
Law Affects Lending,’ Columbia Law and Economic, (2006) Working Paper No.285, (2006), page 12 
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internationally by the UNICTRAL model for insolvency legislation as an essential component 
of a corporate rescue process.147 The statutory provisions in respect of the moratorium require 
careful and expert drafting, so that creditors will regard the general moratorium as being, 
overall, in their interests or at the least not to their significant and long-term disadvantage.148  
 
In Re Alycan Interstate Carp149 and Re Mallerof Haffner,150 two important purposes for a 
moratorium during the corporate rescue processes were identified. The first is to give a debtor 
company time to reorganise its affairs during the salvaging process, without pressure from 
creditors. The second is to protect the company’s rights. Overall, the rationale of the 
moratorium is that a salvaged and viable company will be more to the advantage of creditors 
than one that goes into liquidation.151 In other words, the moratorium is intended to benefit not 
only the company but its creditors as well.152 Of course, a moratorium is justifiable only if there 
is a reasonable prospect that the company will survive and be viable for, if not, the moratorium 
will usually have been to the detriment of the company’s creditors.153   
 
However, the moratorium is susceptible to abuse, for example, it can be combined with so-
called “pre-packing” which is a process in which a financially distressed company negotiates 
a sale of its business which will take effect immediately or soon after it enters liquidation. The 
expression “pre-pack’ connotes that the terms of the sale are agreed before the company enters 
liquidation.154 The covert arrangement is that the company will commence business rescue and 
enjoy the benefits of the moratorium whilst the sale is being negotiated. 
 
The terms of the statutory moratorium, as laid down in legislation, differ between jurisdictions. 
But the moratorium is seldom absolute. Legal proceedings against the company involving 
                                                          
147UNCITRAL Model Para 52 
148 Dal Pon, P.G. and Gig, L., ‘A Principled Justification for Business Rescue laws: A Comparative Perspective (Part 
I),’ (1996), 5 (1), IIRV page 67 
149 11 BR 224 (1981) 
150 25 BR 882 (1982) 
151 Tene, O., `Revisiting the Creditors’ Bargain: The Entitlement to the Going-Concern Surplus in Corporate 
Bankruptcy Reorganisations,’ (2003), 19 BDJ, page 287, Baird, D.G., The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganisations in Bhandari, in J.S. and Weiss, L.A (eds), Corporate Bankruptcy, Cambridge, CUP, (1996), 
page 345 
152 Sandra, F., ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002,’ (2004), 67 (2) MLR page 250 
153 McCormack, G., ‘Corporate Rescue Law in Singapore and the Appropriateness of Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code as a Model,’ (2008) 20 SACLJ, page 398.  
154 So-called ‘pre-packing’, is commonplace, inter alia in the USA; see Baird, D.G. and Rasmussen, R.K., ‘Control 
Rights, Priority Rights and the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganisations’, (2001), 87, V.L.R, page 
941, and Baird, D.G. and Rasmussen, R.K., The End of Bankruptcy, (2002), 55, S.L.R., page 786-788 
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criminal liability, tortious liability and threats to the national security are usually exempted 
from the moratorium.155 
 
2.8 The Outcome of the Corporate Rescue Process  
It is possible that a successfully “rescued” company may, at the end of the rescue process, 
continue with the same business under the same management, and with the same employees. 
It is more likely, however, that the rescued company will have been restructured in one or more 
respects. Its managerial structure may have changed; its operations or its staff complement may 
have downsized; it may have been recapitalised or re-financed; its credit arrangements may 
have been amended. Or the company may have been taken over by another entity, or its 
business may have been sold to an outside party or to its own managers.156 The premise in each 
case is that what has been achieved is a better result for the company’s creditors, employees 
and shareholders than would have been secured by liquidation. 
 
Thus, a successful business rescue encompasses more possible outcomes than simply saving 
the business or the company as it stands.157  Chapter 11 in the USA and the UK insolvency law 
has room for a multitude of outcomes.158 Rescuing a company as it stands is sometimes referred 
to as a pure rescue, in that it involves salvaging the company and its business, for the most part 
with the same workforce, the same controllers, and the same management. Such an outcome 
seems implicitly to be the primary aim envisaged in Chapter 6 of South Africa’s Companies 
                                                          
155 Cf England administration procedure, United States of America Chapter 11 reorganisation. 
156 Belcher, A., Corporate Rescue, Sweet and Maxwell, London, (1997) page 24-34 and Brown, D., Corporate 
Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, (1996) page 6-8. For example in Oakdene 
Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others, Farm Bothasfontein 
(Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd v Kyalami Events and Exhibitions (Pty) Ltd and Others [2012] ZAGPJHC 12 para 12, the High 
Court expressed the basis of South Africa’s business rescue proceedings under Section 127 of the 2008 Act as 
follows: 
“The general philosophy permeating through the business rescue provisions is the recognition of the 
value of the business as a going concern rather than the juristic person itself. Hence the name “business 
rescue” and not “company rescue”. This is in line with modern trend [sic] in rescue regimes. It attempts 
to secure and balance the opposing interests of creditors, shareholders and employees. It encapsulates 
a shift from creditors’ interests to a broader range of interests. The thinking is that to preserve the 
business coupled with the experience and skill of its employers may, in the end prove to be a better 
option for creditors in securing full recovery from the debtor. To rescue the business, provision is made 
to “buy into” the procedure without fear of losing such investment in an ailing company by securing 
repayment as a preferential repayment as part of the “post-commencement financing”. Post-
commencement creditors are thus offered a “super-priority” as an incentive to assist the company 
financially”. [Emphasis supplied] 
 
157 Sandra, F., ‘In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002,’ (2004), 67 (2) MLR page 248 
158 Including pre-pack administration or pre-pack reorganisation. 
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Act of 2008. But any permutation of a successful corporate rescue must have served the best 
interests of the company’s creditors, shareholders and employees.159 In practice, as was noted 
above, a successful rescue often involves the sale of the viable part of the business or a take-
over of the whole financially distressed company.160   
 
Usually, corporate rescue is better achieved by avoiding a piecemeal sale of the company’s 
business because a business is often more than the sum of its parts, and because a business is 
usually worth more if it is preserved or sold in its entirety.161 So-called “corporate rescue” is in 
fact more accurately termed “business rescue” in that the objective is the preservation of the 
business, rather than simply the preservation of the company as a legal entity. Thus a business 
can be saved where it is taken over by a new entity via a merger or take-over, or where the 
business is sold as a going concern to another commercial entity.  
 
Internationally, it is accepted that, where a rescue process cannot save the company as an entity 
in its own right, the aim should be to rescue the business.162 
 
The merits of the model of business rescue adopted in any particular jurisdiction can be judged 
by the rate of successful rescues,163 whilst allowing for the fact that the rescue process may 
have effected changes to many aspects of the business.164 As was pointed out, above, some 
phasing out or scaling down of the company’s activities is likely,165 as is a compromise with 
creditors as part and parcel of the rescue process.166 Similarly, some retrenchment of employees 
may be necessary in order to reduce the cost of the company’s operations.167  
 
The alternative objective of business rescue, in terms of South Africa’s Companies Act, is to 
secure a better result for creditors and shareholders than would have been achieved by the 
                                                          
159 Davis, N., The Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom: Insolvency Litigation and Practice,  (1997) London, 
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160 Phillips, M. and Goldring, J., ‘Rescue and Reconstruction’, (2002), Insolvency Intelligence, London, HMSO, 
page 75 and 76. 
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immediate winding up of the company.168 Case law supports the interpretation that this 
alternative objective can be pursued only where the main objective is impossible to achieve.  
 
2.9 The Necessity for a Corporate Rescue Mechanism 
Companies’ legislation must allow for the winding up of companies, inter alia to remove non-
viable companies from the economy and allow the viable to thrive.169 However, the negative 
consequences of winding up a company on a country’s economy and society need to be borne 
in mind, not least because of the reduction in competition and the possibility that the remaining 
companies will use their dominant position to increase the prices of their goods and services, 
and the possible overall reduction of the number of jobs in the economy.170  An unsatisfactory 
business rescue regime can have a destabilising impact on the national economy.171   
 
As a general principle, the liquidation of a company should be a last resort172 and well-drafted 
business rescue legislation has an important role to play in the economic development of a 
country.173 Corporate rescue can indirectly preserve creativity and encourage 
entrepreneurship.174 
 
All of this is particularly true of developing economies.175 In the process of rescuing a corporate 
entity, the retention of all its employees is not a given.176 In Re Allders Department Stores 
Ltd177 it was held that the goal of protecting of employees should not be accorded such priority 
as to risk sabotaging the rescue of the company. On the other hand, too little attention to the 
interests of employees may scupper the rescue process.178 A difficult balance needs to be 
struck, for the loss of jobs can have serious socio-economic consequences.  
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169 White, J., ‘Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy Law,’ (2011), 7, ARLSS, page 139. 
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2.10 Weaknesses in the concept of business rescue  
Common shortcomings in business rescue legislation have come to light. As regards Australia’s 
voluntary corporate rescue model, Blazic (2010) lists inter alia issues involving secured 
creditors, insolvent trading by the company, ipso-facto clauses in a business plan, procedural 
accountability and abuses, employees’ rights, issues with creditors, globalization and cross 
border insolvency issues as shortcomings.179 In addition to deficiencies in the legislation, these 
weaknesses are influenced by the economic environment, culture and history of the 
jurisdiction. According to the International Monetary Fund, Australia is categorised as an 
advanced economy,180 and the shortcomings within that jurisdiction will probably be found in 
other similarly categorised jurisdictions..  
 
The situation is different in the developing countries. The following factors in implementing 
corporate rescue legislation in such jurisdictions have come to light, namely, weak financial 
institutions, out-dated social protection and corporate governance mechanisms, inadequate 
human and financial capital and entrenched corrupt practices.181 All countries in Africa, 
including South Africa, are categorised in the IMF report as economically developing states.182 
These countries seem to have lower expectations of successful corporate rescue operations.  
 
2.11 South African Corporate Rescue 
2.11.1 Introduction to South African Corporate Rescue 
South Africa’s common law is a mixture of English common law, Roman-Dutch law and 
customary law.183 South Africa’s companies legislation has been heavily influenced by English 
common law and companies legislation.184 This is evident from the structure and content of 
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South Africa’s first post-Union companies legislation, the Companies Act 46 of 1926, which 
was largely based on the United Kingdom Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908. South 
Africa’s company law still shows influences of its hybrid but predominantly Roman-Dutch 
common law.185  
 
2.11.2 The Statutory Development of South African Corporate Rescue 
2.11.2.1 Companies Act 46 of 1926 
In South Africa the concept of corporate rescue was first introduced in the Companies Act 46 
of 1926.186 The process was called judicial management. Although South Africa’s Companies 
Act was generally slow to adapt to economic and technological change,187 the country was 
praised for its attempt to introduce this legislation.188 Australia’s official management, a 
corporate rescue mechanism introduced in 1961, is said to have been inspired by South Africa’s 
experiment with judicial management.189    
 
In South Africa, judicial management failed to develop into a mature corporate rescue process, 
inter alia because of the lack of an automatic moratorium on creditors’ claims against the 
company for the duration of business rescue. This lacuna enabled creditors to apply for the 
liquidation of the company during the process of judicial management which could potentially 
compromise the entire rescue process. In practice the courts almost invariably imposed a 
moratorium. 
 
2.11.2.2 Companies Act 11 of 1932 
In the 1930s the world experienced a severe economic downturn, now known as the Great 
Depression, and institutional lenders cut back on the extension of credit. In South Africa, there 
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was a particular fear that loans to farmers might be called in.190 One of the responses of the 
South African government was to make changes to the companies legislation191 and this led in 
1932 to the enactment of an amended Companies Act which included changes to the judicial 
management provisions, providing for a moratorium on creditor’s claims for companies under 
judicial management.193  
 
The amendments also provided for the setting aside of impeachable transactions in judicial 
management and allowed any party or the judicial manager to apply to court for annulling an 
affected transaction entered into by the company prior to judicial management. Such 
transactions included voidable or undue preferences, dispositions without value and collusive 
arrangements entered into at a time when the company’s liabilities exceeded its assets. 
 
2.11.2.3 Companies Act 23 of 1939 
South Africa then initiated a commission of inquiry with a view to reforming company 
legislation, and the resultant report goes by the name of the Report of the Companies Act 
Commission of 1936.194 The Commission recommended only minor amendments, later 
embodied in the Companies Act 23 of 1939. One amendment implicitly envisaged judicial 
management as a route to winding up a company.195 The amended legislation gave the judicial 
manager power, during the currency of judicial management, to use the company’s available 
funds to pay creditors’ claims and costs incurred in the procedure; in hindsight this undercut 
the whole purpose of judicial management, which was to give the company a breathing space 
from claims against it, and in effect the amendment allowed the judicial manager to act as an 
informal liquidator.196  
 
Nonetheless, the amendments did attempt to address the problem faced by a court in 
determining whether there were sufficient grounds to believe that a company might be able to 
recover from its financial plight.197 The application for a judicial management order was now 
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to be sent first to the Master of the Supreme Court who was required to investigate the affairs 
of the company and produce a report as to whether there was a reasonable probability for the 
company to attain the objectives of the judicial management process – clearly a complex task, 
and a procedural requirement that would delay the company’s entry into judicial management 
and increase the likelihood that it would simply be liquidated. 
 
2.11.2.4 Companies Act 46 of 1952 
The recommendations of the Millin Commission198 were incorporated into the Companies Act 
46 of 1952199 which gave the judiciary greater power in the judicial management process. The 
amendments required the judicial manager to seek the approval of the court for any disposition 
of the company’s assets. Even though this increased dependence on the judicial system, the 
overall result seems to have been positive in preserving companies’ assets and diminishing the 
risk that the judicial manager would succumb to pressure from the company’s creditors to sell  
assets and pay their claims, thereby defeating the purpose of judicial management.  
 
The amending legislation provided that if, at any time during the judicial management process, 
it came to the attention of the judicial manager that a company would not be able to pay all its 
debts in full, he should apply to court for a winding up order.200 The intent was that judicial 
managers should not defer a decision to wind up the company, resulting in further pointless 
diminution of its assets to the detriment of creditors. 
 
The amendments also provided for a ranking during the distribution of the company’s assets 
on the termination of judicial management. Overall priority was given to costs incurred during 
the process, followed by the operational expenses of the business, and lastly the claims of the 
company`s creditors. However, sorely lacking in the process was super-priority for post-
commencement financiers of the company which would been a stimulus for creditors to inject 
funds for the rescue of the company. Overall, however, the intent of the legislation was to 
achieve the financial rescue of the company. 
 
                                                          
198 Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek insake die wysiging van die Maatskappyewet (UG 69 of 1948). 
199 Companies (Amendment) Act 46 of 1952. 
200 See s 440 (1) Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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2.11.2.5 Companies Act 61 of 1973 
In 1963 a commission of inquiry that went by the name of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission201 
under the chairmanship of Justice Jan van Wyk de Vries began its work. The commission was 
tasked with collating opinions, comments and views from stakeholders and the general public 
regarding the reform and modernisation of South Africa’s Companies Act. The various Masters 
of the Supreme Court expressed the view that judicial management should be abolished 
because it had not yielded the desired results and many companies were using it to block 
creditors from asserting their rights.202 This view apparently carried little weight with the 
Commission.203  
 
Consequently, judicial management, with a few changes, was again incorporated into the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973204 justified by the fact that the low rate of success of judicial 
management in South Africa was nonetheless higher than in jurisdictions such as the USA and 
the United Kingdom.205 
 
The scholarly literature reflects some support for judicial management as a way of securing a 
better return for creditors than would be achieved by the immediate winding up of the 
company.206 It should however be borne in mind that, in terms of the legislation, a judicial 
management order was granted only if it was shown that there was a reasonable probability 
that the company would thereby be enabled to pay its debts and fulfil its obligations;207 it did 
not suffice that the return to creditors would be higher than would be achieved by immediate 
liquidation. 
 
A structural improvement achieved by the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was placing the winding-
up provisions in a different chapter of the Act from judicial management. However, this 
structural change alone did not sufficiently separate the two procedures, for some of the judicial 
management provisions continued to refer to the winding-up provisions. 
                                                          
201 The commission issued two reports, the first of which was the main report (Hoofverslag RP 45/ 1970) and the 
second was a supplementary report that annexed the Companies Bill (Aanvullende Verslag en 
Konsepwetsontwerp RP 31/1972).  
202 Hoofverslag RP 45/ 1970 page 524 paragraph 51.02. 
203The Companies Act 61 of 1973 incorporated the recommendations of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission; 
Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African L.J. page 262. 
204 Sections 427-440 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
205 Brown, D., Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, (1996), Chichester, John Wiley and Sons,  page 247. 
206 Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African L.J., page 267. 




2.11.2.6 Companies Act 71 of 2008 
The reforms effected by the Companies Act 71 of 2008 were driven by the widely 
acknowledged need for South Africa to align itself with international trends in company law.208 
The reform process exposed differences of opinion between the Ministry of Justice and the 
Department of Trade and Industries.209 In March 2003 a draft Insolvency and Recovery Bill 
was approved by the cabinet.210 This Bill had been prepared by the South African Law Review 
Commission under the Ministry of Justice. The draft approved by cabinet covered both natural 
and juristic persons although corporate winding-up and rescue is usually located in companies` 
legislation. This proved to be an unsuccessful attempt by the government to reform insolvency 
legislation for both individuals and juristic persons within a single statute.   
 
After a year’s silence, the Ministry of Justice again attempted legislation to reform corporate 
rescue and announced that by the end of May 2004 a draft Business Rescue Bill would be 
complete.211 Surprisingly, about a month later the Department for Trade and Industry also made 
public its intent to reform companies legislation, corporate rescue212 with a target date of June 
2006 for new companies’ legislation. 
 
However, it was only in 2007, a year later than the envisaged completion time for the proposed 
legislative changes, that the department published the Companies Draft Bill 2007. A year later, 
parliament approved the Bill which was signed into law by the State President on 8 April 2009, 
and a day later it was gazetted as the Companies Act 71 of 2008213 which came into force in 
2011 and repealed the Companies Act 61 of 1973 subject to certain transitional 
arrangements.214 Thus, it took nearly three years after presidential assent for the legislation to 
come into force. The delay has been attributed to a significant number of faults in the signed 
                                                          
208 South African Company Law for the 21st Century - Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, May 2004, 1183,  
page 3 available at http://www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=169430 accessed 1.06.2014. 
209 The two departments worked simultaneously on the reform of the Companies Act.  
210 Burdette, D.A., Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model 
for South Africa (Part 1), (2004), 16, S.Afr.Mercantile L.J., 243. 
211 So stated by the Chief State Law Adviser in the Department of Justice, April, 2004; see Loubser, A., `Business 
Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of Home?,’ (2007), 40, Comp. & Int`l L.J.S. Afri., page 160. 
212 The Department of Trade and Industries South African Company Law for the 21st Century - Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform, May 2004, Notice 1183, page 43-45 available at 
http://www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=169430 accessed in 1.06.2014. 
213 Government Gazette Number 32121.  
214 However, in terms of the ‘transitional arrangements’, the provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 still 
apply in the winding up of insolvent companies, as provided for in Schedule 5 item 9 of the 2008 Act. 
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statute215 and in 2010 the errors led to the amendment of 225 provisions of the Act – nearly 
half of the entire statute. The rectifications received presidential assent as the Companies 
Amendment Act 3 of 2011.216 This took place even before the legislation came into force. 
 
The unusual sequence of events from publication of the first Bill to presidential assent raised 
the eyebrows of at least one academic217 who called to mind other companies` legislation 
reforms that had been preceded by a commission of inquiry.218 This scholar predicted that 
substantial problems would become evident when the legislation came to be implemented. As 
was noted, above, significant corrections were in fact made before the legislation came into 
effect, thus defusing this prediction to some extent. 
 
Prior to the enactment of this new legislation, a number of submissions had been made 
regarding the reform of South Africa’s corporate rescue legislation.219 Some scholars proposed 
amendments to the process of judicial management procedure,220 but most were of the view 
that the issue would be more effectively addressed by a complete replacement of judicial 
management with entirely new corporate rescue provisions.221  
 
One suggestion was to integrate corporate rescue into insolvency legislation, as is done in some 
jurisdictions.222 This had already been attempted in the Companies Act 46 of 1926 which 
                                                          
215The errors included grammatical errors and incorrect cross-references; see Cassim, F. et al, Contemporary 
Company Law, 2nd Edition, Juta, (2012), page 1. 
216 Government Gazette Number 34243. 
217 Loubser, A., Some Comparative Aspect of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law, Doctor of Laws 
Unpublished Thesis UNISA, (2010), page 5.   
218 This time there was no Commission formed. Loubser cited,  Keay, A., `To Unify or not to Unify Insolvency 
Legislation: International Experience and the Latest South African Proposal,’ (1999), De Jure 67, notes that the 
English first Company Bill in 1970s which raised a lot of problems due to the fact that it was brought up without 
thorough inquiry from Commission. 
219 Kloppers, P. `Judicial Management-A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?,’ (1999), 10 
Stellenbosch LR, page 368, Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African 
L.J. page 268 , Burdett, D.A., ‘The Introduction of Truly Unified Insolvency Act: Ancillary Matters,’ PART 4 C, 
(2002), page 48-49, Keay, A., `To Unify or not to Unify Insolvency Legislation: International Experience and the 
Latest South African Proposal,’ (1999), De Jure 73-74. 
220 Proposed for amendment of the same procedure in Kloopers, P., ‘Judicial Management Reform -Steps to 
Initiate a Business Rescue’ (2001), 13 S. Afr. Mercantile L.J., page 379-379. 
221 Loubser, A.,’ Business rescue in South Africa: a procedure in search of a home?’, (2007) 40 Comp. & Int'l L.J. 
S. Afr., page 161-162 and 169-170  and Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 
S. African L.J. page 270. 
222 Burdette, D.A., ‘The Introduction of a Truly Unified Insolvency Act: Ancillary Matters,’ Part 4 C,  page 356 
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located judicial management and winding-up in the same chapter223 and such coupling was 
thought to be a reason for the reluctance of companies to apply for judicial management.224 
The rescue process provided for in administration in terms of English law had experienced the 
same problem when that procedure and winding-up were located in the same legislation.225 It 
seems that coupling the two concepts in this way taints the perception of corporate rescue.226   
 
2.12 The General Concept of South African Judicial Management  
As was noted earlier, the Companies Act 61 of 1973 took a notably creditor-friendly approach 
to corporate rescue.227 The focus was on securing the payment of creditors’ claims rather than 
rescuing a struggling corporate entity.228 The judiciary, too, implicitly took this approach. For 
instance, in De Jager v Koroo Koeldranke and Roomys (Edms) Bpk,229 it was held, in the 
context of granting an order for judicial management, that the court should give primary 
consideration to the interests of creditors and shareholders. This approach had the result that 
financially distressed companies seldom resorted to judicial management and of those that did, 
more than eighty per cent were ultimately liquidated.230 
 
Judicial management could be applied for by various stakeholders.231 If the order were granted, 
the court would stipulate a return date and make any other order it thought fit.232 Several factors 
                                                          
223 The Companies Act 46 of 1926 had dealt with judicial management and winding-up in the same chapter. This, 
said one commentator (Olver, H., ‘Judicial Management-A Case for Law Reform,’ (1986) THRHR, page 84,) gave 
the impression that they were aspects of one and the same process. 
224 There are cogent arguments to have insolvency and corporate rescue in separate legislation, see Loubser, A.,’ 
Business rescue in South Africa: a procedure in search of a home?’, (2007)40 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr., page 169. 
225 Finch, V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd Edition, CUP, (2009) page 372, Brown, D., 
Corporate Rescue: Insolvency Law in Practice, John Wiley and Sons, Chichester, (1996), page 654-657. 
226 The psychological impact is noted by Loubser, A.,’ Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of 
a Home?’, (2007)40 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr., page 162, very likely for the public lose confidence on the company 
once it enters into judicial management, see 37. Williams, R.C., Concise Corporate Law, Butterworth, (1994), 
page 227. 
227 Burdette, D.A., ‘Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model 
for South Africa (Part 1), (2004)’, 16, S.Afr.Mercantile L.J., 244. 
228 Even creditors were not in favour of this process, as evidenced in Tobacco Auctions Ltd v A.W Hamilton (Pty) 
Ltd 1966 (2) SA 451 (R), where the creditors preferred that the company be liquidated rather than embarking on 
judicial management proceeding. Perhaps the business community was sufficiently educated on the potential 
benefits to them of judicial judgment.  
229 1956 (3) SA 594  
230 Olver, H., ‘Judicial Management-A Case for Law Reform,’ (1986) THRHR, page 84. 
231 Section 346 (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The interested parties are the company, the creditors 
(including contingent and prospective creditors), members of the company, the Master in the case of a company 
being wound up voluntarily and the provisional judicial manager if a final order of judicial management was 
being sought. These stakeholders are the same persons as are eligible to apply for the winding-up of a company. 
Some of the judicial management directives were located in the winding-up provisions of the legislation.. 
232 Section 428 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
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were then considered on the return day in determining whether to grant a final order of judicial 
management.233 The courts inevitably set the bar higher for the granting of a final as distinct 
from a provisional order for judicial management234 and relatively few companies were 
accorded a final order. 
 
The following grounds had to be established for the court to grant an order for judicial 
management.235 Firstly, that, by reason of mismanagement or any other cause, there was a 
reasonable probability that, if the company were placed under judicial management, it would 
be enabled to fulfil its obligations, Secondly, the court had to be satisfied that granting such an 
order would be just and equitable.236 In combination, these requirements imposed a heavy 
burden of proof on an applicant for the order.237 In particular, proving the requisite ‘reasonable 
probability’ was judicially interpreted as requiring more than just a business plan and financial 
projections.238 Forecasts based on unprovable contingencies were not regarded as 
persuasive.239 
 
The approach of the judiciary in this regard is epitomised in Silverman v Doornhoek Mines 
Ltd,240 which is one of the earliest and most often cited decisions on judicial management. In 
this case, the court interpreted the legislative provisions as meaning that a strong probability 
had to be demonstrated that, if a company`s management or assets were sound, it would revive 
and become financially sound. It was further held that a judicial management order should be 
                                                          
233 Section 132 (2) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provides that the following factors are taken into 
consideration: 
(a) the opinions and wishes of creditors and members of the company; 
(b) the report of the provisional judicial manager under section 430; 
(c) the creditors who did not prove claims at the first meeting of creditors and the amounts and nature of 
their claims; 
(d) the report of the Master; and 
(e) the report of the Registrar, 
234 Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 31.   
235 Section 427 (2) and 346 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 stipulated the parties who could apply for a 
judicial management order. 
236 Section 427 (1) Companies Act 61 of1973. 
237 Noordkaap Lewendehawe Ko-op Bpk v Schreuder 1974 (3) SA 102 (A). 
238 See also Noordkaap Lewendehawe Ko-op Bpk v Schreuder 1974 (3) SA 102 (A) which held that what had to 
be shown was a reasonable probability, not a mere possibility. Further, see Loubser, A., Some Comparative 
Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law, Doctor of Laws Unpublished Thesis UNISA, (2010), 
page 23. 
239 Factors such as managerial efficiency, currency stabilization, demand fluctuation and government policies, 
play a significant role in a business plan. 
240 1935 TPD 353. 
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granted only in special circumstances since it was a privilege in favour of a company. This 
precedent set a high bar for subsequent applications for a judicial management order.241 
 
In their interpretation of the judicial management provisions of the Companies Act, the 
judiciary of that era, in seeking an interpretation of the statutory provisions, had regard to the 
record of parliamentary speeches at the time when the law was enacted.242 In the parliamentary 
debate preceding the enactment of the Companies Act of 1926 the Minister for Justice said that 
a judicial management order was to be granted to companies that were significant for the 
country and its economy.243 This statement that seems to have influenced the judiciary in 
determining whether to grant orders of judicial management244 
 
Aside from the problematic criteria for the granting of judicial management, the process had 
other significant shortcomings, of which the following are particularly significant. Only 
companies could qualify for the process.245 The statutory criterion requiring a reasonable 
probability that the company would be able to pay its debts set the bar unrealistically high246 
and was seldom able to be satisfied; realistically, a compromise of creditors’ claims would 
often be necessary.247 The discretion vested in the court by the legislation was arguably too 
wide and too vaguely expressed.248 The process from application to an order of provisional 
judicial management, and thence to a final order, tended to be very protracted.249 The 
involvement of the court was, arguably, excessive and the judiciary had developed significant 
scepticism vis-a-vis the process. Consequently, potentially salvageable companies were forced 
                                                          
241 Tenowitz v Tenny Investments (Pty) Ltd 1979 (2) SA 689 (E), Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim 2000 3 SA 325 (C), 
Makhuva v Lukhoto Bus Service (Pty) Ltd 1987 3 SA 376 (V) and Kotze v Tulryk Bpk 1977 (3) SA 118.  
242 The case law in this regard of course predates the decision in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) in which the Supreme Court of Appeal essentially redefined the principles of 
statutory interpretation, and decisively moved away from a search for ‘the intention of the legislature’. 
243 Union of South Africa House of Assembly Debates 25 February 1926 Volume 6 column 983-984. 
244 This criterion, it is submitted, is too impossibly elastic to be capable of consistent application.  
245 Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African L.J. page 267. 
246 Section 427 (1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973; in this regard, see Silverman v Doornhoek Mines Ltd. (1935) 
TPD 349 and Burdette, D.A., Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business 
Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1), (2004), 16, S.Afr.Mercantile L.J., page 249. 
247Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African L.J. page 268  
248 A required prospect that the company would be able to pay its debts in full is believed to be the factor that 
led to the failure of Official Management in Australia – see Harmer, R.W., `Comparison of Trends in National 
Law: The Pacific Rim,’ (1973)23, BJIL, page 149. See also Burdette, D.A., Some Initial Thoughts on the 
Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model for South Africa (Part 1), (2004), 16, 
S.Afr.Mercantile L.J., 244. 
249 Section 428 and 427 of the Companies Act 1973. 
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into liquidation.250 A corpus of experienced and expert judicial managers had not evolved;251 
the legislation laid down no criteria for such appointments and usually professional liquidators 
were appointed who inevitably had the wrong mind-set and lacked expertise in rescuing 
companies rather than winding them up.252  
 
A moratorium on creditor’s claim was not an automatic consequence where a company entered 
juridical management, but the court had the power to impose such a moratorium.253 This was 
a fundamental lacuna in the legislation in that corporate rescue is scarcely conceivable in the 
absence of such a moratorium. Even where a moratorium was judicially imposed, creditors 
could apply to court for leave to sue the company.254 Where such leave was sought, it was 
irrelevant whether the claim had arisen before or after the commencement of the judicial 
management proceedings.255 In Millman NO v Swartland Huis Meubeleerders (Edms) Bpk: 
Repfin Acceptance Ltd intervening,256 the court said that, in matters involving judicial 
management, the objects of the legislation had to be considered.257 The decision in Le Roux 
                                                          
250 Companies seeking a compromise with creditors had to proceed in terms of s 311 of the Companies Act 61 
of 1973, which explicitly provided for such compromises; but even that provision had its weaknesses as an 
avenue for business rescue. Kloppers, P. ‘Judicial Management– A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of 
Reform?’ (1999) 3 Stell LR 417, page 430 states that “… Section 311 aimed more at the rescue of the corporate 
shell than the rescue of a viable commercial enterprise capable of making a useful contribution to the economic 
life of the country” . An effective business rescue process of course goes further than merely enabling the 
payment of the company’s creditors. 
251 The inappropriateness of employing liquidators to rescue a company has often been remarked upon; see for 
example Olver, H., ‘Judicial Management-A Case for Law Reform,’ (1986) THRHR, page 87. 
252 Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African L.J. page 267 and Burdette, 
D.A., A Framework for Corporate Insolvency Law Reform in South Africa (2002) LLD, University of Pretoria, page 
349. 
253 Section 428 (2) (c) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
254 In Ross v Northern Machinery and Irrigation (Pty) Ltd 1940 TPD 119 at 235 the court said that, “There is, 
however, great force in the contention advanced on behalf of the applicant that it is inequitable that by the 
refusal of leave, the applicant should be deprived of the possession and use of the property, with at least the 
potential risk of depreciation, for the benefit of creditors, of whom it is not one, when the applicant stands to 
gain nothing by the eventual success of the judicial management.” [Emphasis supplied] Under such 
circumstances the court could grant the creditor leave to claim possession of the company’s property without 
an inquiry into the damage that this would do the prospect of the company`s rehabilitation; the focus was 
entirely on the creditor’s rights.  
255 Samuel Osborn (SA) Ltd v United Stone Crushing Co (Pty) Ltd (Under Judicial Management) 1938 WLD 229. 
256 1972 (1) SA 741 (C) at 744B. In this case, it was held that, “The objectives of a judicial management order are 
to postpone a liquidation of a company which is in difficulties and to provide a moratorium for that company for 
a period long enough  (it can be either a period fixed by the court or an indefinite period) to enable that company 
to meet its obligations and to become successful concern.”    
257 To the same effect, see Western Bank v Laurie Fossati Construction (Pty) Ltd (Under Judicial Management) 
1974 (4) SA 607 (E) at 611. 
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Hotel Management (Pty) v E Rand (Pty) Ltd258 was a particular set-back for the concept of 
judicial management.  
 
This study has been unable to locate empirical data as to the precise number of successful 
forays into judicial management.259 The only available record referred to in the literature is one 
in the 1980s that recorded a twelve per cent success rate.260 There is a similar dearth of reliable 
statistical data as regards more sophisticated forms of business rescue in the jurisdictions where 
this is provided for. Where records are available, they tend to be lacking in important details,261 
such as the category of company rescued, whether public or private, whether post-
commencement finance was made available, and if so how much, and the proportion of their 
claims that was eventually paid out to creditors. It also needs to be borne in mind that corporate 
rescue can take place informally, by a process agreed to by the interested parties and outside 
of the legislative processes and structures; statistical records of such informal processes are of 
course simply not kept.  
 
2.13 The General Concept of South African Business Rescue262 
In terms of the Companies Act 2008, for a company to commence business rescue procedure, 
it must be ‘financially distressed’.263 The Act tries to provide for a time frame to take action in 
this regard.264 This implies that the company which qualifies for entry into business rescue need 
not necessarily be actually insolvent (even commercially insolvent), merely financially 
distressed. Further, it shows that the legislation recognises the desirability of early remedial 
action. 
 
                                                          
258 [2001] 1 All SA 233 (C). 
259 In principle, judicial management can involve a compromise with creditors, which would increase the 
prospects of a successful  outcome; see Henning, J., `Judicial Management and Corporate Rescues in South 
African Law,’ in  Rajak, H., (Editor), Insolvency Law Theory and Practice, (1993) page 308. 
260 Olver, A.H., `Judicial Management- A Case for Law Reform,’ (1984) 49, THRHR, page 85. 
261 Wood, P.R., Law and Practice of International Finance: Principles of International Insolvency,’ 2nd Edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, (2007), page 48. 
262 All the issues raised and discussed in this sub-chapter are analysed further in the following chapters. 
263 Section 128 (1) (f) provides a definition of a financially distressed company in this context, as follows: 
 (i) a company that appears to be reasonably unlikely to be able to pay all of its debts as they become due and 
payable within immediately ensuing six months; or  
(ii) where it appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within the immediately 
ensuing six months.  
264 The importance of prompt actions is discussed in Finch, V., ‘The Recasting of Insolvency Law,’ (2008), 68 
M.L.R, 723-726 and Finch, V., `Doctoring in the Shadows of Insolvency,’ (2005), J.B.L., page 690. See Esty. B. and 
Megginson, W.,’ Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Debt Ownership Structure: Evidence from the Global 
Syndicated Loan Market, (2003), 38 (1), The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 37-59. 
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A financially distressed company can commence business rescue via either of two processes. 
The first is by way a resolution of the board which is then filed with the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission.265 The second is where an affected person applies to court 
to place a company in business rescue.266 Each of these two modes of entry into business rescue 
has its own grounds.267 The grounds required for the court to order that business rescue 
commence are wider than where the board passes a resolution in this regard in that, where an 
order of court is sought, an issue arises as to whether such an order would be “just and 
equitable” – as was the case for an order of judicial management.  
 
Once a company has commenced business rescue, the following are the phases in the 
process:268 
(i) the temporary supervision of the company, and the management of its affairs, 
business and property; 
(ii) a temporary moratorium on the rights of the claimants against the company or in 
respect of property in its possession, and on enforcement action; and 
(iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the company 
by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and its equity 
in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on 
a solvent basis or, if this is not possible, that results in a better return for the 
company`s creditors and shareholders than would result from the immediate 
liquidation of the company. 
 
The management of a company that is under business rescue is vested in the turnaround 
expert referred to as the business rescue practitioner.269 This person is appointed either by 
the company or by the “affected persons”, which includes the company’s creditors. The 
practitioner is appointed by the company if business rescue commenced via a resolution of 
the board of directors.270 (An affected person then has the right to apply to court for to have 
the appointment set aside.271) Where an application has been made to court for a company 
                                                          
265 Section 129 (2) of the Act. 
266 Section 131 (1) of the Act. 
267 Section 129 (1) where the company voluntarily commences rescue and section 131 (4) (a) where the court 
makes an order. 
268 Section 128 (1) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
269 Section 128 (1) (d) read with s 140(1) of the 2008 Act. 
270 Section 129 (3) of the 2008 Act. 
271 Section 130 (1) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
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to commence business rescue, the court appoints an interim practitioner,272 nominated by 
the affected person who is the applicant.273 The secured creditors are often dominant in this 
process, in which event their nominee will be appointed, thereby giving those creditors 
significant assurance that their interests will be protected.274 
 
Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008 (which has the heading ‘Business Rescue and 
Compromise with Creditors’) accords a company significant protection once business rescue 
commences.275 In particular, a statutory moratorium automatically comes into place barring 
the commencement of legal proceedings against the company or any enforcement action, 
unless the practitioner or the court consents.276. 
 
Overall, the statutory scheme for business rescue attempts intends to balance the interests of 
employees of the company and the interests of other affected persons – which the judicial 
management legislation did not attempt to do.277 The company must also comply with 
                                                          
272 Section 131 (5) of the 2008 Act. 
273 An independent creditor who has a majority voting interest has the power to reject the practitioner; section 
131 (5) and Section 147 of the 2008 Act. 
274 Discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
275 Section 133 of the 2008 Act. 
276 Section 133 of the 2008 Act. 
277 Employees’ interests are protected by section 136 of the Act 2008 which provides as follows: 
“ Effect of business rescue on employees and contracts 
(1) Despite any provision of an agreement to the contrary- 
(a) during a company`s business rescue proceedings, employees of the company immediately before 
the beginning of those proceedings continue to be so employed on the same terms and conditions, 
except to the extent that- 
 (i) changes occur in the ordinary course of attrition; or 
(ii) the employees and the company, in accordance with applicable labour laws, agree different terms 
and conditions; and 
       (b) any retrenchment of any such employees contemplated in the company`s business rescue plan is     
subject to section 189 and 189A of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995), and other applicable 
employment related legislation.” 
Further protection is afforded in terms of sections 130, 131, 148 and 150 (2) (c) (ii) of the Act 71 of 2008. Similar 
protection for employees is found in the administration process in the UK, See McCormack, G., Corporate Rescue 
Law-An Anglo-American Perspective, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., (2008), page 294. The situation is, however, 
different in terms of reorganisation in the USA where employees are not protected during the process and the 
terms and conditions of employment, including a modification of collective bargaining agreements, can be 
amended without considering the interests of an employee, see Skeel, D., `Employees, Pension and Governance 
in Chapter 11,’ (2004), 82,(4), (WULQ, page 1472, Where the business is transferred, Chapter 11 offers no 
protection to employees; see McCormack, G., Corporate Rescue Law-An Anglo-American Perspective, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd., (2008), page 294. 
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relevant labour legislation.278 Employees’ claims are accorded preferential status279 and are 
arguably over-protected,280 to the extent that creditors may be reluctant to co-operate in the 
rescue process.   
 
2.14 Types of Business Entities Qualifying for South African Corporate Rescue 
2.14.1 Judicial Management 
A judicial management order could be made only in respect of companies registered under the 
Companies Act.281 On occasion the courts took cognisance of the size of the company’s 
business, as in Tobacco Auctions Ltd v A W Hamilton (Pty) Ltd282 as an issue relevant to 
whether an order of judicial management should be granted. Other factors sometimes 
considered by the courts were the number of the company`s members and the value of its 
assets.283  Some scholars suggested that judicial management should be made available to other 
forms of business entities.284 
 
It seems that the judicial management legislation was not designed to assist small companies.285 
The scholarly literature, however, favoured having only one legislative rescue process.286 In 
South Africa, the business rescue provisions of the Companies Act are available to close 
corporations as well as companies.287. 
                                                          
278 See Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others para 15 where the court said: 
“The philosophy is to try and prevent the negative social results following upon companies in distress 
having to lay off or retrench its employees. Of course, where a company has no employees, these 
considerations may not apply and the court will have to take this fact into consideration when exercising 
its discretion whether or not to grant a business rescue order”. [Emphasis supplied] 
279 Section 144 (2) of the Act. 
280 In jurisdictions where international standard labour laws are adhered to, the employer has no discretionary 
power, and an agreement is needed between employer and employee within the ambit of the labour law 
framework; see Articles 3, 4 and 10 of the International Labour Organisation, Protection of Workers' Claims 
(Employer's Insolvency) Convention, 1992 (No. 173). 
281 That is to say, companies registered in terms of Chapter IV of Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
282 1966 (2) SA 451 (R) at 453. 
283 Kloopers, P., ‘Judicial Management Reform - Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue’ (2001), 13 S. Afr. Mercantile 
L.J., page 369. 
284 Partnerships, close corporations, sole proprietorships and business trusts were amongst the structures 
suggested to be included in judicial management, see Kloppers, P., `Judicial Management-A Corporate Rescue 
Mechanism in Need of Reform?,’ (1999), 10 Stellenbosch LR, page 367 and Smits, J., `Corporate Administration: 
A proposed Model,’ (1999), 32 De Jure, page 94. 
285 Olver, H., ‘Judicial Management-A Case for Law Reform,’ (1986) THRHR, page 87. 
286 Kloppers, P., `Judicial Management-A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?,’ (1999), 10 
Stellenbosch LR, page 368, Rajak, H. and Henning, J., ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’, (1999), 116 S. African 
L.J. page 268 , Burdette, D.A., ‘The Introduction of Truly Unified Insolvency Act: Ancillary Matters,’ PART 4 C, 
(2002), page 48-49, Keay, A., `To Unify or not to Unify Insolvency Legislation: International Experience and the 
Latest South African Proposal,’ (1999), De Jure 73-74. 




2.14.2 Business Rescue  
In contrast to judicial management which was available only to companies registered under the 
companies legislation, business rescue in terms of the Companies Act 2008 is available not 
only to registered companies, 288 but is also potentially available to close corporations.289 This 
is a positive development, given that most South African businesses are small to medium-sized 
enterprises290 and there are many close corporations in existence. The legislated process of 
business rescue has not however been made available to partnerships, business trusts or sole 
traders, but an argument can be made that the process should be so extended.   
 
2.15 Conclusion 
The concept of business rescue, and its manifold potential benefits, has gained broad 
acceptance in South Africa, and the failed experiment with judicial management has been 
consigned to history. However, improvements to the business rescue provisions of the 
Companies Act will no doubt continue to be made, as weaknesses in the legislation are 
revealed, inter alia, by judicial decisions. 
 
The process of such an attempted rescue involves significant costs, both direct and indirect.  
Direct costs are those incurred by the company in applying for a court order and the hiring of 
experts such as financial analysts, accountants and lawyers to assist in carrying out the rescue 
activities. Indirect costs include the possible loss of customers, trade suppliers and employees, 
thereby preventing business activities from being conducted in the same manner as before. The 




                                                          
288 Section 14 of the 2008 Act provides for the registration of companies, as defined in s 1.  
289 This is provided for in terms of Section 224 and Item 6 of Schedule 3 of Companies Act 71 of 2008 which 
amended Section 66 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
290 Burdette, D.A., Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model 


























As indicated in the preceding chapter, a company can commence business rescue via two 
possible routes, namely, through a board resolution filed with the Companies Commission or 
by an order of the High Court following an application by an affected person.291 
                                                          




This chapter discusses the impact on the company’s creditors where business rescue 
commences via either of these two routes, and goes on to discuss the duties of the business 
rescue practitioner. 
 
3.2 Commencement of Business Rescue Proceedings 
3.2.1 Company Resolution to Commence Business Rescue Proceedings 
Commercial insolvency, sometimes called cash flow insolvency (connoting an inability to pay 
debts as they fall due) is a common early symptom of financial distress in a company.292 At 
this juncture, the company’s liabilities may, but do not necessarily, exceed its assets – which 
would constitute factual insolvency as distinct from commercial insolvency.293  
 
If the board has reasonable grounds to believe the company is financially distressed, the Act 
implicitly requires the directors to confront the situation and either place the company in 
business rescue or explain in writing to all affected persons why, as a board, they are not doing 
so.294. The fact that the company has been placed in liquidation is not a barrier to its 
commencing business rescue;295 in such circumstances, the board is not permitted to resolve 
that the company enter business rescue296 but there is no bar on an affected person’s applying 
to court for an order that the company commence business rescue.  
 
The board of directors of a company is usually well placed to become aware at an early stage 
of the company’s actual or pending financial distress. A report of the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission report released in 2015297 reflects that 90 percent of business 
                                                          
292 Goode, R.M.,  The Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law, (Sweet & Maxwell), 3rd Edition, 2005, pages 86-87 
293 Ibid. 
294 Section 129(7); in terms of s 128 (1) (f)“financially distressed”, in reference to a particular company at any 
particular time, means that- 
(i) it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its debts as they become due 
and payable within the immediately ensuing six months; or 
(ii) it appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six 
months; 
295 See Welman v Marcelle Props 193CC and Another (33958/2011) [2012] ZAGPJHC 32, para 28; Sulzer Pumps 
(South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v O&M Engineering CC [2015] ZAGPPHC 59 para 23; Merchant West Working Capital 
Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd & Another [2013] ZAGPPHC 109 
para 8 and Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd & Another [2012] ZAWCHC 33 para 11. To the same 
effect, see Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden No and Others (18486/2013) [2013] ZAGPJHC 148, 
para 47. 
296 Section 129(2)(a). 
297 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, Business Rescue Status Quo Report, Prepared by Pretorius, 
M. of Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, 2015, page 31.  
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rescue proceedings commenced via board resolutions and the remaining 10 percent via 
applications to court by affected persons. 
 
The ease of access into business rescue via a board resolution (subject to possible formal 
objection by an affected person) is one of the factors that identifies the South Africa’s business 
rescue regime as debtor-friendly.298 The board is thereby in a position to initiate the process in 
order to temporarily escape pressure from creditors299 through the coming into force of the 
statutory moratorium. The directors may be motivated primarily by a desire to avoid liquidation 
in order to avoid the consequential loss of their source of income.300 On the other hand, the 
ease of entry into business rescue via a board resolution opens the door for unsalvageable 
companies.301 A filtering mechanism in this regard is desirable.302 
 
Business rescue commences immediately the board has passed and filed the requisite resolution 
with the Commission or when the court has given its consent to file such a resolution.303  At 
this juncture, the statutory moratorium takes effect304 but the creditors and other affected 
persons have the right to apply to the High Court to set aside the board resolution.305  
 
                                                          
298 In Ex parte: Nell N.O. and Others (45279/14) [2014] ZAGPPHC 620, para 27 the judge commented that a 
resolution of the board to commence business rescue mechanism is an easier route into business rescue than 
an application to court In this regard, see also dicta in Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others (2015/24751) 
[2015] ZAGPJHC 189; para 4 where the company had passed the resolution without the knowledge of the 
shareholders.  
299 In Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others (2015/24751) [2015] ZAGPJHC 189; 84 Spilg, J. specified factors 
to be considered when determining whether the directors had initiated business rescue proceedings in bad faith, 
namely:  the attitude of the major creditors; whether the company has assets; whether there are possibilities of 
funding for it to be rescued; whether the company intends to implement a plan that meets the objectives 
stipulated by the statute and whether there is a reasonable prospect of the plan being implemented. 
300 Where directors take the initiative they avoid the legal risks involved in continuing to manage an insolvent or 
near insolvent company. 
301 See African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & Others (228/2014) [2015] 
ZASCA 69; 2015, where the company filed for business rescue in circumstances where there were no prospects 
of financial recovery. A similar issue has arisen in Sweden; see Lofalk, G., ‘The Far-reaching Reforms of Swedish 
Insolvency Legislation, ` Eurofenix (Autumn 2003), pages 8-11, and Bergstrom, C. and Others, `Secured Debt and 
the Likelihood of Reorganisation,’ 21 International Review of Law and Economics, (2002), page 359. 
302 The Court has the power, on application by an affected person, to set aside board`s resolution under s 130 
(1) (a) of the 2008 Act. 
303 Section 132 (1) (a) of the 2008 Act, further all the directors should sign a business rescue resolution agreement 
document failure to do so the resolution is at risk of being set aside of failure to comply with the procedure as 
it is provided under Section 129 of the 2008 Act; this was situation was witnessed in DH Brothers Industries (Pty) 
Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP) para 16 
304 Once a creditor has failed to pay a debt, the creditors have the right to enforce  repayment’ seeesection 129 
(1) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. This is subject to any credit agreement in a restructuring order or 
proceedings as provide for in s 129 (2) of the statute. 
305 Section 130 (4) of the 2008 Act, explained later in this chapter. 
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The Act places an obligation on the board of directors in this regard..306 If the board has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed, but it does not pass a 
resolution to commence business rescue, the board is obliged to inform each affected party in 
writing why such a resolution was not passed and filed. This is in compliance with the objective 
of the legislation that seeks to identify and then rehabilitate financially distressed 
companies..307 . 
 
The Act attempts to pre-empt abusive conduct in this regard308 by requiring the board to act in 
good faith.309 It is submitted that the Act could profitably be more explicit in this regard. 
 
3.2.2 Setting Aside Business Rescue Resolution  
An affected person is given the right to apply to court to set aside a resolution of the board of 
directors for the commencement of business rescue.310 The grounds for doing so are specified 
in the Act. The court is given a discretion as to whether to receive a report from the practitioner 
as to whether the company appears to be financially distressed and if so whether there is a 
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.311  
 
A director who has not voted against the resolution has the right to apply to court to set aside 
the board resolution.312  A further basis for judicial intervention is that accorded to any affected 
party if the company has not adhered to the procedural requirements for the filing of the 
resolution. These provisions of the Act will fall to be interpreted in accordance with the 
                                                          
306 Section 129 (7) of the 2008 Act 
307 In the USA Chapter 11 sections 303 and 105 provide for a business judgement. 
308 Section 130 (5) (c) (iii) of the Act, provides that if the court finds that there were no reasonable grounds for 
believing that the company would be unlikely to pay all of its debts as they became due and payable, an order 
of costs may be made against any director who voted in favour of the resolution to commence business rescue 
proceedings, unless the court is satisfied that the director acted in good faith and on the basis of information 
that the director was entitled to rely upon in terms of section 76(4) and (5). In appropriate circumstances, the 
directors can be subjected to other liabilities for carrying on business recklessly, with gross negligence or for any 
fraudulent purpose as envisaged in Section 77 and 22 (1) of the 2008 Act. 
309 See Climax Concrete Products CC t/a Climax Concrete Products CC v Evening Flame Trading 449 (Pty) Ltd and 
Others (812/2012) [2012] ZAECPEHC 39, para 19. 
310 Section 130 (1) (a) of the 2008 Act provides for setting aside the resolution, on the grounds that: 
(i) there is no reasonable basis for believing that the company is financially distressed; 
(ii) there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing the company or; 
(iii) the company has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements set out in section 129. 
311 Section 130 (5) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
312 Section 130 (2) of the 2008 Act grants a right to a director who in good faith voted for the resolution to apply 
to set it aside after he or she has discovered that the information were false or misleading.  
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decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality313 which emphasised the importance of context in statutory interpretation.  
 
One of the statutory criteria to be applied by the court where application is made for the setting 
aside of the board resolution in this regard is that it would be “just and equitable” to do so.314 
This aspect of the legislative provisions came under critical scrutiny in Absa Bank Limited v 
Caine NO and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited and Another315 where the view was 
expressed that this ground should also have been made available to creditors and affected 
persons seeking the setting aside of the resolution. Similar criticism was voiced by the court in 
DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others.316  
 
The “just and equitable” criterion in this context came under scrutiny by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nell N.O. and Others317where the court 
observed that – 
 
“It has been suggested that the effect of the inclusion of sub-para (ii) in this section 
is to introduce a fourth ground for setting aside a resolution to commence business 
rescue in addition to those set out in s 130 (1) (a). I do not think that is correct. This 
appears to me to be yet another case in a long line… in which the legislation uses 
the disjunctive word `or`, where the provisions are to be read conjunctively and the 
word `and` would have been more appropriate. Where to give the word `or` a 
disjunctive meaning would lead to inconsistency between the two subsections it is 
appropriate to read it conjunctively as if it were `and`. This has the effect of 
reconciling s 130 (1) (a) and s 130 (5) (a) and limiting the grounds upon which an 
application to set aside a resolution can be brought, whilst conferring on the court 
in all instances a discretion, to be exercised on the grounds of justice and equity in 
the light of all the evidence as to whether the resolution should be set aside” 
[Emphasis supplied].   
 
                                                          
313 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 18. 
314 Section 130 (5) (a) (ii) of the 2008 Act. 
315 (2813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46 para 26. 
316 (3878/2013) [2013] ZAKZPHC 56 para 18. 
317 (35/2014) [2015] ZASCA 76 para 31 
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After the passing and filing of the board resolution to commence business rescue, the company 
is protected, for the duration of the business rescue process, by a moratorium against any legal 
or enforcement proceedings,318 although the legislation does not impose a complete bar in this 
regard and, moreover, an affected person has the right to apply to court to set aside the 
resolution.319 In this regard, the legislation attempts to balance the rights of the company 
against the rights of creditors and other affected persons, as was noted in Suidwes Landbou 
(Pty) Ltd v Wynlandi Boerdery CC and Others320 where the judge commented that the right to 
apply for the setting aside of the board resolution was intended to prevent the business rescue 
process from being abused by the management of the company and that after a business rescue 
plan has been adopted, the creditors’ right in this regard terminates.321 It is significant that, in 
terms of the legislation, it is not open to the company’s creditors to argue that the board 
resolution should be set aside on the ground that it is ‘just and equitable’ to do so.  
 
According to Section 130 (5), when considering an application in terms of subsection (1) (a) 
to set aside the company`s resolution, the court may:- 
(a) set aside the resolution:- 
(i) on any grounds set out in subsection (1); or  
(ii) if, having regard to all of the evidence, the court considers that it is otherwise 
just and equitable to do so. [Emphasis supplied] 
 
The presence of the word “or” between sub-sections (i) and (ii) is significant in making ‘just 
and equitable’ considerations a self-standing criterion. 
 
3.2.3 Court Application for Business Rescue Proceedings 
An “affected person” has the right to apply to court for the commencement of business rescue 
proceedings.322 The court has the power to grant such an order on the basis of any of the 
following criteria:323 
(i) the company is financially distressed;  
                                                          
318 Section 133 of the 2008 Act  
319 See Ayotte, K and Morrison, E., ` Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, Journal of Legal Analysis`, (2009)1 
(2), page 539. 
320 (1510/2013) [2013] ZANWHC 73 para 20 
321 (1510/2013) [2013] ZANWHC 73 para 23 
322 Section 131 (1) of the 2008 Act. 
323 Section 131 (4) (1) (a) (i)-(iii) of the 2008 Act. 
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(ii) the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation under 
or in terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to employment-related 
matters; or  
(iii) it is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons and there is a 
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company.   
These grounds reflect that the situation is having a direct impact on the company’s creditors. 
This study will examine the first and third ground.  
 
By comparison, in the now-repealed system of judicial management the bar was placed higher 
– the applicant was required to demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that the company would 
be enabled to pay all of its debts.324 In Noordkaap Lewendhawe Ko-operasie Bpk v 
Schreuder325 the word “probability” in this context was interpreted by distinguishing it from a 
“possibility” and the court concluded that the former expression connotes a likelihood of the 
occurrence of the event.  
 
This interpretation was adopted in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 (Pty) Ltd.326 where it was held that an applicant for an order for the 
commencement of business rescue must lay before the court a well-researched basis for 
concluding that the company is capable of being rescued, and not mere speculation.327  
 
This approach has been endorsed in subsequent decisions such as AG Petzetakis International 
Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Marley Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd and 
Another Intervening)328 where the court took cognisance of the two alternative objectives of 
business rescue, the second being that a greater return would be secured for the company’s 
creditors and shareholders than would be achieved by  immediate liquidation.  
 
There is now general acceptance by the courts of the proposition articulated in Oakdene Square 
Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others329 that – 
 
                                                          
324 Section 427 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973; section 195 (1) of the Companies Act 46 of 1926. 
325 (1974) 3 SA 102 (A)   
326 [2011] ZAWCHC 442 para 21  
327[2011] ZAWCHC 442 paras 24 and 25. 
328 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) 
3292013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) para 29  
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“a reasonable prospect is less than a reasonable probability but more than a mere 
speculative suggestion. It must be a prospect based on reasonable grounds”.  [Emphasis 
supplied] 
 
The lesser requirement of showing a mere ‘reasonable prospect’ in this regard significantly 
reduces the evidential burden for creditors, bearing in mind the likelihood that they have little 
knowledge of the company`s financial affairs.330  
 
This interpretation has been followed in later decisions.331 In Propspec Investments v Pacific 
Coast Investments 97 Ltd and Another,332 it was held that an applicant need not provide a 
detailed rescue plan, as this is the later task of the business rescue practitioner after a thorough 
investigation of the company`s managerial and financial affairs.333 It has been held that an 
applicant need do no more than explain a strategy that, if developed into a plan, could achieve 
the objectives of business rescue.334 
 
Nevertheless, this interpretation – which is the one currently followed by the courts –  makes 
it easier for affected persons, particularly directors and shareholders, to apply for an order 
placing the company in business rescue as a mere delaying tactic,335 aimed at halting or setting 
                                                          
330 See Joubert, E.P and Loubser, A., ‘Executive Directors n Business Rescue: Employees or Something Else?,’ 
(2016) De Jure, page 99 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2225-7160/2016/v49n1a6  accessed 
27.09.2016.  
331 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd v Pello NO, China Construction Bank Corporation Johannesburg Branch v Crystal 
Lagoon Investments 53 (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAGPJHC 54;  Ex parte: Target Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and Another v Cawood N.O. and Others (21955/14; 34775/14) [2015] ZAGPPHC 740. See the 
criticism in Delport, P., Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2012) page 464 . 
332 2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) paras (11) and (15) 
333 Section 141 of the 2008 Act lays down the duties of the business rescue practitioner. In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 
153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and Another v Bestvest and Another (21857/2011, 2106/2012) [2012] ZAWCHC 139, para 41 
the court said: “That is not to say, however, that a party can approach the Court for the appointment of a 
business rescue practitioner with flimsy grounds in the hope that the practitioner will provide the panacea to its 
problems. The application must set out sufficient facts, if necessary augmented by documentary evidence, from 
which a Court would be able to assess the prospects of success before exercising its discretion” 
334 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd v Pellow NO and Others, China Construction Bank Corporation Johannesburg Branch 
v Crystal Lagoon Investments 53 (Pty) Ltd and Others (GSJ) [2014] ZASCA 162 para 13; see also Finance Factors 
CC v Jayesem (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] ZAKZDHC 45 para 22 and Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd (2013) 
para 31.  
335 This was among the reasons for providing strict requirement for one to apply for business brought forward 
by the judge in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd2012 (2) SA 
423 (WCC) para 24 
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aside liquidation proceedings.336 This stratagem is particularly tempting where the directors are 
also the only shareholders.337 In general, shareholders may be tempted to engage in such tactics 
because they often stand to receive little or nothing if the company is liquidated.338 On the other 
hand, the aforementioned lesser burden of proof assists those who have an untainted desire to 
see the company rescued from pending insolvent liquidation. 
 
In adjudicating an application for the commencement of business rescue, the court takes 
cognizance of the applicant’s access or lack of access to relevant information regarding the 
company and the prospects of a successful rescue.339  
 
Section 131 (4) (a) of the 2008 Act is expressed as allowing the court to consider any of three 
grounds for placing the company in business rescue. This provision envisages that an applicant 
does not have to show that the company is financially distressed or that it has failed to pay over 
any amount in terms of an obligation under or in terms of public regulation and that an applicant 
is entitled to rely only on the third ground, namely that such an order is otherwise just and 
equitable and that there is a reasonable prospect of “rescuing the company” by achieving either 
of two objectives specified in s 128(1)(b)(iii).  
 
However, where business rescue commences by the passing of a board resolution, s 129(1)(a) 
read with s 130(1)(a)(i) makes clear that the company must be “financially distressed”. Section 
128(1) (b) (iii) is explicit that the alternative goals of business rescue are, firstly, that the 
company will continue in existence on a solvent basis or, if that is impossible, that the process 
                                                          
336 Section 131 (6) of the 2008 Act. These affected persons are necessitated to use the court application for 
that purpose as the legislation already limit the board resolution to pass business rescue proceedings when the 
company is in liquidation under Section 129 (2) (a) of the 2008 Act. 
337 Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others (2015/24751) [2015] ZAGPJHC 189; [2015] 4 All SA 433 (GJ), 
para 140 where the court learnt that one of the shareholders passed a resolution to activate the business 
rescue proceedings without the knowledge of his co-shareholders. 
338 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, Business Rescue Status Quo Report, Prepared by M. 
Pretorius of Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, 2015, page 31, discovered that the applicants 
for court route business rescue proceedings are 50 percent shareholders and 50 percent unsatisfied creditors. 
It was further stated that for the shareholders of a company, the only incentive they have is to delay the whole 
process of winding a company, see McCormack, G., Corporate Rescue Law-An Anglo-American Perspective, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., (2008), page 293 and Jacobs, L., ‘Post-Commencement Financing and Creditors: A 
South African Perspective,’ (2012), 33 (3), Comp.Law., page 95, and White, J. J., `Death and Resurrection of 
Secured Credit,’ (2004), 12, ABILR, page 149 
339 The company’s financial records may be erroneous or faulty; see Yatzee Investments CC (Under Business 
Rescue) v Capx Finance (Pty) Ltd and Others (3300/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 117, para 13 
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will result in a better return for the company’s creditors and shareholders than would be 
achieved by immediate liquidation.  
 
The drafting of these poorly integrated provisions calls for improvement.340 This study is of 
the view that the grounds set out under Section 131 (4) (a) of the 2008 Act would be more 
coherent if they were redrafted to read as follows:  
(i) The company is financially distressed; 
(ii) The company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation under 
or in terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to employment-related 
matters;  and 
(iii)  It is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons and there is a 
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company.   
 
3.2.4 Application of Business Rescue Proceedings when a Company is in Liquidation 
The application to court for an order that a company commence business rescue proceedings 
can be made “at any time”, save where the board has already so resolved.341 The phrase “at any 
time” extends to the situation where the company in question is already in liquidation.342 If 
such an order is sought when the company is in liquidation, the court will suspend the 
liquidation process until the adjudication of the application.343 The applicant for an order 
should ensure that all the requirements necessary for the court to grant a suspension of the 
liquidation proceeding are adhered to, as provided for in Section 131 (2).344  
 
In Sulzer Pumps (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v O&M Engineering CC the applicant for a winding-
up order argued that there is a clear distinction between Section 129 (2) (a) and 131 (6) of the 
                                                          
340 See Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nell N.O. and Others (35/2014) [2015] ZASCA 76 para 31 
when dealing with the setting aside of a business rescue resolution. 
341 Section 131 (1) of the 2008 Act. In Sulzer Pumps (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v O&M Engineering CC [2015] 
ZAGPPHC 59 para 29 the court said that, “….The Act does not set out a time frame within in which an application 
for business rescue must be launched, but it must be done at a time when the entity can still be rescued, not to 
thwart an application for liquidation”.. 
342 This is so regardless of the stage of the liquidation process; Richter v Absa Bank Limited (20181/2014) [2015] 
ZASCA 100, para 12. T  
343 Section 131 (6) (a) of the 2008 Act. In Industrial Development Corporation of SA Limited and Another v 
Schroeder N.O and Others (1958/2015) [2015] ZAECMHC 65, para 43 it was held that the liquidation proceedings 
will be suspended, not discharged. 
344 See Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Gas 2 Liquids (Pty) Limited (45543/2012) [2016] ZAGPJHC 38, 
where neither the provisional liquidator nor all of the affected person had been given notice and the court 
refused to grant an order, following in this regard the decisions in Taboo Trading 232 (Pty) Ltd v Pro Wreck Scrap 
Metal CC and others 2013 (6) SA 141 KZP and ABSA Bank Ltd v Summer Lodge (Pty) Ltd 2013 (5) SA 444 GNP. 
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2008 Act345 and that, where liquidation proceedings are already initiated, the only way for the 
liquidation to be suspended is via an application as envisaged in Section 131 (6), and not by a 
board resolution. The act of the company’s board, in resolving to commence business rescue 
when liquidation had already commenced, was held to have the purpose of frustrating the 
liquidation proceedings.346  
 
The conversion from winding up proceedings to business rescue is a significant mode of entry 
into business rescue in allowing entry by a company in liquidation that, nonetheless, 
demonstrably has a reasonable prospect of being rescued.  
 
3.3 Competing Objectives of Business Rescue Proceedings  
A business rescue practitioner will have to choose which of the two alternative objectives of 
business rescue to pursue. Restoration of the company to viability has been held to be the 
primary objective,347 as was recognised by Eloff, AJ in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) 
Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 (Pty) Ltd348 where he compared the South African 
corporate rescue process to that in Australia..  
 
In Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another, Anglo Irish Bank 
Corporation Ltd v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another349 it was held that the 
notion of a “better return to creditors” envisaged in Section 128 (b) (iii) should be interpreted 
in context and with reference to a business rescue plan under Section 150. To similar effect, 
see Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and 
Another350 where the court said that: 
 
“The potential business rescue plan provided for in ss 128 (1) (b) (iii) has two objects 
in mind, the primary object being to facilitate the continued existence of the company 
in a state of solvency and secondly and in the alternative, in the event that the primary 
objective cannot be achieved or appears not to be viable, to facilitate a better return for 
                                                          
345 [2015] ZAGPPHC 59 para 25 
346 [2015] ZAGPPHC 59 para 30 and para 28.  
347 This view was also observed in Joubert, E.P., ‘”Reasonable Possibility” versus “Reasonable Prospect”: Did 
Business Rescue Succeed in Creating a better than Judicial Management?,’ 76, Contemp. Roman-Dutch L., 
(2013)page 52 
348 [2011] ZAWCHC 442 para 2. 
349 [2012] ZAWCHC 33 para 13. 
350 (3813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 40.  
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the creditors or shareholders of the company than would result from immediate 
liquidation.” 
 
The court went on to say that: 
 
“If a purposive approach to interpretation of the Act is undertaken as one should do, 
there can be little doubt that companies, being vehicles to obtain economic and social 
well-being, should rather be rescued if at all possible, than “killed” in a winding-up 
process…”351 
 
That the primary objective of business rescue is restoring the company to viability was 
affirmed in Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden No and Others352 where the 
judge drew a distinction in this regard between business rescue and judicial management. In 
AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Marley 
Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another Intervening),353 Coetzee AJ drew a further distinction in 
saying – 
 
“Section 131 (4) does not incorporate the alternative object of the (at the s 131 stage 
future) rescue plan which is referred to in s 128, namely a plan which could result in 
better return of creditors or shareholders than would result from immediate 
liquidation. It seems that the intention of the legislation at this point is as follows: 
[17.1] The requirements for granting of a s 131 rescue order include the company 
under consideration must have a reasonable prospect of recovery. 
[17.2] Once a company is under business rescue, its rescue plan may be aimed at the 
alternative object, namely a better return than the return of immediate liquidation.” 
[Emphasis supplied] 
 
“Rescuing the company” is defined in s 128 (1) (h) as achieving one of two alternative 
objectives. Some decisions have accorded the two objectives equal weight.354 In Newcity 
Group (Pty) Ltd v Pellow NO and Others, China Construction Bank Corporation 
                                                          
351 Ibid para 47. 
352 (18486/2013) [2013] ZAGPJHC 148, paras 43 and 44 
353 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ), para 17 
354 Anderson, C., ‘Viewing the Proposed South African Business Rescue Provisions from an Australian 
Perspective,’ 4, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, (2008), page 110.  
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Johannesburg Branch v Crystal Lagoon Investments 53 (Pty) Ltd and Others (GSJ),355 the 
court held that an order for the commencement of business rescue will be granted at least if a 
rescue plan could fulfil either of the two objectives. 
 
Either objective, it seems, can be pursued as long as there is a serious and executable plan. To 
the same effect, see Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd356 and 
Griessel.357 
 
In Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf and Country Estate (Pty) Ltd.358 Binns-Ward J accorded 
equal weight to the two objectives. It is noteworthy, however, that the alternative objective is 
not aimed at “rescuing the company” in any ordinary sense of the word.359 
 
Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others Case (2013),360 which is now a leading 
decision, held that either of the two objectives envisaged in Section 128 (1) (b) would qualify 
as a “business rescue” in terms of Section 131 (4).361 This accords with administration 
proceedings in the UK, where the objectives of the proceedings are not considered to follow 
the priority in which they are stated in the legislation.362 
 
In Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Beginsel NO and Others363 the court 
granted an order for business rescue to continue on the basis that the process could result in 
better returns for creditors than immediate liquidation.  
 
                                                          
355[2013] ZAGPJHC 54 para 23 
356 2013 (1) SA 542 para 7  
357 [2015] ZAGPJHC 189 [2015] para 79.  
358 2012 2 SA 378 (WCC) para 17 
359 See also Griessel and Another Case [2015],. 
360 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) at para 26 and para 31 
361 To similar effect, see Ex parte: Target Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another 
v Cawood N.O. and Others (21955/14; 34775/14) [2015] ZAGPPHC 740, para 50. 
362 Section 8 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 provides that- 
(3) The purposes for whose achievement an administration order may be made are- 
(a) the survival of the company, and the whole or any part of its undertaking, as a going concern ; 
(b) the approval of a voluntary arrangement under Part 1 ; 
(c) the sanctioning under section 425 of the Companies Act of a compromise or arrangement between the 
company and any such persons as are mentioned in that section ; and 
(d) a more advantageous realisation of the company's assets than would be effected on a winding up ;  
and the order shall specify the purpose or purposes for which it is made. [Emphasis supplied] 
363 2013 (1) SA 307 (WCC). 
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Section 128 (1) (b) (iii) of the 2008 Act clearly states the objectives of business rescue 
proceedings in hierarchal form as, first, “the development and implementation, if approved, of 
a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other 
liabilities, and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in 
existence on a solvent basis” and –   
 
“if it is not possible for the company to so continue in existence results in a better return 
for the company’s creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate 
liquidation of the company;” [Emphasis supplied]. 
 
Arguably the decision in Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd,364 where the court gave equal 
weight to both objectives is inconsistent, at least on the literal level, with the language of this 
provision.  
 
Loubser365 has suggested that business rescue proceedings can properly focus on the sale of the 
business, or part of it, for the purpose of paying the creditors more than would have been 
payable on immediate liquidation. In Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden NO 
and Others the court endorsed the sale of a company as a going concern to achieve a similar 
objective.366 A distinction needs to be drawn in this regard between disposing of the company`s 
business and merely disposing of its assets. In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd Case 
(2013),367 the court held that business rescue should not be employed as an alternative to 
liquidation.368  
 
                                                          
364 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) at para 26 and para 31 
365Loubser, A., `Tilting at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African 
Law’ page 144. 
366 [2013] ZAGPJHC 148 para 44. In Oakdene Square Properties Case (2012) para 12, the court held that the 
general philosophy of business rescue is the recognition of the value of the business as a going concern rather 
than the juristic person itself. Hence the name “business rescue” and not “company rescue”.  See also Merchant 
West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) LTD v Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd and 
Another [2013] ZAGPJHC 109, para 5 
367 2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) at para 33, the court referred to making the business rescue process an avenue for 
liquidating companies; this arguably, is contrary to what is envisaged in the legislation. 
368 Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another (3813/2013, 
3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46 para 52. The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor 
Regime, (2016), page 8 states that where an enterprise is viable, meaning that it can be rehabilitated, its assets 
are often more valuable if retained in a rehabilitated business than if sold in liquidation. 
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The alternative objective of business rescue can encourage creditors, particularly unsecured 
creditors, to support the process.369 Secured creditors are inherently less likely to give their 
support to a business plan aimed at securing the alternative objective, since their interests are 
probably fully catered for by the security they hold.370  
 
In the UK, the administration process focuses on the repayment of creditors. In France, the 
rehabilitation legislation focuses on protecting employees’ jobs by keeping the company in 
existence. In the USA, Chapter 11 salvaging the business as a going concern is the primary 
objective of corporate reorganisation.  
 
3.4 Business Rescue Practitioner Role and its Impact on the Rights of Creditors 
The business rescue process is inherently difficult to administer where the legislation leaves 
the company’s incumbent management in office whilst according priority to the interests of the 
company’s creditors.371  
 
As was noted earlier, South Africa’s now-repealed judicial management process protected the 
company’s creditors, while the new business rescue regime leaves the company’s directors in 
office, with overall control vested in the business rescue practitioner. The objective of the 
legislature in this this regard was to balance the interests of the company and its creditors372 
with a statutory system of checks and balances.373 
 
In South Africa, the person mandated by the Act to oversee the process of business rescue is 
termed the “supervisor” or the “business rescue practitioner” or simply “the practitioner”.374 
                                                          
369  See Balcerowicz, E. and others, ‘The Development of Insolvency Procedures in Transition Economies: A 
Comparative Analysis,’ (2003), CASE Network Studies and Analyses No.254, page 20 
370Pretorius, M., Addressing Principal-Agent Conflict in Business Rescue, (2014), Conference Paper, page 330, 
available at 
http://www.repository.up.ac.za/bitsream/handle/2263/51599/Pretorius_Addressing_2014.pdf?sequence=1&i
sAllowed=y accessed on 27.04.2016 
371 Yang, M. and Li, X., ‘The History of Corporate Rescue in the UK,’ (2012), 8 (13)Asian Social Science, page 23. 
372  See S Franken ‘Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’, (2004) 5(4) 
European Business Organization Law Review, page 652; to the same effect, see J Qian and PE Straha ‘How Laws 
and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Banks Loans’, (2007) 62 (6) The Journal of Finance page 
2804. 
373 See Carapeto, M., Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?, Working Paper, Cass Business School, 
(2003), page 8; see also, see McCormarck, G., Corporate Rescue Law- An Anglo-American Perspective, Edward 
Elgal Publishing Ltd., (2008), page 294. For a contrary view, see Yang, M. and Li, X., ‘The History of Corporate 
Rescue in the UK,’ (2012), 8 (13) Asian Social Science, page 23. 
374 This official goes by different colloquial titles in different jurisdictions, including turnaround professional, 
company doctor, risk consultant, business recovery specialist, interim turnaround executive, cash-flow manager, 
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The rescue process envisages several avenues for the appointment of a business rescue 
practitioner. Firstly, the practitioner is appointed by the board where the process was 
commenced by a board resolution.375 A second method is nomination by the affected persons 
who applied to court for the commencement of business rescue.376 A court appointment of a 
business rescue practitioner is subject to ratification by the holders of the majority of the 
independent creditors’ voting interests. The creditors’ right to nominate a rescue practitioner 
gives them an indirect voice in the rescue process.377 The practitioner is expected to act in a 
professional manner and with integrity.378  
 
The Act gives a potential voice to disgruntled creditors where the practitioner was appointed 
by a board resolution by giving them the right to apply, on specified statutory grounds, to have 
the appointment of the business rescue practitioner set aside.379 Creditors may resort to such an 
application if they believe it necessary to protect their interests, such as where they suspect that 
                                                          
debt management company, private equity provider, credit adviser and insurer, independent business reviewer 
and solution provider; see MacDonald, D., ‘Turnaround Finance,’ (2002) Recovery (Winter) 17; Bingham, R., 
‘Poacher Turned Gamekeeper,’ (2003), Recovery (Winter) 27; and Godfrey, P., ‘The Turnaround Practitioner – 
Advisor or Director?’ (2002) 18 IL&P 3 
375 Section 129 (3) (b) of the 2008 Act 
376 Section 131 (5) of the 2008 Act; the practitioner is appointed by the court but is nominated by the affected 
persons. 
377Tomasic, R., `Creditors Participation in Insolvency Proceedings-Towards the Adoption of International 
Standards,’ (2006), 14, Insolvency Law Journal, page 178 
378 See Absa Bank Limited v Caine NO and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another 
(3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 10 where the court referred to an earlier decision where the business 
rescue practitioner was removed from the office after failing to: (i) convene a first meeting of creditors in terms 
of s 147 of the Act within the requisite ten business days after being appointed; (ii) prepare and publish a 
business rescue plan in terms of s 150 of the Act which had to be done within twenty five business days after 
being appointed; (iii) convene a meeting in terms of s 151; (iv) file a report in terms of s 132(3)(a) or apply for 
an extension of the three month period within which the business rescue had to be finalised. Similar failures of 
duty on the part of the business rescue practitioner feature in African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba 
Furniture Manufacturers & Others (228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69 para 35; Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand 
Coal Reclaimers Proprietary Limited and Others (10862/14) [2015] ZAKZPHC 21 paras 55 and 58; Absa Bank 
Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another (3813/2013, 3915/2013) 
[2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 56; and Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others (2015/24751) [2015] ZAGPJHC 189; 
para 8.  See also Pretorius, M. Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, Business Rescue Status 
Quo Report Final Report, (30 March 2015), page 75 available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/files/4714/2866/7900/Report_Number_3_ammended_30032015.pdf accessed on 23 
November 2015. See also Finch, V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd Edition, CUP 
(2009) page 245.  
379 Section 130 (1) (b) read with Section 139 (2) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) of the 2008 Act., see Stevenson, M., `The 
Enterprise Bill 2002 - A Move Towards Rescue Culture?,’ 2002, 15(7), Insolv.Int., page 54. See also Frisby, S., 
Report on Insolvency Outcomes, A paper presented to the Insolvency Service, available at 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk accessed on 23.11.2015 
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the practitioner is not maintaining a proper balance between the company’s interests and their 
own,380 or where they suspect that the practitioner is engaging in some form of abuse.381  
 
A rigorous exercise of his statutory powers of investigation382 is crucial to the exercise of the 
mandate of the business rescue practitioner and the prospects of a successful rescue of the 
company. 
 
It is well established that when a company becomes financially distressed, the duties of its 
directors, previously confined to the interests of the company, extend to a certain degree to its 
creditors; see Kinsela v Russell Kinsela383and Liquidator of West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd.384 
 
3.4.1 Compensation of the Business Rescue Practitioners 
The remuneration of the rescue practitioner impacts on the company’s creditors. The Minister 
of Trade and Industry is empowered to prescribe the scale of fees in this regard.385 The scale 
takes account of the size of the company.386 The agreement between the company in business 
rescue and the practitioner in this regard has to be approved by the creditors’ meeting. The 
practitioner’s claim is accorded preferential status in the business rescue process.387  
 
                                                          
380 Ayotte, K and Morrison, E., ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’, Journal of Legal Analysis, (2009)1 
(2), page 512. 
381 See for example Ex parte: Nell N.O. and Others (45279/14) [2014] ZAGPPHC 620; para 35 footnote 16 where 
the court commented that, for example, the directors could use the moratorium to dispose of or dissipate 
company assets and conceal or destroy evidence.  
382 In terms of s 141 of the 2008 Act. 
383 (1984) 4 A.CL.C. 215 at page 221; the court said that ‘But where a company is insolvent the interests of the 
creditors intrude. They become prospectively entitled, through the mechanisms of liquidation, to displace the 
power of the shareholders and directors to deal with the company`s assets.’ 
384 (1988) 4 B.C.C. 30. 
385 Section 143 of the 2008 Act read with Regulation 128 of the Companies Regulation 2011 Gazetted on 26 April 
2011: Tariff of Fees for Business Rescue Practitioners:  
(1)The basic remuneration of a business rescue practitioner, as contemplated in section 143 (1), to be 
determined at the time of the appointment of the practitioner by the company, or the court, as the case 
may be, may not exceed; 
(a) R 1250 per hour, to a maximum of R 15 625 per day, (inclusive of VAT) in the case of a small company; 
(b) R 1500 per hour, to a maximum of R 18 750 per day, (inclusive of VAT) in the case of a medium 
company; or 
(c) R 2000 per hour, to a maximum of R 25 000 per day, (inclusive of VAT) in the case of a large company, 
or a state owned company. 
386 See Absa Bank Limited v Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) Ltd and Others (70637/13) [2014] ZAGPPHC 1048 para 66 
where it had come to light that the business rescue practitioner was being remunerated on the scale appropriate 
to a large company while the company in question was a small one.; see also Pretorius, M. Business Enterprises 
at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, Business Rescue Status Quo Report Final Report, (30 March 2015), page 37. 





The legislation attempts toprovide for  entrance into  business rescue  either by the relatively 
quick and simple route of a   board resolution or by the more complex route of a High Court 
application. The latter process will require an applicant creditor to have s substantial knowledge 
of the company’s financial and other affairs, and such knowledge may be difficult for a creditor 
to acquire. In relation to both of these routes, the legislation needs to have safeguards against 
abuses, such as application for entry into business rescue as a mere stratagem for the company 
to delay payments of its debts by getting the benefit of the statutory moratorium.388  
 
The relative merits of the two alternative objectives of business rescue proceedings have given 
rise to some controversy, revealed inter alia in the judicial interpretation that does not accord 
the payment of creditors’ claims against the company as a priority.. However, other decisions 
have given equal weight to the two alternative objectives of business rescue. 
 
This study takes the view that the primary objective of the legislation, as currently drafted, 
makes the rescue of financially distressed companies the broad primary objective and the 
payment of creditors’ claims as an ancillary objective. 
 
This study has revealed that creditors, who are so minded, have a significant chance of 
succeeding in setting aside the appointment of a business rescue practitioner who was chosen 
by the directors, and securing the appointment of a practitioner of their choosing.  
 
The business rescue process leaves in office the incumbent board of directors of the company, 
and required to work with and under the supervision of the business rescue practitioner. The 
possibility of conflicts of interest in this arrangement is significant. A business rescue 
practitioner who was nominated by the company’s creditors is likely to enjoy the latter’s 
confidence, but there is a risk that the business rescue process may then, de facto, be 
substantially controlled by creditors who will strive primarily to secure the payment of their 
claims, even if this will leave the company struggling to survive financially in the future. 
  
                                                          
388 This is against the intent of the business rescue process, as was noted in Griessel and Another v Lizemore 




LEGAL IMPLICATIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS DURING THE 
EXECUTION OF THE BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
The company’s creditors are key players in the business rescue process. Chapter 6 of the Act 
requires the creditors to be given notice of “each court proceeding, . . .  decision . .   . or other 
relevant event concerning the business rescue proceedings”.389 Other affected persons’ interests 
also have to be taken into account.390  
 
This chapter examines the statutory provisions in terms of which creditors are involved in the 
business rescue process and relevant judicial decisions.  
 
4.2 Position of Creditors in the Hearing of the Business Rescue Proceedings 
Mere entry into the corporate rescue process of course carries no guarantee of a successful 
outcome. It is important that the confidence of the creditors be retained throughout.391  
 
After business rescue commences, affected persons have the right to participate in the hearing 
of any application by an affected person to set aside the board’s resolution in this regard.392 In 
Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Group Ltd and Another (Advantage Project 
Managers (Pty) Ltd intervening,393 Rodgers AJ said: 
 
“I do not think that the legislature contemplated that an affected party would have 
to apply for leave to intervene in the proceedings. If the person is an ‘affected 
person’ such person has a right to participate in the hearing. If the person wishes to 
file affidavits, the court will obviously need to regulate the procedure to be followed 
to ensure fairness to all concerned.” 
 
                                                          
389 Section 145(1)(a) 2008 Act. 
390 See Qian, J. and Strahan, P.E., ‘How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Banks Loans,’ 
62 (6), The Journal of Finance, (2007), page 2804 and Mülbert, P. O., ‘A Synthetic View of Different Concepts of 
Creditor Protection - Or a High-Level Framework for Corporate Creditor Protection’, (2006). ECGI - Law Working 
Paper No. 60/2006, page 22. 
391 See Franken, S., ‘Creditor and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited,’ (2004), 4, European 
Business Organization Law Review, page 672. A statutory business rescue regime that impedes creditors’ 
intervention in the corporate rescue process is a debtor-oriented system.  . 
392 Section 130 (4) and 131 (3) of the 2008 Act. 
393 2011 (5) SA (WCC) para 21.  
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To similar effect, in Engen Petroleum Ltd v Multi Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others,394 Boruchowitz 
J said:  
 
“Engen, as an affected person, has a right to participate in the hearing of an 
application in terms of s 131(1) of the Act. It would not require leave of the court 
to intervene. Such leave may, however, be necessary as a procedural requirement.” 
 
In AG Petzetakis International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (Marley 
Pipe Systems (Pty) Ltd and Another Intervening)395 Coetzee AJ said: 
 
“In my view it follows that they have an automatic right to participate in the 
proceedings (without the need for an order authorising them to do so) in terms of 
section 130(4) of the Companies Act…” 
 
This right of participation continues after the adoption of the business rescue plan, as was 
observed in African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd and Others. A business rescue plan may provide that a creditor loses the right to 
enforce a debt if the plan is implemented according to its terms and conditions.396 As was noted 
earlier, the creditors have the right, during the rescue proceedings, to participate in any hearing 
arising out of the proceedings,397 and can thus voice grievances and protect their interests.  
 
The judiciary’s divergent views regarding the need to join creditors as parties to judicial 
hearings in the course of business rescue have now been settled by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. In Absa Bank Limited v Golden Dividend 339 (Pty) Ltd and Others398, the court took 
the view that mere notice to creditors sufficed, and that they need not be joined as parties, 
saying that this would be illogical and contrary to commercial practice. On appeal, (reported 
as Absa Bank Limited v E J Naude NO and Others399) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that 
where a creditor of the company makes application to court in respect of business rescue 
proceedings, the other creditors must be cited as joint applicants. It was held that mere 
                                                          
394 2012 (5) SA 596 (GSJ) para 30 
3952012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) para 4 
396 Section 154 of the 2008 Act. 
397 Section 144 (3) (a) and (b), Section 145 (1) (a)-(c) and Section 146 (a)-(c) of the 2008 Act.  
398 (70637/13) [2014] ZAGPPHC 1048, para 29 and 30. 
399 [2016] ZASCA 78. 
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knowledge on the part of the other creditors of an application to set aside an adopted business 
rescue plan does not suffice; they have a direct and substantial interest in the matter and their 
non-joinder would be a fatal flaw in the application.400 This decision was followed in Stalcor 
(Pty) Ltd v Kritzinger NO and Others where it was held that creditors have a direct and 
substantial interest in every matter that arises during the operation of the proceedings.401.   
 
4.3 Creditors’ Committee in Protection of Creditors’ Interests 
The Companies Act provides that a creditors’ committee may be formed as part of the business 
rescue proceedings.402 Such a committee has a useful role in protecting the rights of the 
creditors.403. The importance of establishing a creditors’ committee is expressed in the World 
Bank Principles as follows.404 
 
“The role, rights and governance of creditors in the proceedings should be clearly 
defined. Creditor interests should be safeguarded by appropriate means that enable 
creditors to effectively monitor and participated in insolvency proceedings to ensure 
fairness and integrity, including by creation of a creditor’s committee as a preferred 
mechanism, especially in cases involving numerous creditors.” [Emphasis supplied]. 
 
                                                          
400 The court referred to Gordon v Department of Health, Kwazulu-Natal [2008] ZASCA 99; 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA) 
where it was held that if an order or judgment cannot be sustained without prejudicing the interests of third 
parties, then those third parties have a legal interest in the matter and must be joined as parties.  
401 (1841/2012) [2016] ZAFSHC 6 at para 43. Rampai, J said:  “The mere service of the application, although it 
constituted proper notice to them, was not enough.  It could not be regarded as a proper substitute for citation.  
Citation is not a mere notice of intention to go to war.  It is a declaration of war itself.  Once a party is cited as a 
respondent then the rules of engagement apply.  Such rules do not have their ordinarily binding force where, as 
in this matter, an uncited individual or enterprise with a direct and substantial interest in the relief sought is 
merely given notice of the application.” 
402 Section 145 (3) and 147 (1) (b) of the 2008 Act. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 2004 states at para 129 
that: “The insolvency law should facilitate the active participation of creditors in insolvency proceedings such 
as through a creditor committee, a special representative or other mechanism for representation. The 
insolvency law should specify whether a committee or other representation is required in all insolvency 
proceedings. Where the interests and categories of creditors involved in insolvency proceedings are diverse 
and participation will not be facilitated by the appointment of a single committee or representative, the 
insolvency law may provide for the appointment of different creditor committees or representatives.” 
403 Mindlin, P., `Comparative Analysis of Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act, 71 of 2008`,(Business 
Rescue Proceedings), Presentation to the Company Law Symposium organised by the South Africa Department 
of Trade and Industry & The Specialist Committee on Company Law, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1.03.2013, 
page 21, available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/business-_regulation/presentations/symposium1of6.pdf 
accessed on 23.11.2015 In comparing South African business rescue proceedings with that of USA Chapter 11, 
Mindlin states that a creditors’ committee is among the factors that has played a major role in the success of 
reorganisation under Chapter 11. 
404 Principle C7.1 of the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regime, (2016) 
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The World Bank Principles goes on to say:405 
 
“Where a committee is established, it duties and functions, and the rules for the 
committee`s membership, quorum and voting, and the conduct of meetings should be 
specified by the law. It should be consulted on non-routine matters in the case and have 
the ability to be heard in key decisions in the proceeding. The committee should have 
the right to request relevant and necessary information form the debtor. It should serve 
as a conduit for the processing and distributing that information to other creditors and 
for organising creditors on critical issues. In reorganisation proceedings, creditors 
should be entitled to participate in the selection of the insolvency representative.”   
 
In line with this approach, Section 149 (1) of the 2008 Act states that a committee of creditors: 
 
“(a) may consult with the practitioner about any matter relating to the business rescue 
proceedings, but may not direct or instruct the practitioner;  
(b) may, on behalf of the general body of creditors or employees, respectively, receive 
and consider reports relating to the business rescue proceedings; and  
(c) must act independently of the practitioner to ensure fair and unbiased representation 
of creditors’ or employees’406 interests.” 
 
The creditors’ committee has a role to play in ensuring that a business rescue plan is adhered 
to407 and that the company’s incumbent management does not abuse its powers.408 
 
The Act is silent as to who is to bear the operating costs of a creditors’ committee,409 and this 
lacuna needs to be filled. Arguably, the costs should be part of the administrative expenses of the 
                                                          
405 Principle C7.2 of the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regime, (2016) 
406 Similar duties apply to the employees committee. 
407 What is required, but is missing from the Act, is a mechanism  to solve conflicting matters that might arise 
between the business rescue practitioner and the creditors’ committee, as is suggested in the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, page 204. 
408 UNCITRAL (2004) page 242.  Tomasic, R., `Creditors’ Participation in Insolvency Proceedings-Towards the 
Adoption of International Standards,’ (2006), 14, Insolvency Law Journal, page 179 notes that that the 
incumbent management of the company is likely to influence decisions during the rescue, but the creditors will 
exercise oversight. 
409  The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (2004) recommendation 130 states that: “…The insolvency law should 
specify how the costs of the creditors committee would be paid.” 
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business rescue proceedings410 with appropriate safeguards to prevent improper collusion with 
the rescue practitioner in regard to such costs.411 
 
The Act allows employees to form a committee to safeguard their rights412 and there may thus 
be costs incurred by two committees. The Act does not compel the formation of such 
committees.413  The employees of a company are creditors to the extent of their unpaid 
remuneration, reimbursement or other entitlements.414 Nor does the Act prescribe the number of 
members of such committees; a one-person committee is conceivable. 
 
4.4 The Business Rescue Plan and its Impact on Creditors' Rights 
The business rescue practitioner has a duty to prepare a business rescue plan415 within 25 days 
after appointment.416 A registered trade representing employees, and any employee not so 
represented, has the right to propose an alternative business plan if the one prepared by the 
practitioner is rejected.417 The creditors can informally make proposals to the practitioner for a 
business rescue plan.418  
  
                                                          
410 See Mindlin, P, op cit, page 21. 
411 Section 149 (1) (a) and (c) of the 2008 Act requires that the committee neither direct nor instruct the rescue 
practitioner when consulting on the implementation of the rescue plan. In Zhang, H. and others, `The Balance 
of Power in Insolvency Proceedings: The Case of China’, (2011), 8 International Corporate Rescue, pages 10-13 
it is said that banks and other financial institutions possess great influence in the functioning of creditors’ 
committees. This influence normally starts during the preparation of the rescue proposal where their status as 
secured creditors ensures  that their interests are not put at risk. Zhang, H., ‘Balance of Power and Control of 
Creditors in the Insolvency Procedures: a Comparison between the UK and China,’ (2011), 26 (10), J.I.B.L.R., page 
493 states that in practice these financial institutions decide the fate of the rehabilitation proceedings. 
412 Section 148 of the 2008 Act.  
413 Section 147 (1) (1) of the Act 2008 states that during the creditors’ meeting they “may determine whether or 
not a committee of creditors should be appointed” [Emphasis supplied]. It is noted in UNCITRAL (2004), page 
250 that creditors` committees are costly and not time-effective unless the procedure includes creditors with 
diverse interests in the rescue process and are also geographically dispersed.  
414 Section 144 (2) of the Act 2008; see A G Petzetakis International Holding Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and 
Others 2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) para 12. 
415 Section 140 (1) (d) of the 2008 Act has similarities to the UK administration mechanism where the rescue 
proposal is prepared by the administrator; by contrast, in the USA, France and Spain the management of 
company has a mandate to do so, but in some cases the creditors prepare the rehabilitation plan. 
416 Section 150 (5) of the 2008 Act. The Act does not specify the consequences where the business rescue 
practitioner fails to publish the business rescue plan on time.  
417 Section 144 (3) (g) (i) and 145 (2) (b) (I) of the 2008 Act. In Ex parte: Target Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another v Cawood N.O. and Others (21955/14; 34775/14) [2015] ZAGPPHC 740, 
para 36 and Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Ply) Ltd and Another; Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited 
v West City Precinct Properties (Ply) Ltd and Another (19075/11, 15584/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33 para 8 the 
persuasive power of creditors in developing a business rescue plan under Chapter 6 was acknowledged.  
418 Section 145 (1) (d) of the 2008 Act. 
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The Act does not oblige the practitioner to liase with other stakeholders in the preparation of the 
rescue plan, though it would almost always be wise to do so, and the practitioner has the right to 
apply to court to set aside the result of a vote rejecting the business plan.419  
 
In Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand Coal Reclaimers Proprietary Limited420 Pillay J said: 
 
“The scheme of business rescue is manifestly to enable stakeholders to participate 
meaningfully in the business rescue process. The [business rescue plan] must make full 
disclosure of all relevant information to enable stakeholders to make informed decisions. 
Such disclosure must also seek to clarify and convince stakeholders of the factual basis 
for seeking business rescue, that it is a genuine attempt at rescuing the business and not a 
subversive exercise to enable the company to avoid its creditors. A BRP cannot hope to 
secure buy-in or endorsement of stakeholders without full and meaningful disclosure of 
relevant information.” 
 
In order to enhance the prospects of consensus in regard to the business plan, the Act, as was 
noted earlier, explicitly permits creditors to informally propose a rescue plan to the rescue 
practitioner.421  
 
A question arises as to whether creditors can utilise corporate restructuring, as encountered in 
in the US Chapter 11 and UK administration proceedings, such as a compromise or a “pre-pack 
sale” of the whole or part of the company’s business or assets.422 The business rescue 
provisions of South Africa’s Companies Act are silent in this regard, but has no explicit 
prohibition on including a compromise with creditors in a business rescue plan, for the Act 
does not specify any arrangement that is barred from inclusion in a business rescue plan. 
 
The Act does however provide positively for what must be contained in a business rescue 
plan.423  
                                                          
419 Section 153 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act 2008. 
420 [2015] ZAKZPHC 21 at para 24. 
421 Section 145 (1) (d) of the 2008 Act. 
422 The sale of assets in pre-packing administration has been endorsed by the English courts; see Re T&D 
Industries Plc [2000] 1 WLR 646; Re Transbus International Limited [2004] 1 WLR 2654 where the administrator 
was allowed to sell the company`s assets immediately after his appointment.  




In Eveleigh v Dowmont Snacks (Pty) Ltd and Others424 the court said that mere speculative 
suggestions would not suffice in a business rescue plan.  
 
In Commissioner of South African Revenue Services v Beginsel NO and Others425, the court 
said that the content of the rescue plan depends on the nature of and the reason for financial 
distress of the company in question. Fourie J went on to say: 
 
“It follows, in my view, that, upon a proper construction of section 150 (2), substantial 
compliance with the requirements of the section will suffice. This would, in my view, 
mean that, where sufficient information, along the lines envisaged by section 150 (2), 
has been provided to enable interested parties to take an informed decision in 
considering whether a proposed business rescue plan should be adopted or rejected, 
there would have been substantial compliance” [Emphasis supplied]. 
 
A similar view was taken in Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd 
and Another426 where Van De Merwe J said that: 
 
“…It also seems to me that to require, as a minimum, concrete and objectively 
ascertainable details of the likely cost of rendering the company able to commence 
or resume its business, and the likely availability of the necessary cash resource in 
order to enable the source, nature and extent of the resources that are likely to be 
available to the company, as well as the basis and terms on which such resources will 
                                                          
Part A- Background: this includes the list of company`s assets and their status, also provide a list of post-
commencement creditors if any, together with the creditors status if the company was to go to liquidation. Also 
remuneration agreement of business rescue practitioner should be seen in this part of the rescue plan 
Part B- Proposals: this should provide for the duration which the plan will be implemented, the extent of claims 
payment to the creditors. It should also give the significance of the business rescue proceeding as to compare 
with the immediate liquidation together with the impact of plan to each class of creditors. 
Part C-Assumptions and Conditions: this includes any available condition for the rescue plan to operation and 
implemented to the fully and any impact that it will have on the employees. Importantly the envisaged 
company`s financial stability for the coming three years. 
This mandatory content of a South African business rescue plan resembles the provisions of Section 1123 (a) of 
the Bankruptcy Act 1978 in the USA where Chapter 11 states that the reorganisation plan must provide for the 
classes of creditors, the treatment of creditors that will be barred from claiming, and must provide for the equal 
treatment of each creditor in a given class, except where the creditor has agreed to less favourable treatment.  
424 [2014] ZAKZPHC 1 at para 29. 
425[2012] ZAWCHC 194 para 38. 
4262013 (1) SA 542 para 15. 
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be available, tantamount to requiring proof of a profitability and unjustifiability limits 
the availability of business rescue proceedings” [Emphasis supplied].  
 
The judicial interpretation of Section 150 (2) of the 2008 Act, which prescribes the content of 
a rescue plan, thus emphasises the right of creditors to detailed information before voting on a 
proposed plan.427  
 
Significantly, Part E of the 2008 Act which deals with “compromises with creditors”428 does 
not extend to companies undergoing business rescue proceedings.429 However, there is no bar 
on a business rescue plan incorporating a compromise with creditors430 and this is 
foreshadowed in Section 150 (2) (b) (ii) of the 2008 Act which provides that the plan must 
specify the extent to which a company is to be released from the payment of its debts.  
 
In Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Others431 
the applicant argued that a compromise with creditors could be achieved only under the 
compromise provisions of Section 155 of the 2008 Act. The court rejected this argument and 
pointed out that the non-availability of a compromise with creditors in business rescue could 
prevent the realisation of the objectives of the process.432  
 
                                                          
427 See further Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 
(WCC) para 24 where Eloff J expanded on what should be contained in a business rescue plan. He said that if the 
objective was to salvage the company, the plan should include:-the likely costs of rendering the company able 
to commence with its intended business, or to resume the conduct of its core business; the likely availability of 
the necessary cash resource in order to enable the ailing company to meet its day-to-day expenditure, once its 
trading operations commenced or resumed. If the company was to be reliant on loan capital or other facilities, 
some concrete indication should be given of the extent and the basis or terms upon which it will be available, 
including the availability of any other necessary resources, such as raw materials and human capital; and the 
reasons why it was being suggested that the proposed business plan would have a reasonable prospect of 
success.. In the event the business rescue proceeding aimed at increasing the value of creditors’ claims 
compared to what they would accrue if there was an immediate winding-up, then the following details should 
be given, namely, the source, nature and extent of the resources likely to be available to the company; and the 
basis and terms upon which such resources would be available..  
428 This is a mechanism that provides for the restructuring of the financial affairs of a company without the 
involvement of a business rescue practitioner, it allows a company to propose a compromise or arrangement to 
its creditors in a form that is almost identical to a business rescue plan. 
429 Section 155 (1) of the 2008 Act.  
430 Section 150 (2) of the 2008 Act. 
431 [2016] ZAWCHC 124, para 35. 
432[2016] ZAWCHC 124, para 35, the court further stated that Sections 150 (2) and 154 (2) of the 2008 Act have 
incorporated elements of compromise for the purpose of smoothly functioning of business rescue proceedings. 
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4.5 Approving the Business Rescue Plan and the Role of Creditors 
Creditors’ meetings have a role to play in ensuring that the rights of creditors are respected in 
a business rescue process. The Act provides that the agenda of the meeting must be set out in 
the notice of the meeting.433 . Creditors are required to participate in the process in good faith.434 
 
At creditors’ meetings, decisions are taken by voting,435 including a vote on a proposed 
business rescue plan.436 Voting is on the basis of voting interests,437 determined with reference 
to the amount owed to the creditor by the company.438 The rescue plan will be deemed to be 
approved if it is supported by creditors who hold more than 75 percent of the voting interests439 
and 50 percent of the independent creditors’ voting interests.440 The criteria for approving the 
plan, varies between jurisdictions.441  
                                                          
433 Section 147 of the 2008 Act provides as follows: First meeting of creditors 
(1) Within 10 business days after being appointed, the practitioner must convene, and preside over, a first 
meeting of creditors, at which- 
(a) the practitioner- 
(i) must inform the creditors whether the practitioner believes that there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing 
the company; and 
(ii) may receive proof of claims by creditors; and 
(b) the creditors may determine whether or not a committee of creditors should be appointed and, if so, may 
appoint the members of the committee. 
(2) The practitioner must give notice of the first meeting of creditors to every creditor of the company whose 
name and address is known to, or can reasonably be obtained by, the practitioner, setting out the- 
(a) date, time and place of the meeting; and 
(b) agenda for the meeting. 
(3) At any meeting of creditors, other than the meeting contemplated in section 151, a decision supported by 
the holders of a simple majority of the independent creditors‟ voting interests voted on a matter, is the decision 
of the meeting on that matter. 
434 In Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd v AFGRIi Operations Ltd and Another, In Re; AFGRI 
Operations Limited v Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd.(666226/2011) [2012] ZAGPPHC 359 para 36 a creditor 
had decided not to approve the business plan before it had been developed. The court said in this regard that 
‘’I would imagine that at the very least there would be an obligation on [the creditor] to participate in good faith 
and to consider on its own merits or demerits any business plan proposed.’’ To similar effect, see Nedbank Ltd 
v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 497 (WCC) at para 55.   
435 Section 147 (3) of the 2008. 
436 Sections 145 (2) (a) and 146 (d) read with Section 152 of the 2008 Act. 
437 Section 128 (1) (j) of the 2008 Act defines “voting interest” to mean an interest as recognised, appraised 
and valued in terms of section 145(4) to (6). 
438 Section 145 (4) (a) provides that a secured or unsecured creditor has a voting interest equal to the value of 
the amount owed to that creditor by the company; and that (b) a concurrent creditor who would be 
subordinated in a liquidation has a voting interest, as independently and expertly appraised and valued at the 
request of the practitioner, equal to the amount, if any, that the creditor could reasonably expect to receive in 
such a liquidation of the company. 
439 Section 152 (2) (a) of the 2008 Act. 
440 Section 152 (2) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
441 For example in Bulgaria the passing of the plan requires a simple majority and half of the value of the claims, 
Croatia requires a simple majority of each group and half of the claims. The Czech Republic has two restructuring 
systems, the first requiring compulsory settlement by a simple majority and three quarters of the volume of 




In South Africa’s business rescue proceedings, creditors are grouped together in the voting 
process.442 The business rescue practitioner is required to hold separate meetings of the holders 
of company securities interests whose rights are to be altered.443  
 
In principle, it is not always advisable for a business rescue process to give the final say on a 
rescue plan to the company’s creditors444 for this effectively gives them a power of veto.445  A 
better balance needs to be struck between the affected parties.  
 
4.5.1 Rights of Creditors who Dissent from the Business Rescue Plan 
Once the business rescue plan is approved it binds all creditors regardless of whether they voted 
for or against it.446  The legislation should provide protection to the creditors who voted against 
it.447 The South African Companies Act provides a measure of such protection in that the 
business rescue plan may provide that, on implementation, a dissenting creditor has a right to 
                                                          
majority of each group and half of the volume of claims with a prohibition to obstruct; Hungary requires a simple 
majority and three quarter of volume of claims; Poland with its three systems, the compulsory settlement 
requires majority vote of three quarter of claims, the continuation it needs simple majority if creditors 
committee, Romania it requires two of six debtor categories approve by majority vote of three quarter of value 
of claims, and Slovakia majority vote of two third of value of claims. These illustrations were provided in a 
tabulated form in Balcerowicz, E. and others, ‘The Development of Insolvency Procedures in Transition 
Economies: A Comparative Analysis,’ (2003), CASE Network Studies and Analyses No.254, page 22   
442 Section 152 (2) of the 2008 Act unlike in compromise with creditor mechanism of Section 155 (6)  of the same 
Act where creditors are categorised in classes when voting.  
443 Section 152 (3) (c) (i) of the 2008 Act. 
444 Save for Section 153 (1) (a) (ii) and (b) (i) (bb) dealing with setting aside the results of the vote on the grounds 
that it was inappropriate by either the business rescue practitioner or any affected persons. 
445 See Asian Development Bank, Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Report of the office of 
the General Counsel on TA 5795-Reg: Insolvency Law Reforms, Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development 
Bank, 1, 2000, page 10-86; creditors’ voting interest is a means employed in corporate rescue mechanisms to 
determine whether to reject or accept the company`s rescue plan.. 
446 Section 152 (4) of the Act 2008. This provision can be termed a cram-down provision compelling the creditors 
to affirm matters . See Cassim, FHI and others, Contemporary Company Law, Claremont, Juta, (2012) 2nd Edition, 
page 907; see also Section 1129 (7) A of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 1978 Chapter 11 – in this mechanism it is 
the court that has the final say on the consideration of the reorganisation plan. There are two requirements for 
a cram-down provision; either that the act done ‘’does not discriminate unfairly’’ or that it is ‘’fair and 
equitable’’. 
447 See International Monetary Foundation, ‘Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues’, (1999) 
available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/ accessed on 27.04.2015. 
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enforce the claim against the company.448 The words “may”449 and “to the extent provided for 
in the business rescue plan” in Section 154 of the 2008 Act make clear that this will be so only 
where the business rescue plan so provides, and not otherwise.  
 
4.5.2 Rights of Creditors in Challenging the Approved Business Rescue Plan 
Arguably, the Companies Act should have stipulated the grounds that a disgruntled creditor 
can rely on when challenging the approved rescue plan, as in the case of a rejected plan.450 It 
is submitted that the Act could profitably have laid down the following grounds, namely: 
(a) The meetings were not conducted in a proper manner; 
(b) Corruption and fraud; 
(c) The business rescue plan containing prejudicial terms;  
(d) Irregularities during the voting process; 
(e) Creditors within a class having been subjected to unequal treatment.  
 
                                                          
448 Section 154 Discharge of debts and claims: 
 (1) A business rescue plan may provide that, if it is implemented in accordance with its terms and conditions, a 
creditor who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of a debt owing to that creditor will lose the right 
to enforce the relevant debt or part of it. 
(2) If a business rescue plan has been approved and implemented in accordance with this Chapter, a creditor is 
not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company immediately before the beginning of the business rescue 
process, except to the extent provided for in the business rescue plan [Emphasis supplied]. 
449 The word “may” expresses a possibility whereas the word “shall” expresses command, instruction or 
obligation;  Concise Oxford English Dictionary 12 edition, (2011). The word “shall” could imply a. 
450 In African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 
(6) SA 471 (GNP) at 494, paragraph [59], the court said:“…it is clear from a reading of chapter 6 of the Act that it 
does not provide a remedy to an affected person to challenge the approval and adoption of a proposed business 
rescue plan, regardless of whether such approval and adoption are preliminary or final. The adoption of a 
business rescue plan in terms of s 152 of the Act is pivotal to the business rescue process. Once adopted, the 
practitioner is required to manage and conduct the affairs of the company in accordance with the plan. The 
practitioner is responsible for the implementation of the business rescue plan: this task is not left to some other 
authority. Nor, for that matter, is there any need for court approval of the business rescue plan. Accordingly, 
once adopted or approved in terms of s 152 of the Act, a business rescue plan forms the foundation of the 
business rescue proceedings to which all the affected persons are bound. It is binding on the company, on each 
creditor and on every holder of securities of the company, whether or not that person was present at the 
meeting, voted in favour of adoption of the plan or in the case of creditors, had proven their claims against the 
company. What occurs is a process of 'cram-down' in terms of which creditors are forced to accept a business 
rescue plan, even against their wishes — thus enabling the business rescue to proceed, despite objections by 
disgruntled creditors. It is with this object in mind that the legislature saw fit not to provide a disgruntled party 
with a judicial remedy to seek to set aside the adoption of a business rescue plan. It is, therefore, not open to any 
'affected person', after the plan has been adopted, to seek to set it aside. Nor is it permissible for an 'affected 
person' to seek to set aside the proceedings of the second meeting of creditors in terms of which a business plan 
is adopted” [Emphasis supplied]. 
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4.5.3 Concept of ‘Inappropriateness’ and its Impact on the Creditors 
A voting majority451 of disgruntled creditors can be overridden where the court allows the 
passing of a rescue plan that received less support than the required minimum voting interest.452  
 
A business rescue practitioner is entitled to apply to court for the setting aside of the voting 
results of the business rescue plan on the grounds that the result was inappropriate.453 Any 
affected person has the right to apply to court for a similar order on the same grounds.454 The 
court must decide the issue on specific statutory grounds.455 These provisions were applied in 
Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd v Spar Group Limited and Another456 where the court 
said that, although creditors had voted against the rescue plan, once the plan was adopted the 
distressed company was assured of securing finance that would enable the company to 
restructure and become financially sound and the restructuring of the company would save 52 
employees from becoming unemployed. The court thus took special account of the last-
mentioned factor.457 The court set aside the result of the vote; as being irrational and 
inappropriate in the light of the objectives of business rescue proceedings.458 Similar provisions 
are found in other jurisdictions.459  
 
                                                          
451 The word ‘majority’ refers to a voting interest. 
452 The statute has not defined the term. In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Berryplum Retailers CC and Others 
(47327/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC 255, para 37 the court said that adopting a dictionary meaning would not be 
appropriate. To the same effect, see FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business rescue) (734/2015) [2017] 
ZASCA 50, para 33. 
453 Section 153 (1) (a) (ii) of the 2008 Act. 
454 Section 153 (1) (b) (i) (bb) of the 2008 Act. 
455 Section 153 (7) of the 2008 Act states that. 
         On an application contemplated in subsection (1) (a) (ii), or (1) (b) (i) (bb), a court may order that 
the vote on a business rescue plan to set aside if the court is satisfied that it is reasonable and just 
to do so, having regard to- 
         (a)the interests represented by the person or persons who voted against the proposed business 
rescue plan; 
         (b) the provision, if any, made in the proposed business rescue plan with respect to the interests 
of that person or those persons; and 
         (c) a fair and reasonable estimate of the return to that person, or those persons, if the company 
were to be liquidated. 
456 [2014] ZAGPPHC 688 paras 35 and 36. 
457 See also FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business rescue) (734/2015) [2017] ZASCA 50 para 38. 
458 [2014] ZAGPPHC 688 para 38. 
459 Similar judicial discretion is found in UK where the court  has the final say on the consideration of a 
rehabilitation plan. In the event that the creditors disapprove the plan, the court has the power to make any 
order that it thinks fit; see Section 24 (5) of the Insolvency Act 1986.. 
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In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd and Another460 the court laid down two stages when determining 
to set aside the vote results on grounds of inappropriateness. The court first considered whether 
the votes were inappropriate; if so, then it determined whether it would be just and reasonable 
to set aside the voting result. In Ex parte: Target Shelf 284 CC; Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and Another v Cawood N.O. and Others.461 the court disagreed with the two 
stage approach, and Kubushi, J said: 
 
“Much as I am in alignment with the said two stage approach adopted in the Shoprite 
Checkers-judgment above, I am not in agreement with its conclusion that only if a 
court finds that the vote is inappropriate can it consider whether it would be 
reasonable and just to set the vote aside. To my mind, a court is enjoined to consider 
whether it is reasonable and just to set the vote aside even where it made a finding 
that the vote is appropriate” [Emphasis supplied]. 
 
It is clear that a business rescue plan that holds out a ‘reasonable prospect’ of success should 
be implemented, despite the votes cast against it, and that a plan that has no such prospect 
cannot be allowed to proceed.462  
 
Secured and unsecured creditors, respectively, often have different prospects for the ultimate 
payment of their claims and consequently may have differing views as to whether a rescue 
should be attempted;463 secured creditors may have little or nothing to gain from business 
rescue, even where it is successful, and may therefore be less in favour. 464 This aspect has been 
                                                          
460 (47327/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC 255, para 40. 
461[2015] ZAGPPHC 740, para 33.  
462 In Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Others [2016] ZAWCHC 124, 
para 76 the court said, “Although affected parties are entitled to be heard in relation to a business rescue 
application, and although their attitude is relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion, the existence of a 
reasonable prospect of rescuing the company is a factual question, albeit involving a value judgment. If the court 
concludes that reasonable grounds for believing that the business can be rescued have not been established, the 
court cannot grant the application, even though many affected parties may support business rescue” [Emphasis 
supplied]. 
463 See FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business rescue) (734/2015) [2017] ZASCA 50 para 34.. 
464 In Griessel and Another Case (2015),para 81 the court said, “…There may be sound commercial reasons why 
suppliers within the manufacturing and service industries would wish to support the continued existence of a 
company (and possibly under existing ownership) in order to avoid the knock-on effect to their own 
commercial viability if a major manufacturer to whom they supply and have given credit, or from whom they 
receive essential components or product for on-sale, closes down” 
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the subject of comment by the courts465 and in the scholarly literature.466 Creditors are unlikely 
to vote in favour of a business plan that holds no additional benefit for them,467 but the courts 
take cognisance of the broad policy objectives of business rescue468 and are prepared to 
exercise their power to overturn a voting result that was “inappropriate”.469   
 
Where the court makes an order setting aside a board resolution for the commencement of 
business rescue, the Act explicitly provides for two ancillary orders that the court can make,470 
but the Act is silent as to what ancillary order can be made where the court sets aside the 
creditors’ vote as inappropriate.471 This lacuna seems to leave the court with two options. 
Firstly, the rescue practitioner could be ordered to call another creditors’ meeting for a second 
vote; secondly, the court could declare the rescue plan adopted. In Copper Sunset Trading 220 
(Pty) Ltd v Spar Group Limited and Another,472 the High Court set aside the result of the vote 
as inappropriate and declared the business plan to be duly adopted, subject to certain 
conditions, and this decision has since been followed.473  
 
                                                          
465 In FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business rescue) (734/2015) [2017] ZASCA 50 para 37 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal took into consideration, inter alia, that the secured creditors favoured immediate winding up. 
466 See Delport, P. et al, Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 Companies Act 71 of 2008 and 
Commentary (eds) (Service issue 10, May 2015) page 530 which comments that since “…creditors are to be 
allowed to exercise their votes freely it has to be assumed that they would only vote in support of the business 
rescue plan if its implementation would be to their benefit.” 
467 See FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business rescue) (734/2015) [2017] ZASCA 50 para 36. 
Liquidation is a speedier process than business rescue proceedings (KJ Food supra para 85).  Hence if the 
prospective returns are similar, a creditor is likely to favour liquidation over business rescue..  
468 In Koen v. Wedgewood Village Golf Estate 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) para 14 the court said:  “…It is clear that the 
legislature has recognised that liquidation of companies more frequently that not occasions significant collateral 
damage, both economically and socially, with attendant destruction of wealth and livelihoods. It is obvious that 
it is in the public interest that the incidents of such adverse socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where 
reasonably possible…” [Emphasis supplied]. 
469 See Joubert, E.P and Loubser, A., ‘Executive Directors n Business Rescue: Employees or Something Else?,’ 
(2016) De Jure, page 103 where the authors refer in this regard to the decisions in Copper Sunset Trading 220 
(Pty) Ltd v SPAR Group Ltd and Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd 2014 6 SA 214 (LP) and KJ Foods CC v First National 
Bank [2015] ZAGPPHC 221.  
470 Section 130 (5) (c) of the 2008 Act. 
471 See in DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd supra para 58. 
472 [2014] ZAGPPHC 688 para 1 sub-para 2. 
473 See KJ Foods CC v First National Bank (75627/2013) [2015] ZAGPPHC 221, para 1 (ii) declared the business 
rescue plan adopted after holding that the vote results were inappropriate.  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal said at para 89 :“…once the result of the vote is set aside the business rescue plan is adopted, by 
the operation of law. That being the position, the declaratory order of the court a quo that the revised 
business rescue plan be adopted by the affected parties is superfluous, as it is a natural consequence of the 
setting aside of the result of the vote.” 
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4.6 The Notice of Implementation of the Business Rescue Plan 
A rescue plan, once adopted, must then undergo ‘substantial implementation’,474 but the Act 
does not define this concept. Companies Regulations 2011 under paragraph 125 (5) stipulates 
Form CoR 125.3 as the notice to be used by the rescue practitioner to provide the stakeholders 
and general public with notification that the business rescue plan has achieved substantial 
implementation. This notice does not make any provision for the practitioner to explain the 
extent to which the rescue plan has achieved its objectives. Arguably, the Act should have 
made this a formal requirement.475 As matters stand, the Companies Commission will be 
unaware of the manner in which the plan has achieved its objectives. By contrast, the Act 
provides in detail for what must be included in a notice for filing for the commencement of 
business rescue proceedings.476  
  
The dictionary meaning of the word “substantial” is of great importance, size, or value.477 The 
Act does not require “full” implementation of the rescue plan for the proceedings to come to 
an end. When notice of substantial implementation is filed, the business rescue proceedings 
terminate,478 the moratorium falls away and creditors again have the right to institute legal 
proceedings against the company and take enforcement action in respect of their claims.  
 
4.7 Timeframe of Business Rescue Proceedings and its Impact on Creditors 
The companies’ legislation provides tight time constraints for the execution of the phrases in 
the business rescue proceeding process.  In Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd v Spar Group 
Limited and Another479 the court said – 
 
                                                          
474 Section 132 (2) (c) and 152 (8) of the 2008 Act. 
475 See Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden No and Others[2013] ZAGPJHC 148 para 84 where 
Kgomo J said “A business rescue plan should be implemented ‘as soon as yesterday’, i.e. immediately, if the ailing 
business is to be healed and rehabilitated for the benefit of all creditors and affected and interested instances. 
If leave is granted to launch the legal proceedings the applicant seeks to institute, it may be years before such 
proceedings are finalised. At that stage, the company in financial distress would be long dead and buried. This, 
cannot be what was intended when the system of judicial management was replaced with the new baby or 
animal-business rescue” [Emphasis supplied]. 
476 Section 129 (3) of the 2008 Act requires a company that has adopted and filed a business rescue resolution 
to publish a notice of the resolution within five days. Section 129 (7) provides that “if the board of a company 
has reasonable grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed, but the board has not adopted a 
resolution contemplated in this section, the board must deliver a written notice to each affected person, setting 
out the criteria referred to in Section 128 (f) that are applicable to the company, and its reasons for not adopting 
a resolution contemplated in this section” 
477 Concise Oxford English Dictionary 12th edition, (2011). 
478 Section 132(2)(b). 
479(365/2014) ZAGPPHC 688, para 17. 
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“…this application was brought to court on urgent basis. In making out a case for 
urgency Counsel for the Applicant submitted, correctly in my view, that the real 
urgency lies in the fact that the Applicant does not have the luxury of time on its side: 
every day that passes in anticipation for the plan to be approved, it becomes more 
difficult for the applicant to turn itself around” [Emphasis supplied].  
 
In this regard, Makgoba J referred to the decision in Koen v Wedgewood Village Golf Estate480 
where Binns-Ward J said that – 
 
“…it is axiomatic that business rescue proceedings, by their very nature, must be 
conducted with maximum possible expedition. In most cases a failure to expeditiously 
implement rescue measure when a company is in financial distress will lessen or 
entirely negate the prospects of effective rescue. Legislative recognition of this axiom 
is reflected in the time lines given in terms of the Act for the implementation of the 
business rescue procedures if an order placing a company under supervision for that 
purpose is granted. There is also the consideration that the mere institution of business 
rescue proceedings however dubious might be their prospects of success in a given 
case materially affects the right of third parties to ensure their rights against the 
subject company…” [Emphasis supplied]. 
 
The  timelines laid down in the Act must be adhered by the rescue practitioner,481or an 
extension of time must be sought.482 If the practitioner has failed in this duty, the court can 
order his or her removal from office as was observed in in Re Absa Bank Ltd v Caine NO and 
Another.483  
                                                          
480 2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) para 10. 
481 An empirical study conducted in South Africa regarding stakeholders’ views on the operation of the business 
rescue proceedings (see Pretorius, M. Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, Business Rescue 
Status Quo Report Final Report, (30 March 2015), page 35) comments that rescue practitioners have found ways 
to “stretch” the timelines. One such practice is to state at the first creditors’ meeting that it will not be possible 
to have the completed plan within the 25-day time frame and to have the creditors vote for an extension.  
482 As it is enjoined by Sections 129 (3), 132 (3), 150 (5) of the 2008 Act. 
483 [2014] ZAFSHC 46 para 10;  the court referred to a decision involving the same parties which dealt with the 
removal of the business rescue practitioner following a total failure to abide to the timeframe provided by the 
statute. The court noted that the practitioner had failed to do the following: (i) convene a first meeting of 
creditors in terms of s 147 of the Act which had to be done within ten business days;(ii) prepare and publish a 
business rescue plan in terms of s 150 of the Act which had to be done within twenty five business days after 
being appointed; (iii)convene a meeting in terms of s 151 of the Act to determine the future of the two 
entities;(iv) file a report in terms of s 132 (3) (a) of the Act, or to apply for an extension of the three month period 




To ensure that the rights of creditors are protected during an attempted business rescue, they 
are given the statutory right to participate in every court hearing that involves the company in 
question. Further, creditors are entitled to form committees in order to safeguard their rights. 
Issue can arise in respect of such committees. The legislation does not specify the minimum 
number of members in such committees. Moreover, the various creditors may have divergent 
interests and differing economic strength, and such factors could affect the functioning of these 
committees. There is a possibility of the various committees having different agendas. 
 
The court has the final say in decisions made by the creditors’ meetings in respect of the 
proposed business rescue plan. The power of the court to set aside a voting result as 
inappropriate empowers the court to override a decision made by the creditors. This judicial 
power limits the influence exerted by the creditors in preparing and approving the rescue plan.  
 
The power of the court in this regard was regarded as necessary in order to enhance the prospect 
of a successful business rescue. Where creditors hold security for their debts, they may be 
reluctant to support a business rescue plan that would dilute the value of that security, and the 
overriding power of the court in this regard reveals the determination of the drafters of the Act 
to achieve the successful rescue of a company against resistance by the creditors.  
 
As regards the duration of the business rescue proceedings, the Act is tailored to allow the 
process to be conducted as expeditiously as possible, with due regard for the interests of the 
company’s creditors whose rights of enforcement have been stayed by the statutory 
moratorium, and with appropriate regard for the burden borne by the business rescue 
practitioner which may impel that person to seek extensions of time from the court or the 







NOTABLE ISSUES UNDER BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON CREDITORS’ RIGHTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Certain statutory aspects of business rescue deserve special attention by virtue of their impact 
on the rights of creditors and because they have been the subject of divergent judicial 
interpretation.  
 
This chapter considers aspects of the business rescue proceedings that have come under 
scrutiny in regard to creditors’ rights. These include the statutory moratorium, post-
commencement finance and the order of the payment of claims. The situation of sureties is 
considered, and the concept of a “binding offer” in this context.  
 
5.2 Evaluation of Moratorium on Creditors’ Enforcement Rights in Business Rescue 
Proceedings 
The preamble to South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008 acknowledges one of its objectives 
as being to provide for the efficient rescue of financially distressed companies.484 An important 
aspect of the statutory business rescue regime is the temporary moratorium that automatically 
comes into place for the duration of the process,485 and which is intended to give the company 
a breathing space in which creditors cannot institute or enforce legal proceedings for the 
payment of claims.486 The moratorium is intended to allow viable companies to get back on 
                                                          
484 Section 7 (k) of the 2008 Act. 
485 Section 133 (1) of the 2008 Act provides that:-(1) During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, 
including enforcement action, against the company, or in relation to any property belonging to the company, or 
lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with any forum, except- 
(a) with the written consent of the practitioner; 
(b) with the leave of the court and accordance with any terms the court considers suitable; 
(c) as a set-off against any claim made by the company in any legal proceedings, irrespective of whether 
those proceedings commenced before or after the business rescue proceedings began; 
(d) criminal proceedings against the company or any of its directors or officers; 
(e) proceedings concerning any property or right over which the company exercises the power of a trustee; 
or  
(f) proceedings by a regulatory authority in the execution of its duties after written notification to the 
business rescue practitioner. 
The moratorium in business rescue proceedings is temporary; see JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd and Others (7076/2015) [2016] ZAKZDHC 24; para 34. 
486 See INSOL International, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts (2000) 
which discusses the extent of co-operation that is expected of a creditor toward a distressed company during 
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their feet financially.487 Business rescue would seldom be possible without such a 
moratorium488 The moratorium also assists in ensuring the equal treatment of the company’s 
creditors, secured and unsecured.489 
 
In some jurisdictions, a moratorium is not automatic as it is in South Africa, but has to be 
imposed by court order.490 In Chapter 11 proceedings in the USA, the debtor company, once it 
has filed for the rehabilitation, is granted a ninety-day automatic stay of all proceedings. Some 
time limits also apply in South Africa’s business rescue.491 In the UK the moratorium in the 
administration proceedings must be supported by the creditors and it has to be approved by the 
court.492 An automatic right to a of stay of execution is vulnerable to abuse.493  
 
The legislative provisions need to be drafted in a way that retains the confidence of the 
company’s creditors494 In South Africa, creditors are entitled to seek the consent of the rescue 
practitioner or the leave of the court to institute or enforce legal proceedings against the 
                                                          
the moratorium. In Chetty v Hart (20323/2014) [2015] ZASCA 112; para 39 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated 
the said that, “Section 133(1) was enacted to protect a company under business rescue against claims from 
creditors. Its object is to prevent the practitioner being inundated with legal proceedings without sufficient time 
within which to consider whether or not the company should resist them and to prevent the company that is 
financially distressed from being dragged through litigation while it tries to recover from its financial woes. Its 
effect is to stay legal proceedings except in those circumstances mentioned in s 133(1)(a) to (e). The creditor 
may initiate or continue the proceedings in terms of s 133(1)(a) with the written consent of the practitioner.” 
487 Claessens, S. and Klapper, L.F., ‘Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865, page 6 and 8, available at 
www.univie.ac.at/bwl/ieu/lehre/ss06/..../debtor_in_possession.pdf , accessed on 25. July. 2014 
488 The Companies Act 46 of 1926 introduced a process of judicial management without providing for an 
automatic stay of legal proceeding against the company, but a later amendment provided for such a 
moratorium; see the Companies Act 11 of 1932, discussed above in Chapter 2.11.2. 
489 See Pretorius, M. and Rosslyn-Smith, W., ‘Expectations of a Business Rescue Plan: International Directives for 
Chapter 6 Implementation,’ (18)2, Southern Africa Business Review, (2014), page 114. 
490 India is an interesting example of a jurisdiction which had no moratorium for some creditors in its corporate 
reorganisation mechanism, following the enactment of the Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement 
of Security Interest Act 2002 and before Companies Act 2013 came to force. Before 2002 India under its Sick 
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985, companies could abuse the moratorium at the expense of 
creditors by prolonging the restructuring procedure for years, see Zwieten, K., ‘Corporate Rescue in India: The 
Influence of the Courts’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (2015), page 3. See also La Porte and others, ‘’Law 
and Finance’’, JPE, (106)6, (1998), page 1135 and 38.  
491 Section 132 (3) of the Act 2008. If the proceedings have not terminated within three months, the business 
rescue practitioner has the right to apply to court for an extension.  
492 Sections 10 and 11 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986. These provisions provide for a moratorium during the 
application stage and after the order for administration mechanism has been granted by the court.  
493 Haselman, R., and others, `How the Law Affects Lending,’ Columbia Law and Economic, (2006) Working Paper 
No.285, page 1 also observed that the presence of automatic moratorium undermines creditors’ right to enforce 
their security. 
494 As it is under Sections 130, 132, 134, 136, 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154 to mention but 
few of the 2008 Act. 
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company, although the bar against such proceedings in this regard is not absolute495 and the 
criteria on which consent or leave will be granted or refused are not made explicit in the Act. 
In Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies (Pty) Ltd and 
Another496 and Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden NO and Others497 it was held 
that leave to litigate would be granted only in special circumstances.  
 
Chapter 6 of the Act does not lay down the criteria to be applied in this regard,498 although the 
Act is very specific on other matters affecting the moratorium. The courts are thus not 
constrained by the Act in this regard and will take  account of the policy objectives of business 
rescue.499 Lifting the moratorium in respect of a creditor’s claim can jeopardise the entire 
attempt at business rescue and prejudice other creditors.500  
                                                          
495 Section 133 (1) (a) for the consent and 1 (b) of the 2008 Act for the application. According to Chetty v Hart 
(20323/2014) [2015] ZASCA 112; para 45 the availability of these remedies and the way the moratorium 
provision is tailored guarantees the creditors that there is no absolute bar on legal action against the company.   
496 [2013] ZAGPJHC 109; at para 67 Kgomo, J. stated that-“… A court being asked for leave to proceed against a 
company under business rescue, thus during a moratorium, must receive a well-motivated application for that 
so that it could apply its mind to the facts and the law if necessary and then be in a position to make a ruling in 
accordance with any terms it may consider suitable in the peculiar circumstance.” 
 497[2013] ZAGPJHC 148 para 71 and following his judgment in Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) 
Ltd Case (2013), Kgomo, J. held that the failure of the applicant to show exceptional circumstances meant the 
the application had to be rejected.. 
498 In Concorde Plastics (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1624 (LAC) at 1644F-1645A it was held 
that very powerful considerations are required. 
499 In Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund Case 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 18 it was held that a court must take 
account of context, as well as language. Delport, P., et al Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008, Service 
Issue 9 Vol 1 at 478(6) comments that the intention of the moratorium is to cast the net as wide as possible in 
order to include any conceivable type of action against the company. 
500Re Absa Bank Ltd v Caine N.O and Another [2014] ZAFSHC 46 para 48 where the rescue proceeding had already 
being in existence for the past two and half years. Under this prevailing circumstance the court ruled that it will 
not be fair to prevent creditors from exercising their contractual rights during the stay of business rescue 
proceeding should not exceed to an extent that it detriments the rights of creditors. This is a kind of circumstance 
that the court thought it just and equitable to grant leave for the party to enforce its right irrespective of the 
existing stay of enforcement 
Further, in an English decision Re Atlantic Computer Systems plc [1992] Ch 505 at 542-544 where an applicant 
applied to be granted a permission to exercise its property right of repossessing the computers which were held 
by a company in administration under both hire purchase and long lease agreements. The Court of Appeal made 
some points that a court could consider when it is called upon to grant a leave to lift a moratorium: 
1. In an event a party is applying for a leave so that it exercises its property right, such as repossession, 
the court will look whether that act will frustrate the mechanism, if not it will grant the leave. 
2. The court should take a balance the interests of the party claiming to repossess against the interests of 
the other creditors. 
3. In the balancing exercise undertaken by the court due weight should be given to the owners of the 
property. This is done for the purpose of preventing the owner of the property to indirectly finance the 
proceeding for the benefit of unsecured creditors. 
4. Also the court would grant a leave for legal proceeding if the refusal will significant harm to the 
applicant. 
5. In a circumstance that it has rejected a leave, the court should order the practitioner to act in a manner 




The approach of Kgomo, J. in Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd Case (2013) and 
Merchant West Working Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd (2013) was held to be unconvincing in 
Moodley v On Digital Media (Pty) Ltd and Others501 where the court construed the moratorium 
as not restricting an affected person from approaching the court on matters regarding the 
business rescue practitioner or the company in relation to the business rescue plan. The court 
observed that issues that arise during the operation of the business rescue are not subject to the 
moratorium. Similarly, in Resource Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand Coal Reclaimers Proprietary 
Limited and Others the court disagreed with the views advanced in Redpath Mining South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd and pointed out that nowhere does the Act state that exceptional circumstances 
must be present for the court to grant leave in this regard.502  
 
Another contentious issue is the scope of the moratorium. Save for certain exceptions, the 
moratorium applies to claims that arose before the business rescue proceedings commenced. 
However, in Murray NO and Another v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Westbank503 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal held that – 
 
“The liquidators’ construction that, in terms of Section 133 (1), the cancellation of an 
agreement constitutes ‘enforcement action’ which requires the consent of the 
practitioner or the court, would also fundamentally change our law of contract. As 
explained earlier, our law of contract provides for a unilateral cancellation in the case 
of a breach of contract. The way I see it, the legislature intended to allow the company 
in distress the necessary breathing space by placing a moratorium on legal 
                                                          
501 (20456/2014) [2014] ZAGPJHC 137; paras 10 the court stated that:“The language of s 133, when read in 
context with the other relevant provisions in Chapter 6 and having regard to its purpose, does not include 
within its ambit proceedings relating to the development, adoption or implementation of a business rescue 
plan. It is the business rescue practitioner who must develop a business rescue plan and implement it if 
adopted and the company, under the direction of the practitioner, must take all necessary steps to attempt to 
satisfy any conditions on which the business rescue is contingent and implement the plan as adopted. Legal 
proceedings, such as the present case, which seek that an adopted business rescue plan be executed and 
implemented strictly according to its terms and in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Companies 
Act, are legal proceedings against the business rescue practitioner and the company in business rescue in 
connection with the business rescue plan. They are not legal proceedings against the company or property 
belonging to the company or lawfully in its possession within the meaning of s 133(1)” [Emphasis supplied]. 
In  in para 11 the court concluded that “Section 133, therefore, finds no application in legal proceedings 
against a company in business rescue and its business rescue practitioner in connection with the business 
rescue plan, including its interpretation and execution towards implementation…” 
502 (10862/14) [2015] ZAKZPHC 21, para 10-13. 
503 (20104/2014) [2015] ZASCA 39, para 40. 
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proceedings and enforcement action in any forum, but not to interfere with the 
contractual rights and obligations of the parties to an agreement. Such an intention 
would, in any event, be contrary to the tenet of our law that the legislature does not 
intend to alter the existing law more than is necessary, particularly if it takes away 
existing rights” [Emphasis supplied]. 
 
Fourie AJA held that a party to a contract can, in the exercise of common law rights, unilaterally 
cancel the contract without permission from the business rescue practitioner or the leave of the 
court, as the right of cancellation is not affected by the moratorium and does not amount to legal 
proceedings as envisaged in the Act.504 Thus, a party to a contract can exercise this right 
notwithstanding the objectives of business rescue proceedings. It is unexpected that the Act was 
not drafted in a manner that makes the cancellation of a contract subject to the moratorium.  
 
The stay on legal proceedings against the company during the business rescue proceeding 
encompasses quasi-judicial proceedings. A noteworthy aspect of South Africa’s business rescue 
regime is the importance accorded to the company’s employees..505 
 
In in Fabrizio Burda v Integcomm (Pty) Ltd506 it was held that proceedings in the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration constitute legal proceedings as envisaged in the 
business rescue legislation, and are thus subject to the moratorium. In National Union of Metal 
Workers of South Africa obo Members v Motheo Steel Engineering507 which concerned an 
urgent application in relation to the applicability of Section 133 (1) (a) of the 2008 Act, the 
Labour Court held that labour law does not bar employees from exercising their right to institute 
legal proceedings, except where the Constitution provides otherwise.508  
 
These two conflicting decisions regarding the enforcement rights of workers during business 
rescue proceedings were to some extent resolved in Sondamase and another v Ellerine Holdings 
                                                          
504 The court interpreted the phrase “no legal proceedings, including enforcement action” to mean enforcement 
action as a result of legal proceedings. Thus, cancellation of a contract is a unilateral act by a party that does not 
involve any legal proceedings. 
505 Joubert, E.P and Loubser, A., ‘Executive Directors n Business Rescue: Employees or Something Else?,’ 
(2016) De Jure. Atpage 95, the authors acknowledge the importance accorded to employees throughout the 
business rescue proceedings. Lesser emphasis in this regard is accorded in countries such as UK, Germany USA 
and Canada. 
506 (Unreported case No. JS539/2012, 29.11.2013). 
507 (J271/2014) [2014] ZALCJHB 31, para 1. 
508 The court referred to Section 210 of the Labour Relation Act, 66 of 1995. 
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Limited (in business rescue) and another509 where the Labour Court recognised that the stay of 
legal proceedings against a company in rescue proceedings includes arbitration proceedings in 
labour tribunals.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal finally resolved the issue in Chetty v Hart.510 In this case, the 
court had regard to the purpose of the moratorium in business rescue and related it to alternative 
dispute resolutions in labour matters, and ruled that a wide scope must be accorded to the 
moratorium. As to the meaning of “forum” in Section 133 of the 2008 Act, the court affirmed 
the interpretation adopted in Murray NO and Another 511 which held that a forum is a court or 
tribunal.  
 
The decisions taken in these two cases took a practical approach to the purpose of moratorium 
in business rescue proceedings.512  . 
 
The moratorium protects the debtor company from the commencement of business rescue 
through to its termination.513 It has been suggested that in such moratoriums, the period of 
                                                          
509 (Unreported case No. C669/2014, 22.01.2016) 
510 (20323/2014) [2015] ZASCA 112; at para 35 it was held that “…the purpose of the provision, which is to give 
breathing space to the practitioner to get the company`s financial affairs in order, also requires it to be construed 
widely because arbitrations, like court proceedings also involve diversion of resources-both time and money-that 
may hinder the effectiveness of the business rescue proceedings. To construe it narrowly, as the court a quo did, 
and as the respondent contends we should, would be at odds with its language, defeat its purpose and lead to 
insensible and impractical consequences” [Emphasis supplied]. 
511 (20323/2014) [2015] ZASCA 112. At para 19 the court ruled that if the drafters had intended to restrict legal 
proceedings to court proceedings, they would simply have used the word ‘court’ instead of ‘forum’ in Section 
133 of the 2008 Act. 
512 In JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others (7076/2015) [2016] ZAKZDHC 24; at 
para 36 it was held that it would be impossible to conduct business rescue proceedings in the absence of a 
moratorium. 
513 In Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (2013) at para 5.  
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moratorium must be neither too long nor too short514 and that a balance needs to be struck in 
this regard between the interests of the company and the rights of its creditors.515  
 
5.3 The Treatment of Suretyship in Business Rescue Proceedings  
Save for the leave of the court or the consent of the practitioner, a company that has commenced 
business rescue proceeding cannot, as a result of the statutory moratorium, be sued in respect 
of a suretyship that it has given for the debt of another person.516. This is not made explicit in 
the Act, but it has been so ruled by the courts as a matter of interpretation517 and on the basis 
                                                          
514 In Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City 
Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another (19075/11) [2012] ZAWCHC 33, para 11, Traverso DJP said, “…The Act 
envisages a short term approach to the financial position of the company. This is so for self-evident reasons. 
There must be a measure of certainty in the commercial world. Creditors cannot be left in the state of flux for an 
indefinite period…It must either be unlikely that the debts can be repaid within the ensuing 6 months. In the 
case the company is presently insolvent and cannot pay its debts unless a moratorium of 3-5 years is granted. 
The fact of this matter does not bring West City`s financial situation within the definition of financially 
distressed” [Emphasis supplied]. See also Eloff AJ in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAWCHC 442 para 24. Further, see Finch, V., ‘Re-invigorating Corporate Rescue’, 
[2003], J.B.L. page 538. In Kang, N. and Nitin, N., `The Evolution of Corporate Bankruptcy Law in India,’ ICRA 
Bulletin Money and Finance, Oct 2003- March 2004, page 49, the authors cite the example of India where the 
corporate rehabilitation procedure can take up to fifteen years to be finalised. 
515 Pretorius, M., Business Rescue Status Quo Report Final Report, Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria 
(Pty) Ltd (30 March 2015), page 34 cites the following factors when determining whether the duration of a 
moratorium is reasonable: 
(a) Industry effect (mining very long and retail industry short). 
(b) Sources of PCF sought (international vs local funders require different times to complete due diligences 
etc.). 
(c) Shareholder country of origin vs that of creditors relative to South Africa (influence *n travel, 
negotiation, exchange controls). 
(d) Number of times creditors request revisions of the proposed plan. 
(e) Legal proceedings initiated by affected parties during the process of the rescue. These can be of various 
natures. 
(f) Nature of the cause of decline/distress 
(g) External and environmental factors (ex. Businesses in the platinum belt are suffering due to the strike). 
516 Section 133 (2)of the 2008 Act provides that during business rescue proceedings, a guarantee or surety by a 
company in favour of any other person may not be enforced by any person against the company except with 
leave of the court and in accordance with any terms of the court considers just and equitable in the 
circumstances. 
517 Section 5 (2) of the 2008 Act provides that in interpreting and applying this Act the courts can use foreign 
company law. In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) and Others 2012 
(5) SA 497 (WCC) paras 26 the High Court made a reference to the application of foreign law in interpreting the 
legislation. Hence the court applied common law suretyship principles when arriving to its decision after it 
discovered that there was a lacuna with regarding to surety status in business rescue proceeding. 
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of common law principles of suretyship,518 as recognised in South African law.519 A common 
law principle in this regard is that, unless the deed of suretyship states otherwise, if the principal 
debt is discharged by a compromise with or a release by the principal debtor, the surety is 
released from his obligations. This principle has had to be adapted to accommodate the 
statutory business rescue regime and the terms of an adopted business rescue plan.520 
 
In Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff and Another,521 the rescue plan provided 
for the discharge of the principal debtor’s liabilities in full and final settlement, but it was silent 
on the status of the surety. It was held that, since the rescue plan was silent on the issue, the 
principles of suretyship decree that the surety is thereby discharged.522 A somewhat different 
factual context was in issue in Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others.523 In this case the 
suretyship agreement had preserved the right of the creditor to enforce its claim against the 
surety in the event the principal debtor entered into a restructuring process. However, the 
business rescue plan provided that the claim in question would be paid in full and final 
                                                          
518 One of the relevant English decision as far as suretyship is concerned is by the full bench in Wides v Butcher 
& Sons (1905) 26 NLR 578, which dealt with a settlement between an insolvent debtor and its creditors. In this 
matter the deed of assignment provided that the signing creditors released, acquitted and discharged the debtor 
from all claims and demands whatsoever. However, the recourse remedy clause was later unilateral inserted in 
the deed. The court held that the recourse clause did not form part of the deed, hence the surety was full 
discharged of the debt obligations. It was agreed by all the judges that if the clause was part of the deed the 
decision would have been different. In reference to the test set-forth by the House Of Lords in Muir v Crawford 
1875 LR 2 HL at 456, the court further at para (584) stated that: 
“There is no doubt that a simple discharge of a debtor by a creditor discharges also the surety, upon the 
simple ground that if it were otherwise, it would be a fraud upon the debtor, to profess to discharge him 
of the debt due to the creditor, and at the same time to leave him open to recourse against him by the 
surety. But a discharge of the debtor does not liberate the surety if the remedy against the surety is 
expressly reserved, because in that case the discharge is not an absolute release,… The reservation has 
the effect, because it rebuts the presumption which ordinarily exists that if you liberate the principal 
debtor, you mean to liberate also the surety, and it has the effect of preserving the right of recourse by 
the surety against the principal debtor…” [Emphasis supplied] 
The preservation of right to recourse against the principal debtor in the suretyship between the parties 
automatically invokes the right of the creditors to proceed against the surety in the event the principal debtor 
has is discharged as a result of the compromise under the business rescue plan. This established principle of 
suretyship give reliance on what the parties have agreed in their deed. 
519 Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Ungerer 1981 (2) SA (T) at 225, Leipsig v Bankorp Ltd 1994 (2) SA 128 (A) at 
132H-133A, Kilroe-Daley v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 (4) 609 (A) 6221-6231, Millman and Another NNO v 
Masterbond Participation Bond Trust Managers Pty Managers Pty Ltd (under Curatorship) and others 1997 (1) 
SA 133 (C) at 122C, BOE Bank Ltd v Bassage 2006 (5) SA 33 (SCA)  and Kirlroe-Daley v Barclays National Bank 
Ltd 1984 (4) 609 (A) at 6221-6231.  
520 Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff and Another [2014] 3 All SA 50 (WCC) para 14. 
521 [2014] 3 All SA 50 (WCC) para 14. 
522 Ibid at para 85, it was held that the adoption of a business rescue plan does not without more affect a 
creditor’s rights against the surety; it depends on an application of the general principles of the law of suretyship 
to the actual provisions of the plan. 
523 [2013] ZAWCHC 194. 
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settlement. The creditor applied for judgment against the surety for the remaining balance as 
amended by the rescue plan. The surety argued that the suretyship was accessory in nature, 
with the result that once the principal debtor was discharged, the surety was released. The court 
held in favour of the surety, effectively ruling that the terms of the business rescue plan 
prevailed over the suretyship. 
 
In Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns,524 Rogers AJ held that if the principal debtor enters into any 
legal proceedings that might have an impact on the creditor’s claim, the creditor could enforce 
its claim against the surety. The court held that the moratorium is a defence in personam against 
the company in business rescue proceedings, which connotes that it protects the distressed 
company but not a surety for the company.525 The debt itself is not discharged, as it is with a 
defence in rem, it merely releases the principal debtor.526  
 
This decision was followed in African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba 
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others.527 The crux of this case was the interpretation 
of Section 153 (1) (b) (ii) of the 2008 Act which deals with binding offers. The court was also 
required to determine the status of the surety in the rescue proceedings. The court held that the 
creditor’s claim against the surety was expressly protected under the suretyship agreement in 
the event that the principal debtor embarked on restructuring, or in the event of its insolvency 
or liquidation. However, given that the rescue plan provided for the full and final settlement of 
the creditor’s claim, the surety demanded to be released from its obligations. It was held that 
Chapter 6 of the Act has no provision barring a creditor from enforcing a claim against the 
surety, notwithstanding the terms of the business rescue plan. The court said that if the 
                                                          
524 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) para 25. 
525 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) para 18.  
526 In Nedbank Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa and another v Bestvest 153 (Pty) and Others526 the High Court 
judge ruled against the release of surety with reference to the terms of suretyship agreement. See further 
Forsyth, C.F. and Pretorius, J.T., Caney’s The Law of Suretyship in SA, Juta, (2010) 6th Edition, page 188. 
527 2013 (6) SA 471 paras 68-73. At para 69 Kathree-Setiloane, J said that: “There is, furthermore, no basis to 
suggest that such a provision could be read into the business rescue regime. As already explained, the express 
purpose of business rescue is to provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed 
companies, in a manner that balances the right and interests of all relevant stakeholders`. The emphasis of the 
business rescue regime is therefore on the company in financial distress, and the relevant stakeholder. There 
need be no connection between a surety and either the company in financial distress or the stakeholders and, 
whether or not a creditor is entitled to pursue a surety will, in the ordinary course, have no bearing on the 
prospects of rescuing a company.” 
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legislation had intended to such an extremely negative impact on creditors, this would have 
been expressly stated.528 
 
In both Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio and Absa Bank Limited the creditors and 
the principal debtors agreed on a compromise provided for in the business rescue plan in terms 
of which there was to be a payment in full and final settlement. The courts held that the business 
rescue plan overrode the suretyship and rejected the creditors’ claim to be entitled to proceed 
against the surety. By contrast, the decisions in Investec Bank Ltd and Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others, permitted the creditors to enforce their claims against the 
surety where the suretyship contained preservation clauses in favour of the creditor. The courts 
felt it was just to grant the creditor an enforcement right against the surety.  
 
These differing interpretations were addressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in New Port 
Finance Company (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nedbank Ltd529 where Wallis, JA, obiter, regarded 
the terms of the suretyship as overriding the terms of the business rescue plan.530  
 
It is likely that henceforth, suretyships will contain a standard term to govern the situation 
where the principal debtor enters into business rescue, and a rescue plan is adopted.531 The deed 
                                                          
528 In Business Partners Limited v Tsakiroglou and Another (17827/2014) [2015] ZAWCHC 61, para 29 this 
interpretation was endorsed as regards the liability of a surety after the release of the principal debtor in terms 
of a business rescue plan. 
529 (30/2014) [2014] ZASCA 210 para 12. 
530 In Business Partners Limited v Tsakiroglou and Another (17827/2014) [2015] ZAWCHC 61, para 31 the court 
held that where a surety has renounced the benefit of excussion, the creditor has a right to proceed against the 
surety for the full amount and need not pursue the principal debtor for the payment; thereafter the surety has 
a right of recourse against the principal debtor.  At para 34 the High Court said, “It is now settled that South 
African law of suretyship, does not recognise a so-called prejudice principle to the effect that if a creditor should 
do anything in his dealings with the principal debtor which has the effect of prejudicing the surety, the latter is 
released from his obligations.” This in line with an obiter dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Absa Bank 
Limited v Davidson 2000 (1) SA 1117 (SCA), para 19, where Olivier, JA stated that, "As a general proposition, 
prejudice caused to a surety can only release a surety (whether totally or partially) if the prejudice is the result 
of a breach of some or other legal duty or obligation. The prime sources of a creditor's rights, duties and 
obligations are the principal agreement and the deed of suretyship. If, as is the case here, the alleged prejudice 
was caused by conduct falling within the terms of the principal agreement or the deed of suretyship, the 
prejudice suffered was one which the surety undertook to suffer." In practice the surety is not totally prejudiced 
as he still has a right of recourse against the principal debtor. 
531 Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio v Greeff and Another (18136/13) [2014] ZAWCHC 78; para 43, Absa 
Bank Limited v Du Toit and Others (7311/13) [2013] ZAWCHC 194 paras 14 and 15, Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 
2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) para 25, and Nedbank Ltd v Wedgewood Village Golf Estate (Pty) Ltd and Others, Nedbank 
v Mostert and Another, Nedbank Ltd v Trustees of the IC Stratford Family Trust and Another (20896/2010, 
22331/2010, 24607/2010) [2011] ZAWCHC 384. In all these decisions, reference is made to a standard form of 
suretyship agreement used by banks and other financial institutions that preserves the creditor’s right to pursue 
the surety in the event that the principal debtor is sequestrated, liquidated, or placed in business rescue 
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of suretyship should state the juncture at which the creditor can enforce his claim against the 
surety, and in particular whether this can occur before the rescue plan has been approved. 
Secondly, the suretyship should also be explicit as to the amount that the creditor is entitled to 
recover from the surety before and after the approval of the business rescue plan. Thirdly, the 
suretyship should address the position of surety vis-a-vis the principal debtor where the latter 
embarks on business rescue 
 
These issues impact on other stakeholders and the company itself. The terms of the suretyship 
should be such as not to jeopardise the business rescue proceedings. 
 
These issues could usefully be addressed by legislative amendments to Chapter 6 of the 
Companies Act 2008.532 
 
5.4 Status of Post-Commencement Financiers in the Business Rescue Proceedings  
For a distressed company to be able to obtain finance after it has entered into business rescue 
proceedings, is a complex task.533 Ideally, a company should negotiate for post-commencement 
finance before the restructuring begins.534 The company or the rescue practitioner, can then 
                                                          
proceedings, administration, or is party to a compromise or arrangement, under statute or otherwise in the 
context of insolvency or restructuring. 
532 In Australia the companies’ legislation is explicit that the release of a company as principal debtor in 
rehabilitation proceedings does not affect the creditors’ rights against the surety. (Section 444H (b).) Creditors 
who are not parties to an arrangement are not bound by it.Section 444J of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 
provides that a deed of company arrangement for the release of a principal debtor does not affect the creditor’s 
rights in terms of a guarantee or indemnity. 
533Section 60 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 provides that “1) Every adult natural person, and every juristic 
person or association of persons, has a right to apply to a credit provider for credit (2) Subject to sections 61 and 
66, a credit provider has a right to refuse to enter into a credit agreement with any prospective consumer on 
reasonable commercial grounds that are consistent with its customary risk management and underwriting 
practices. (3) Subject to sections 61 and 92(3), nothing in this Act establishes a right of any person to require a 
credit provider to enter into a credit agreement with that person” [Emphasis supplied].Further, see Pretorius, M. 
and Du Preez, W. ‘Constraints on Decision Making regarding Post-commencement Finance in Business Rescue,’ 
(2013), SAJESBM, 182 (6) page 170. On the same issue, see Burdette, D.A., The Development of a Modern and 
Effective Business Rescue Model in South Africa: Pre-consultation Working Document, The Centre for Advanced 
Corporate and Insolvency University of Pretoria, 2004 available at http://www.turnaround-
sa.com/pdf/The%20development%20of%20a%modern%and%20effective%20rescue%20model%20for%20Sout
h%20Africa.pdf accessed on 27.04.2016 and Jacobs, L., ‘Post-Commencement Financing and Creditors: A South 
African Perspective,’ (2012), 33 (3), Comp. Law., 94-96. 
534 In Griessel and Another (2015),para 81 the court said “…in order to give content to the purpose of business 
rescue it is necessary to establish, before considering the paying out of creditors or shareholders in the form of 
a dividend through a business rescue plan, whether the company has access to investor funding that may tide it 
over or whether creditors are prepared to support the rehabilitation of the company instead of closing it down.” 
The urgency of obtaining post-commencement finance is noted in Pretorius, M. and Rosslyn-Smith, W.J., 
‘Expectations of a business rescue plan: international directives for Chapter 6 implementation’ Southern African 
Business Review, (2014), page 132. The early acquisition of debtor-in-possession financing reduces the risk of 
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negotiate with current or prospective creditors regarding financial assistance during 
restructuring.535 Carapeto concluded that, under Chapter 11, distressed companies that secured 
debtor-in-possession financing have a high probability of being reorganised536 and found that 
it is almost impossible to restructure a financially distressed company without post-
reorganisation financing.537 
 
The significant role played by post-commencement finance has been recognised by the South 
Africa judiciary. An applicant for entry into business rescue has a good chance of persuading 
the court to grant the order if there is proof that there will be a post-commencement fund to 
finance the company’s operations.538 Newcity Group (Pty) Limited v Pellow N.O. and 
Others,539 was an appeal from a rejection of an application by a company in provisional 
liquidation to be placed in business rescue in terms of Section 131 (4) (a) of the 2008 Act. The 
appellant claimed that the company was able to secure funds and would ultimately be rescued 
if was permitted to enter business rescue.540 The Supreme Court of Appeal commented that the 
funds relied on by the appellant were just statements of intent not formal agreements541 and 
                                                          
liquidation and the time spent in the bankruptcy proceedings; Elayan, F. and Meyer, T.,` The Impact of Receiving 
Debtor in-Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent under Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy,’ 28 (7) & (8), Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, (2001), page 906. 
535 Pretorius, M. and Du Preez, W. ‘Constraints on Decision Making regarding Post-commencement Finance in 
Business Rescue,’ (2013), SAJESBM, 182 (6) page 180.  
535 Principle 3.2 of Part B of the World Bank also states that corporate rescue statute of a country should 
encourage lending to, investment in, or recapitalization of viable financially distressed enterprises. 
536 See Carapeto, M., Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?, Working Paper, Cass Business School, 
(2003), page 2, available at http://www.facultyresearch.london.edu/docs/294.doc accessed in 12.12.2015. This 
empirical study took a sample of large companies that had filed for reorganisation during a certain period of 
time, and compared the success of those that had post-petition financing and those that had not. 
537 In business rescue, certain of the company’s operations commonly require financing, such as labour costs, 
obtaining goods and services from trade suppliers, rent, insurance, maintenance of contracts and other 
operating expenses, together with the cost of maintaining the value of assets. See Pretorius, M. and Rosslyn-
Smith, W.J., ‘Expectations of a business rescue plan: international directives for Chapter 6 implementation’ 2014 
Southern African Business Review, page 132. 
538 Optifeeds (Pty) Ltd v Business Depot 2 CC t/a GS Poultry and Others (6885/2014) [2014] ZAGPPHC 276, paras 
38 and 39, where among other things the High Court was determining the prospect of a company being rescued 
after it has received an application for the resolution of a company to embark on business rescue proceedings 
to be set-aside. The court referred to the principles for assessing the feasibility of a company being rescued that 
were laid down in Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and Another 2013 (1) SA 542 
(FB): where among of them being “…the likely availability of the necessary cash resource in order to enable the 
company to meet its day-to-day expenditure, or concrete factual details of the source, nature and extent of the 
resources that are likely to be available to the company, as well as the basis and terms on which such resources 
will be available,…” The facts in the possession of a court show that a company is to receive funds from state 
that will enable it to be rescued. Consequently the court ruled that there is a reasonable prospect of a company 
being rescued; hence it rejected the plea of setting aside the resolution.  
539 (577/2013) [2014] ZASCA 162. 
540 (577/2013) [2014] ZASCA 162, para 8. 
541 (577/2013) [2014] ZASCA 162, para 19. 
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that, even if those funds were made available, they would not be sufficient to service the loans 
of its creditors to a greater extent than would be the case under liquidation or in a restructuring 
of the company.542 The court affirmed the decision of the court a quo.543  
 
The courts regard the availability of post-commencement finance as an important factor in 
determining whether there is a reasonable prospect of a company’s achieving the objectives of 
business rescue.   
 
The Companies Act does not give the courts the power to order an institution or individual to 
provide post-commencement finance to a company in business rescue; 544 this was stated obiter 
in Kritzinger and Another v Standard Bank of South Africa.545 
 
A financially distressed company undergoing business rescue is permitted to issue collateral 
that is not already encumbered.546 Post-commencement financiers can thus be granted security 
only in respect of the unencumbered assets of the company;547 this restriction is an important 
protection for the company’s other creditors and ensures that the secured creditors’ rights and 
interests remain intact.548 By comparison, in reorganisation proceedings under Chapter 11, a 
company is allowed to offer security to a post-commencement financier in respect of an 
encumbered property.549 There is an argument that, if this is workable in the USA, the same 
                                                          
542 (577/2013) [2014] ZASCA 162, para 23. 
543 Newcity Group (Pty) Ltd v Pellow NO and Others, China Construction Bank Corporation Johannesburg Branch 
v Crystal Lagoon Investments 53 (Pty) and Others [2013] ZAGPJHC 54, para 23 where the High Court held that 
the fact of a company being in provisional liquidation for more than a year and nothing has materialised, and 
there is no imminent prospect of third party funding being obtained but only speculation is enough to 
comprehend that the company will not be able to achieve the objects of rescue mechanism. This was also 
available in Eveleigh V Dowmont Snacks (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZAKZPHC 1 para 29, where the absence of 
evidence that the Trustee is willing to finance the company made the honourable Judge refuse to grant the order 
of business rescue proceedings, when determining the reasonable prospect it being rescued.  
544 This view was provided in the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Oakdene Square Properties 
(Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] ZASCA 68 by stating that it is 
not underlying purpose of the statute to force commercial banks to finance companies which are in financial 
distress. 
545 [2013] ZAFSHC 215 para 57. 
546 Section 135 (2) (a) of the 2008 Act. 
547 This is also the practice in under Article 75 of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law 2006. 
548Zhang, H., ‘Balance of Power and Control of Creditors in the Insolvency Procedures: a Comparison between 
the UK and China,’ (2011), 26 (10), J.I.B.L.R., page 497. It stated that the absence of super-priority will motivate 
banks to provide funds to the solvent companies knowing that their interests will not be jeopardised. 
549 Section 364 (c) (d) of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code 1978 it provides for borrowing with a first lien on 
collateral subject to prior encumbrances. The first one is through junior lien this is comprised by agreement 
between the pre-petition security holder and the post-commencement financier. And the second is the priming 
lien where a distressed company is priming the existing secured creditor without its consent. However the 
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relaxed rule should be included in South Africa’s business rescue legislation550 and perhaps the 
statutory draftsperson should go back to the drawing board in regard to the rules for post-
commencement finance.551 
 
To be more explicit in this regard: it is submitted that s 135(2)(a) of the Act should be amended 
to permit the company to offer security to lenders in respect of encumbered assets that are 
under-secured, as the present prohibition is a barrier to the acquisition of new funds during the 
business rescue process.  
 
The operative portion of the amended section should then read as follows –  
 
“…may be secured to the lender by utilising any asset of the company to the extent that it is 
not otherwise fully encumbered” [Emphasis supplied].  
 
The proposed addition of the word ‘fully’ will allow access to under-secured company 
assets.552 There is a downside to this suggestion, in that if the rescue attempt fails and the 
company is liquidated, the unsecured creditors will receive a lesser dividend.553  
 
Post-commencement financiers, realising the dire straits of the company seeking funds, are 
likely to drive a hard bargain regarding interest and other terms,554 to the potential detriment 
                                                          
legislation has set grounds for the company to take a priming action. A company has to prove that there all other 
type of financing are unavailable and the interest of the primed creditor in the collateral at issue will be 
adequately protected. 
550Dahiya, S. and others, ‘’Debtor-in-Possession Financing and Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence 69 J. 
Fin. Econ page 279, the authors found out that when comparing to debtors having no post-commencement 
finance, those with funds the reorganisation went very fast and their likelihood of survival was high than 
liquidation. On the other hand, Carapeto, M., ` Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?,’ Working 
paper, Cass Business School (2003), page 2 reported that the rehabilitation process should be very cautious in 
preventing the existence of priming lien as they result to increase liquidation of companies as the creditors will 
not be comfortable in providing loans in exchange of a collateral that might in the future subjected to another 
loan by the other creditor.  
551 It is, very rare for a distressed company at this time to still have any collateral to offer for the purpose of 
acquiring a loan from these lenders. These financiers will need security for ensuring that their money will be 
paid after the procedure regardless it was successful or not, in Haselman, R., and others, `How the Law Affects 
Lending,’ Columbia Law and Economic, (2006) Working Paper No.285, page 34. 
552 Principle 3.2 of Part B of the World Bank (2015) recommends for countries to have enabling legal framework 
that encourage lending to, investment in, or recapitalization of viable financially distressed enterprises in every 
possible manner. 
553 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, page 115. 
554 Zhang, H., ‘Balance of Power and Control of Creditors in the Insolvency Procedures: a Comparison between 
the UK and China,’ (2011), 26 (10), J.I.B.L.R., page 493 it was observed that post-commencement financers stand 
a very good chance of dictating the terms of the loan agreement, since, at that moment, the survival of the 
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of the company’s other creditors.555 The company’s creditors will of course be made aware of 
the terms of post-commencement finance, and may be given the opportunity to vote on the 
matter.556  
 
Post-commencement financiers have an interest in negotiating terms that will make for 
efficiency in the restructuring arrangement as a whole. In Chapter 11, a performance-based 
compensation package557 is an arrangement promised to the management of the company as 
motivation to expedite the reorganisation proceedings. But securing finance by offering 
security over the company’s assets is often more straightforward and more quickly arranged.558 
The terms of a package invariably provide for a reduction in rewards to the company’s 
management if they fail to meet stipulated targets. Such checks and balances, overseen by post-
commencement financiers, decrease the financiers’ risks in the restructuring proceedings.559  
 
                                                          
company depends largely on them. This control can even reach a stage of demanding a position in the company`s 
management as a control mechanism during rescue as it was observed in US debtor in possession, See White, J. 
J., `Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit,’ (2004), 12, ABILR, page 175. 
555 It was reported that in Chapter 11 the loans supplied in debtor in possession had higher interest rates than 
the normal credit provided when the company is solvent in Elayan, F. and Meyer, T., ` The Impact of Receiving 
Debtor in-Possession Financing on the Probability of Successful Emergence and Time Spent under Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy,’ 28 (7) & (8), Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, (2001), page 907 and see White, J. J., 
`Death and Resurrection of Secured Credit,’ (2004), 12, ABILR, page 139. In a recent study it was found out that 
debtor in possession lending interest rates is much higher as it stands at 7.63 percent and 10.73 percent 
Abraham, N. and Habbu, A., ``DIP Lending and the Death of Emergence: Reorganisation Outcome Post-crisis, 
page 13 available at https://turnaround.org/cmaextras/The-Death-of-Emergence.pdf accessed on 4.04.2015. 
556 Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act does not  expressly require the rescue practitioner to involve the creditors when 
entering into agreements with a post-commencement financier. However, the right of  creditors to be given 
notice of all relevant matters concerning business rescue proceedings, as required by  Section 145 (1) of the 
2008 Act, impliedly extends to decisions on post-commencement finance. Section 150 (2) provides that the 
business rescue plan must contain all the information reasonably required to enable affected persons to decide 
whether or not to accept or reject the plan. (Emphasis supplied) It seems clear that post-commencement finance 
agreements must be included in the rescue plan for the creditors’ consideration.  
557 Without a success fee, the practitioner may have an interest in drawing out the procedure, particularly where 
he is entitled to a monthly or hourly fee.; see LoPucki, L.M., `The Trouble with Chapter 11, Wis.L.Rev. (1993), 
pages 739-745. See also Davis, A. `Want Some Extra Cash? File for Chapter 11,’ Wall Street Journal, (2001). 
558 In the notorious Enron case a debtor-in-possession finance contract provided for a bonus to the management 
in consideration for effecting a quick sale of company assets; Ahrens, F., ` Enron Files for New Bonuses Severance, 
Washington Post, 30-3-2002.   
559LoPucki, L., The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen`s The End of Bankruptcy, 
Stan. L. Rev., (56)3, (2003), page 648. This USA based study revealed that during the 1980s when the debtor 
company was in control of the reorganisation process only twenty percent of distressed companies embarked 
on a going-concern sale; by comparison, in 2002 the figure was seventy five percent. This trend is confirmed in 
Baird, D. and Rasmussen, R., Chapter 11 at Twilight, Stan.L.Rev. (2003), 863-699 where it is noted that permitting 
creditors to take control of rehabilitation proceedings can result to an acceleration of going-concern sales or the 
piecemeal liquidation of companies. 
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Such creative practices are less likely to be successful in South Africa’s business rescue regime 
because the whole process is managed by the rescue practitioner whose remuneration comes 
from the distressed company. If it is suggested to the post-commencement financiers that they 
should offer inducements to the rescue practitioner, in order to speed up the proceedings, this 
could create conflicts of interest and could tempt the practitioner to favour the creditors’ 
interests, rather than the interests of the company. The business rescue practitioner will usually 
be assured of the payment of his fee, regardless of the success or failure of the business rescue, 
but a “success fee” of some kind can be a strong motivating factor. The Act provides that, 
where there is to be additional remuneration for the practitioner, this can be negotiated, but is 
subject to approval by the holders of a majority of the creditors’ voting interests560 and they 
will therefore have to agree to any performance-based or other compensation package.561  
 
5.4.1 Payment Ranking of the Post-Commencement Financiers 
The Companies Act provides in s 135 for the ranking of creditors’ claims against a company 
in business rescue.562 Significantly, a preferential ranking is accorded to post-commencement 
finance.563 In the rescue plan, the practitioner is required to set out the order of preference in 
which creditors will be paid564 but no specific guidance, outside of the aforementioned 
provision of the Act, is given to the rescue practitioner in setting the order of preference.565  
 
The judiciary has attempted to clarify this important issue. In Redpath Mining South Africa 
(Pty) Ltd v Marsden NO and Others566 Kgomo, J. after acknowledging that s 135 of the Act 
                                                          
560 Section 143 (2) and (3) of the 2008 Act. 
561 Section 145 (1) of the Act 2008 allows creditors to informally propose inclusions in the rescue plan, and some 
suggestions be forthcoming after a creditor becomes a post-commencement financier.  
562 The payment ranking of creditors is among the factors that post-petition creditors take into consideration 
when deciding whether to inject funds into a company in business rescue; see Calitz, J. and Freebody, G., ‘Is 
Post-commencement Finance proving to be the Thorn in the side of Business Rescue Proceedings under the 
2008 Companies Act?,’ (2016), De Jure, (40), page 271. 
563 Section 135 of the 2008 Act. 
564 Section 150 (2) (b) (v) of the 2008 Act. 
565 Principle 2 and 3 of Part A of the World Bank Principles of Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor 
Regimes, Revised 2016, available at http://www.pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/919511468425523509/ICR-
Principles-Insolvency-Creditor-Debtor-Regimes-2016.pdf accessed on 11.05.2016 deals with movable and 
immovable securities and recommends that a country`s insolvency (including corporate rescue) statute 
should have clear provisions governing the hierarchy of creditors’ claims. On page 6 an executive summary 
gives advice on the predictability of the priority of claims in the established mechanism. The UNCITAL 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, (2005), para 13 of page 14 states that:“…Clear rules for the ranking of 
priorities of both existing and post-commencement creditor claims are important to provide predictability to 
lenders, and to ensure consistent application of the rules, confidence in the proceedings and that all 
participants are able to adopt appropriate measures to manage risk…”[Emphasis supplied] 
566(18486/2013) [2013] ZAGPJHC 148 para 60. 
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provides for the ranking of creditors’ claims, expressed the ranking in more expansive terms 
than does the Act (and, arguably, deviating from the Act567) as follows:  
1.The practitioner, for remuneration and expenses and other persons (including legal and 
other professionals) for costs of business rescue proceedings. 
2. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable after business rescue 
proceedings began. 
3.Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business rescue 
proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance. 
4. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business rescue 
proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance. 
5. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business rescued 
began. 
6. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable before business 
rescue proceedings began. 
7. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business 
rescue proceedings began.  
 
If Kgomo J. is correct in his view on the ranking of claims against a company in business 
rescue,568 secured creditors will lack the incentive to provide post-commencement finance.569  
 
                                                          
567 This judgment endorses what was held in this regard in Merchant West Working Capital Solutions 
(Proprietary) Limited v Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Proprietary) Limited and Another 
[2013] ZAGPJHC 109 para 21. However, Delport, P., and Others (eds.), Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, Durban: LexisNexis. (2011), page 478 points out that this order payment does not correspond to what is 
provided under Section 135 of the Act 2008 as nowhere in that provision are pre-petitioned secured creditors 
mentioned.  See also Stoop, H. and Hutchison, A., "Post-Commencement Finance - Domiciled Resident or 
Uneasy Foreign Transplant?" (2017), PER / PELJ (20) at page 18 where the authors say that the judgment does 
not expressly consider the wording of the provision, nor the impact of the chosen interpretation, and in fact 
does not cite the legislation directly but instead relies exclusively on a single secondary source which is a book 
by Stein, C. and Everingham, G., New Companies Act, pages 420-421 
568 The ranking suggested by Kgomo J. was clearly obiter. 
569 A prospective post-commencement lender would not advance funds unless his claim, and the security for the 
loan, enjoyed priority over other creditors in the event of the company’s default; see Zhang, H. and others, `The 
Balance of Power in Insolvency Proceedings: The Case of China’, (2011), 8, International Corporate Rescue, page 
13 and United Kingdom Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice, Cork Report, (1982) 
para 1491. The terms of the loan would also have to provide assurance that other creditors could not interfere 
with the secured assets; see Hill, C., Is Secured Debt Efficient?, (2001-2002), 80, Texas Law Review, page 1119; 
Such security is in effect a form of insurance for the lender –see Finch, V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles 
and Perspectives, 2nd Edition, CUP, (2009), page 74; a secured creditor’s claim is thus not merely to a 
proportionate amount of the free residue – see Goode, R.M., Commercial Law, 3rd Edition, Penguin Books; 
London, (2004) part 4. 
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Finch identifies the following reasons for a creditor of the company to seek collateral, 
namely,570 a concern that the company will overpay dividends to its shareholders;571 a concern 
that the company may take on further debt by borrowing from other sources; a concern that the 
company may conceal assets;572 a concern that the company’s management may exercise their 
powers to benefit themselves, and a concern that the company may invest in high risk ventures 
that diminish the entity’s value.573 In short,, financiers insist, from the outset, on stringent terms 
that will mitigate their loss if the borrowing company undergoes restructuring. 
 
Where a company is in liquidation, a secured creditor retains the right to its security and if the 
security is adequate, has the prospect of its claim being be paid in full.574 By contrast, where a 
company is undergoing business rescue, it is common for the rescue practitioner to propose a 
rescue plan that involves a dilution of secured creditors’ rights575 in the context of the ranking 
of claims imposed by Chapter 6 of the Act, which elevates post-commencement financier’s 
claims and employees claims to high priority. As a result, the company’s creditors, including 
its secured creditors, are likely to be in a worse position than before business rescue.576  
 
This s the background to judicial interpretations regarding the ranking of claims in business 
rescue which have as their object the rehabilitation of financially distressed companies, even if 
this entails diluting the rights of the company’s secured creditors 
 
                                                          
570 See further Finch, V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and Perspectives, 2nd Edition, CUP, (2009), page 
88-89. 
571 To similar effect, see Hill, C., Is Secured Debt Efficient?, (2001-2002), 80, Texas Law Review, page 1118.  
572 This was earlier observed in Bebchuk, L.A. and Fried, J.M., `The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy,’ (1996), 105, Yale Law Journal, page 864. It has been observedthat banks and other 
lending institutions prefer immovable security - see McDonald, C. and Schumacher, L., ‘Financial Deepening in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Evidence on the Role of Creditor Rights Protection and Information Sharing,’ 
(2007), IMF Working Paper No. 203, page 12. 
573 See further Ronald, M., ‘Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit,’ (1997), 110 (625), Harvard Law Review, 
pages 641-645. The issue of over-investment is discussed in Bebchuk, L.A. and Fried, J.M., `The Uneasy Case for 
the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,’ (1996), 105, Yale Law Journal, page 864.  
574 Section 366 (1) (c) Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
575 Section 150 (2) (b) (ii) of the 2008 Act provides for the extent to which the company is to be released from 
the payment of its debts and debt conversation aspects.  
576 Calitz, J. and Freebody, G., ‘Is Post-commencement Finance proving to be the Thorn in the side of Business 
Rescue Proceedings under the 2008 Companies Act?,’ (2016), De Jure, page 272, Section 134 (3) of the 2008 Act 
say that this provides protection to secured creditors in the event that the company wishes to dispose of any 
property over which another person has a security or title interest. Section 134 (3) is relevant in the event that 
“…the company wishes to dispose of any property over which another person has any security or title interest…”.   
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If the attempt at business rescue fails to achieve its statutorily defined objectives, the ranking 
of claims that will then apply will dilute the rights of secured creditors vis-à-vis the company 
and the company will inevitably go into liquidation. In such liquidation, the claims of post-
commencement financiers will be ranked below the costs of the liquidation577 and they may 
well be in a worse position than if the company had been liquidated immediately it became 
financially distressed, without the losses and costs incurred in the unsuccessful attempt at 
business rescue. 
 
The judicial interpretation, outlined above, reflects what the government proposed in the 
Companies’ Bill 2007 in which the employees’ post-commencement claims were accorded 
preference over the claims of the company’s secured creditors578 but the proposal was omitted 
from the text in the enacted version of the 2008 Act.  
 
Given the importance and sensitivity of this issue, 579 it is submitted that Chapter 6 of the Act 
should have provided in more detail for the ranking of claims against a company undergoing 
business rescue, instead of merely providing in detail in s 143 (5) of the Act 2008580 for the 
preferential status accorded to the rescue practitioner`s claim for remuneration and expenses.  
 
It is suggested that Section 135 would be improved if it was amended to rank the claims of 
creditors in the following order: 
1. The practitioner, for remuneration and expenses and other persons (including legal and 
other professionals) for costs of business rescue proceedings.581  
                                                          
577 Section 135 (4) of the 2008 Act. The situation is otherwise under Chapter 11 where a post-commencement 
financier is granted super-priority status, ahead of any other claim against the company, ranking even ahead of 
administrative expenses.   
578 Section 138 (3) (ii) of the Companies Bill 2007 provides that after payment of the supervisor’s remuneration 
and costs referred to in section 146, and other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue proceedings, 
all claims contemplated -(a) in subsection (1) will have preference in the order in which they were incurred 
over:(i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2); and (ii) all secured and unsecured claims against the company. 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
579 Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The Bill of Rights protects the right to 
property, and states that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property 
580 “To the extent that the practitioner`s remuneration and expenses are not fully paid, the claim for those 
amounts will rank in priority ahead of the claims of all other secured and unsecured creditors.” 
581 Section 135 (3) read with Section 143 of the 2008 Act. 
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2. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business rescue 
began.582 
3. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable after business rescue 
proceedings began.583 
4. Secured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business rescue 
proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance.584 
5. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made after business rescue 
proceedings began, i.e. post-commencement finance.585 
6. Employees for any remuneration which became due and payable before business rescue 
proceedings began.586 
7. Unsecured lenders or other creditors for any loan or supply made before business rescue 
proceedings began.587 
 
5.5 Analysis of Binding Offer in Business Rescue Proceedings 
Allowing creditors of a company undergoing business rescue to sell their voting rights to other 
interested parties is a prudent step toward the goal of restructuring a financially distressed 
company.588 Such a provision in corporate rescue legislation is aimed at balancing the need to 
get the company back on its feet quickly while allowing creditors to withdraw from an 
arrangement that does not have their support589 and it is a potential way to remove unhappy 
creditors from the process.  
 
The legislation attempts to facilitate the rescue of a distressed but potentially viable company 
even where some creditors dissent from the rescue plan.590 Section 153 (1) (b) (ii) of the 2008 
Act gives an affected person the right to make a binding offer to purchase the voting interests 
                                                          
582 As noted, above, section 25 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 gives constitutional 
protection to the right to property.. 
583 Section 135 (1) read with Section 135 (3) (a) of the 2008 Act. 
584 Section 135 (3) (a) read with Section 135 (2) of the 2008 Act.  
585 Section 135 (3) (a) read with Section 135 (2) of the 2008 Act. 
586 Section 144 (2) of the 2008 Act. 
587 Section 135 (3) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
588 Principle C14.2 of the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regime, (2016), this 
principle is that during the formulation and consideration of the rescue plan, there should be a flexible approach 
that is consistent with fundamental requirements designed to promote fairness and prevent commercial abuse.  
589 As envisaged in Section 7 (k) of the 2008 Act which promotes balancing the rights and interests of all the 
stakeholders involved in the rescue mechanism. 
590 Section 153 (1) (a) (ii), 153 (1) (b) (i) (bb) and 153 (7) of the 2008 Act deals with setting aside the results of 
the vote as inappropriate; Section 153 (1) (a) (i) and 153 (1) (b) (i) (aa) provides for a revision of the rescue plan. 
108 
 
of a dissenting creditor.591 The value of voting interest will be independently and expertly 
determined on the basis of the amount that would have been received if the company were to 
be liquidated.592 If the creditor disagrees with the valuation, he has the right to apply to court 
to review, reappraise and revalue the determination.593  
 
The concept of a binding offer has been criticised. Loubser suggests that, firstly, the offer 
should be binding once it is made; secondly, that the offer should not be more than the 
liquidation claim, given that the concurrent creditors may receive little or nothing.594 The 
treatment of the offeree after relinquishing the voting interest has been criticised.595  
 
A business rescue plan must spell out the benefits of adopting the plan, compared with the 
benefits that would be received by creditors if the company were to be placed in liquidation.596  
 
There is now clarity on the legal nature and consequences of binding offers made in the course 
of business rescue. In African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others597 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a binding offer 
made to a creditor who opposes a business rescue plan is not automatically binding on the 
offeree. 
 
The binding offer provisions of Chapter 6 have come under constitutional challenge598 on the 
basis that they impact on voting rights599 and deny access to the court by way of review, 600 and 
that these provisions breach the constitutional right to equality.601 The constitutional challenge 
                                                          
591 This provision states that “any affected person, or combination of affected persons, may make a binding offer 
to purchase the voting interests of one or more persons who opposed adoption of the business rescue plan, at 
a value independently and expertly determined, on the request of the practitioner, to be a fair and reasonable 
estimate of the return to that person, or those persons, if the company were to be liquidated”. 
592 Section 152 (1) (b) (ii) of the 2008 Act. 
593 Section 153 (6) of the 2008 Act. 
594Loubser, A, Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law, LLD Thesis, 
University of South Africa,(2010) page 138; see also Loubser, A. ‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the 
Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2)’ TSAR 689, (2010), pages 700-701  
595 Locke, N. and Esser, I., ‘Company Law and Stock Exchanges’ Annual Survey of South African Law 231, (2013), 
page 282.  
596 Section 150 (2) (b) (vi) of the 2008 Act states that the rescue plan must set out the benefits of adopting the 
business rescue plan as opposed to the benefits that would be received by creditors if the company were to be 
placed in liquidation. 
597 [2015] ZASCA 69; 2015 (5) SA 192 (SCA); [2015] 3 All SA 10 (SCA).  
598 2013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) (since overturned on appeal and reported at [2015] ZASCA 69 ) 
599 2013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) para 43. 
600 2013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) para 47. 
601 2013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) para 56. 
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was unsuccessful, and these provisions were held to be justifiable, given the objectives of the 
statutory scheme for business rescue.602 Dissenting creditors’ rights were held to be protected 
where they sold their voting interests.603  
 
In DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and others,604 it was held that it was not the 
intention of the legislature that a binding offer, once made, would bind the offeree and that if 
this had been the intent, the legislation would have said so.605 The court held that the offer only 
binds the offeror and has legal obligations if accepted by the other party.606 I 
 
Previously disputed issues were settled by the Supreme Court of Appeal in African Banking 
Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others.607 
Inter alia, the court was required to interpret the term “binding offer” in the context of 
Chapter 6 of the Act and whether such an offer binds the offeree once it is made. In this case, 
the respondent, who wanted the rescue plan to be approved, had presented an audited 
financial statement of seven years previously which indicated that the company had not 
carried on any business since then.608 The creditor in question was reluctant to support the 
plan. In its judgment, the court cited the dictionary definition of the term “offer” and 
concluded that it is acceptance that creates rights and obligation.609 The court held further 
                                                          
6022013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) para 56 the judge said, “…Section 153(1)(b)(ii) of the Act serves a compelling and 
legitimate governmental purpose, and the deprivation of the voting interest in the company accompanied by 
compensation, which is expertly and independently determined, is not arbitrary.’’ 
6032013 (6) SA 471 (GNP) para 32. 
604 2014 (1) SA 103 para 40. 
605 To the same effect, see Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine NO 
and Another (3813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 37. 
606 2014 (1) SA 103 KZP para 39 and in para 40 the court held that, the Act had intended to create rights and 
obligations in itself, it is unlikely in the extreme that it would have used only the word ‘offer`. It could and 
would have introduced a deeming provision of acceptance on the part of the offeree or have stated that the 
offer, once made, gave rise to binding obligations between the parties. This interpretation was endorsed in 
Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine NO and Another (3915/2013) 
[2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 37 where the court stated that ‘…In my view the reference to “binding offer” should be 
regarded as an offer binding on the offeror and not the offeree who should be entitled to either accept or 
reject the offer at his will.  However it is apparent that there is uncertainty and therefore the legislature is 
urged to consider the issue afresh and make the necessary amendments.’ 
607 (228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, para 1. 
608(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, para 4. 
609 (228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69. At para 18, the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to the Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary 12 edition, (2011) for a definition of the term “offer: as ‘an expression of readiness to do or give 
something; [or] an amount of money that someone is willing to pay for something’. Van der Merwe, S.W. and 
others, Contract: General Principles, (2012), 4 edition, page 46 state that an offer is an invitation to consent to 
the creation of obligations between two or more parties and that hat distinguishes a true offer from any other 
proposal or statement is the express or implied intention to be bound by the offeree’s acceptance.  
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that the language of Section 153 (1) (b) (iii) of the statute does not create a binding offer as 
the minimum conditions of a legal contract are lacking.610 It was held that the term “binding 
offer” in this context is no different from the concept in South African contract law in terms 
of which an offer becomes a contract on acceptance by the other party;611 the interpretation 
endorsed by court below was held to be contrary to business practice and impracticable.612 
 
Now that these issues have been authoritatively resolved, Chapter 6 would be improved if it 
were amended to incorporate the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of Appeal in this 
regard.  
 
The business rescue practitioner is required to exercise diligence. Upon appointment, the 
practitioner is required to assess whether the company can attain the objectives of business 
rescue.613 If the answer is negative, the practitioner should move for the liquidation of the 
company and not waste time and resources on preparing any kind of business plan.614 These 
principles were made clear by the court in Kariba where the company could not put forward 
any reasonable prospect for a successful rescue.615  
 
Another issue that is a challenge with regard to binding offers is what will transpire if the 
offeror fails to make the payment due to the offeree for the acquisition of voting rights. The 
Act requires that, within five business days, the rescue practitioner has to produce a revision of 
the rescue plan that includes the amendment of the voting interest resulting from the binding 
offer.616 The statute is silent as to whether the rescue practitioner has a duty to facilitate 
expeditious payment to the offeree to enable the approval and implementation of the rescue 
plan.617 Chapter 6 would be improved if such a duty were imposed on the offeror. Also unclear 
                                                          
610(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, para 19. 
611 See High Court in Gqwaru and Another v Magalela Architects CC and Another (19959/2016) [2017] ZAGPJHC 
32 para 14 where it was held that it would be absurd to consider whether the second respondent would accept 
the offer before one was made to him. 
612(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69, para 25 where the court cites the decision in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund 
v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] ZASCA 13; para 18 as support for the view that the respondent`s 
interpretation of the concept binding offer would lead to insensible and unbusinesslike. To the same effect, see 
Panamo Properties (Pty) & another v Nel & others NNO 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA) para 27. 
613 Section 141 (1) of the 2008 Act. 
614 Section 141 (2) of the 2008 Act. 
615(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69 para 5. Aside from the outdated audited financial report, the company failed to 
provide evidence of having machinery nor raw material to enable it to continue in business during the rescue 
proceedings. 
616 Section 153 (4) (a) of the 2008 Act. 
617 Section 153 (4) (b) of the 2008 Act. 
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at present is who is liable if the offeror defaults on his obligation, and whether the company is 
in any way involved in the consequential breach of contract. In Kariba it was held that this is 
not what the Act envisages.618 As far as the principle of contract law was concerned, the 
agreement involved two parties, not including the company, although it is a beneficiary.619 In 
this event the dissenting creditor will have to sue the offeror for the breach and this will not 
involve the company. However, this practice can be seen as effectively shifting debt from one 
party to another which in turn will result in inconvenience and costs to the dissenting creditor.  
 
The concept of a binding offer in South Africa’s Chapter 6 is a unique feature, not found in the 
business rescue legislation of other jurisdictions consulted in the course of this study.620 Not 
surprisingly, such binding offers in South Africa are an invitation to litigation, especially in 
regard to the valuation of the subject matter.621 Chapter 6 allows the vote at a creditors’ meeting 
to be taken on review as “inappropriate”. The court then gets the opportunity to evaluate the 
feasibility of the rescue plan and balance the interests of assenting and dissenting creditors.622 
A court order that a voting result was “inappropriate” serves two purposes. It prevents the 
approval of a flawed rescue plan and it allows the court to assess whether the rescue plan has 
a reasonable prospect of success. A strong case can be made for amending Chapter 6 to remove 
all references to a “binding offer”.623  
 
                                                          
618 (228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69 para 51. 
619 Save for some exceptions, the common law doctrine of privity of contract as stated in Tweddle v Atkinson 
[1861] EWHC QB J57 is that third parties to a contract do not derive any rights from an agreement, neither are 
they subject to any burdens imposed by it. This implies that only those who are party to the contract can sue or 
be sued on it. This was affirmed upheld in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] UKHL 1 and 
Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58.. Huyssteen L.F. and others, Contract Law in South Africa, Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, (2010), page 312 states that: ‘’There are no real exceptions to the doctrine of 
privity of contract in South African law, and there are no direct actions (such as exist in some other systems of 
law) by a contract in party against a third person or by a third person or by a third person against a contracting 
party’’. For instance the right of the beneficiary (in our case a ‘company’) is vested only upon acceptance by him 
or her to be involved in the contract. This was judicially confirmed in Total SA (Pty) Ltd v Bekker NO (1992) 1 SA 
617 (A) and Crookes v Watson (1956) 1 SA 277 (A) 291.  
620 In DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and others 2014 (1) SA 103, para 35 footnote number 34, 
Gorven J found no equivalent of Section 153 (1) (b) (ii) in USA, UK, Australian or German law. 
621 Section 153 (6) of the Act stipulates that a holder of a voting interest, or a person acquiring that interest in 
terms of a binding offer, may apply to a court to review, re-appraise and re-value a determination by an 
independent expert in terms of subsection (1)(b)(ii).  
622 Section 153 (7) of the 2008 Act. 
623 In Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another 
(3813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 37 the uncertainty of the concept was noted, and it was 




Once a company has commenced business rescue it is protected by an automatic moratorium 
that gives it an opportunity to arrange its affairs without creditors pressing for payment of their 
claims. This stay on legal proceedings is essential to facilitate the recovery of a distressed 
company. The creditors are not absolutely barred from enforcing their rights during this period, 
but they need the consent of the practitioner or the leave of the court to do so  
 
The concept of a “binding offer” in Chapter 6 of the Act seems unique to South Africa’s 










The focus of this study has been to analyse creditors’ rights under South Africa’s business 
rescue statutory regime laid down in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. It was necessary 
to investigate creditors’ powers in the commencement stages of the business rescue procedure 
as well as the position of creditors during the operation of the process.624 The analysis of 
creditors’ rights was followed by proposals for amendments to the legislation.625  
 
This chapter gives an overview of the main issues regarding the role of creditors in business 
rescue proceedings, and evaluated possible legislation reforms. Well-functioning business 
rescue regimes contribute to a healthy global economy.626.  
 
6.2 General Summary of the Findings 
This study has found that business rescue legislation is implicitly based on assumptions 
regarding the proper balance in the relationship between a company and its creditors and other 
stakeholders. The provisions of Chapter 6 attempt to protect the rights of creditors while at the 
same time focusing on the rehabilitation of financially distressed companies.  
                                                          
624 My analysis has been particularly influenced and inspired by the writings of Franken, S., ‘Creditor- and Debtor-
Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’, (2004) European Business Organization Law Review, 5 (4), 
page 652 and 653; Qian, J. and Straha, P.E., ‘How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of 
Banks Loans’, 62 (6), The Journal of Finance, (2007), page 2804; and Claessens, S. and Klapper, L.F., `Bankruptcy 
Around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865 
Control and Corporate Rescue, page 2, available at 
http://www.univie.ac.at/bwl/ieu/lehre/ss06/..../debtorinposseession.pdf , accessed in 23.11.2013. 
625Despite the significant amendments to the Companies Act 71 2008 by the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 
2011, business rescue still has a number of lacunae that hinder its efficient implementation. This has been 
judicially commented on in several decisions, inter alia: Van Rensburg N.O. and Another v Cardio-Fitness 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others [2014] ZAGPJHC 40 para 6; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; 
Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another (3813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 25; DH Brothers 
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP), para 25; African Banking Corporation of 
Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & Others (228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69 para 43; JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd 
v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others (7076/2015) [2016] ZAKZDHC 24 para 18. See also Loubser, A., 
‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 2),’ TSAR, (2010), 
page 700-701. 
626 Corporate restructuring features in publications such as the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency 
and Creditor/Debtor Regime, (2016), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law (2005), INSOL International, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-
Creditor Workouts, (2000), UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment (1997) 





Judicial decisions have recognised and tried to give effect to the objectives of the statutory 
business rescue regime, and have accepted the desirability of trying to rescue financially ailing 
companies. The central problem is to maintain a balance between the interests of the company 
on the one hand, and its creditors on the other, with due regard for the wider socio-economic 
issues. 
 
6.3 South African Corporate Rescue Culture 
This study has ascertained that countries whose legal system is based on common law tend to 
adopt a pro-creditor approach to the attempted rescue of financially distressed companies.627 
This was evident in South Africa’s failed experiment with judicial management.628  
 
Jurisdictions with a civil law basis tend to favour a struggling company over its creditors when 
it comes to corporate restructuring.629  
 
The business rescue regime established in Chapter 6 of South Africa’s Companies Act 2008 
marked an abandonment of judicial management630 and in important respects was a movement 
from a creditor-friendly statutory regime to a debtor-friendly regime. Chapter 6 needed to take 
account of the interests of all other affected parties involved including the company’s 
employees. A balance had to be struck between the competing interests, but overall, the 
objective of facilitating a rescue of financially distressed companies had the inevitable result 
of giving significant priority to the interests of the company (and its employees) over the 
interests of the company’s creditors.631 
                                                          
627 As regards the United Kingdom, Australia, India, Germany and New Zealand, this was revealed in an empirical 
survey by La Porta, and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 
58 (2000), page, 3-27: and in La Porta and others, Law and Finance, pages 1132-1133. This study of creditor 
protection examined how law affects lending in various countries on different continents and the impact on 
creditors’ rights. The conclusion was that common law jurisdictions tend to stronger creditor protection than 
civil law jurisdictions. The preamble to the World Bank Principles on insolvency. (The World Bank Principles for 
Effective Insolvency and Creditors Rights Systems, (Revised), 2016) states at pages 2-3 that “…effective systems 
respond to national needs and problems. As such, these systems must be rooted in the country’s broader 
cultural, economic, legal, and social context.” 
628 See Chapter 2 sub-chapter 2.12. 
629 Such as France and the USA (the latter has a mix of civil and common law) and Scandinavia; see La Porta, and 
others, `Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,’ Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (2000), pages, 3-27. 
630 See, supra, Chapter 2 sub-chapter 2.12. 
631 In Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another 
(3813/2013, 3915/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 46, para 40 the court commented that business rescue proceeding are 
more of a debtor-friendly regime and more flexible than was judicial management.  See, above, Chapter 3 sub-




6.4 Initiation Stage of the Business Rescue Proceedings 
Chapter 6 of the Act gives creditors the right to initiate business rescue proceedings if the board 
of directors has not yet done so.632  
 
In terms of Chapter 6, creditors are, from the outset of the business rescue process, significantly 
involved; this is an implicit recognition of the key role they will play.633 In order to fulfil that 
role, creditors require access to information regarding the financial affairs of the company.634 
Even then, lay creditors may have difficulty interpreting the company’s financial information, 
and only those creditors that are financial institutions may have the expertise to do so. The 
process also needs to take account of the interests of secured, unsecured and preferential 
creditors.635 It is somewhat contradictory for secured creditors to become engaged in business 
rescue when their claims against the company could more easily, more quickly, more 
inexpensively and more certainly, be met in an immediate winding-up of the company.636 
 
To be effective, the business rescue legislation must take proper account of all these 
considerations. 
 
The research for this study revealed that most applications to commence business rescue are 
made by companies in respect of which a winding up order has already been made, and the 
applicants are usually directors or shareholders of the company.  
 
As was noted, earlier, a resolution by the board of directors is an easier route into business 
rescue than an application for a court order.637 The primary factual basis for the commencement 
of business rescue, namely that the company is “financially distressed”, is usually first apparent 
to the board, as is the answer to the question whether there is a reasonable prospect of a 
                                                          
632 Section 131 of the 2008 Act. 
633See Chapter 3 sub-chapter 3.2.4. 
634See Chapter 3 sub-chapter 3.2.4. 
635 PC Osode, ‘Judicial Implementation of South Africa’s New Business Rescue Model: A Preliminary Assessment,’ 
4 Penn. St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. 459 (2015), page 480. 
636Section 344 (f) and s 345 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 provide for the winding up of a company and remain 
in force in the winding up of insolvent companies in terms of the transitional arrangements in Sch 5 of the 
Companies Act 2008. 
637 See, Chapter 3 sub-chapter 3.2.1. 
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successful business rescue.638  The board resolution route into business rescue is one of the 
factors that characterise South Africa’s business rescue regime as being pro-debtor, rather than 
pro-creditor.639 
 
As was noted, earlier, the legislation tries to maintain an appropriate balance by giving the 
company’s creditors the right to apply to court for an order setting aside a board resolution to 
commence business rescue.640 This is a prudent safeguard against the abuse of the corporate 
rescue provisions by companies whose financial plight is in reality hopeless.641 Applications 
by creditors to set aside a board resolution for the commencement of business rescue are likely 
to become commonplace, giving the judiciary the opportunity to play a significant gatekeeper 
role in the business rescue regime.642. 
 
Reported judgments suggest a prima facie reluctance by the South African courts to set aside a 
board resolution for the commencement of business rescue643 and the incidence of the onus of 
proof in such applications is of course crucial.644 Aside from contesting the merits of the 
                                                          
638 Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, Business Rescue Status Quo Report, prepared by M 
Pretorius of Business Enterprises at University of Pretoria (Pty) Ltd, 2015. At page 84 it is reported that banks 
are criticising business rescue practitioners for attempting the business rescue of companies in circumstances 
where there is no reasonable prospect of a restoration to viability or securing a better return for shareholders 
and creditors than would be secured from immediate liquidation. To similar effect, see also Loubser, A., ‘Tilting 
at windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African Law’ 2013 SA Merc LJ 456.. 
639 Entry into business rescue via a board resolution can be used to as a tactic to delay the payment of creditors. 
Even if the resolution is set aside by the court, a moratorium of some brief duration will have been secured. In 
short, this easy route into business rescue can operate to the prejudice of creditors; see, above, Chapter 3 sub-
chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 
640 Section 130 of the 2008 Act. 
641 Chapter 3 sub-chapter 3.2.2. 
642 The creditors’ response to a board resolution for the commencement of business rescue will depend on their 
assessment of the benefit they will gain if the company remains in business; see Omar, P., ` Insolvency, Security 
Interests and Creditor Protection,’ The International Insolvency Institute, page 7 available in 
http://.iiiglobal.org/component/idownloads/viewcategory/647.htmlaccessed on 21.04.2016 
643 Section 5 (1) of the 2008 Act requires the courts to interpret and apply the legislation in a manner that gives 
effect to the objectives set out in Section 7 of the Act 2008.  In interpreting the business rescue provisions of the 
Act, the courts will have to consider the wording, context and purpose of the legislative provisions, and the 
underlying premise that viable companies should be rescued rather than liquidated; in this regard, see Re Absa 
Bank Ltd v Caine NO and another ZAFSHC 46 para 47. Further it was cemented in Copper Sunset Trading 220 
(Pty) Ltd v Spar Group Limited and Another . In DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and others at para 
54 the court said that the rights of creditors should be respected and that “…if the rights of creditors were to be 
ridden over roughshod, this would undoubtedly detract from other overarching purposes of the Act, such as 
promoting the development of the South African Economy, promoting investment in the South African markets, 
creating optimum conditions for the investment of capital in enterprises and providing a predictable and 
effective environment for the efficient regulations of companies, to mention only few…” 
644 Section 130 of the 2008 Act. 
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application, creditors can invoke procedural irregularities when applying for the setting aside 
of a board resolution in this regard.645  
 
6.5 Objectives of Business Rescue Proceedings 
The objectives of the business rescue provisions of the Act are a key factor in their judicial 
interpretation.646 As was noted earlier, there have been some judicial differences of opinion as 
to whether the two alternative objectives of business rescue carry equal weight, or whether the 
objective of returning the company to viability predominates over the objective of securing a 
better return for shareholders and creditors than would be achieved by immediate liquidation. 
It seems now to be established that the second objective comes into consideration only if the 
first objective will be impossible to achieve.647 This is yet another factor that establishes South 
Africa’s business rescue regime as being pro-debtor. 
 
In Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Group Ltd and Another (Advantage Project 
Manager (Pty) Ltd Intervening)648 it was held that the objective of the business rescue 
provisions is to rescue a company, where liquidation can be avoided. Prior to the coming into 
force of the business rescue provisions, the judiciary took a markedly pro-creditor approach. 
Thus, for example in Bahnemann v Fritzmore Exploration (Pty) Ltd,649 the court held that, if a 
company fails to meet its obligations toward a creditor, the only proper course of action is to 
liquidate the company, and that judicial management can be considered only if the company 
produces evidence that the process would enable it to pay all of its creditors in full, thus taking 
the view that the interests of creditors come first in judicial management. In De Jager v Karoo 
KoeldrankeenRoomys (Edms) Bpk,650 the court expressed the view that only in very rare 
circumstances would the court go against the wishes of creditors who seek to enforce the 
immediate payment of their claims.  
 
It seems that the board is within its rights to resolve on business rescue on the ground that this 
will provide a better return to creditors of the company than would immediate liquidation.651 
                                                          
645 See Chapter 4.7. 
646 See Chapter 3.3. 
647 Section 128 (1) (b) (iii) of the Act 2008 
648 2011 (5) SA 600 (WCC) at 603 E-F. 
649 1963 (2) SA 249 (T). 
650 1956 (3) SA 594 (C). 
651 Section 129 (7) of the 2008 Act. 
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Indeed, the legislation requires that the board provide reasons why it has not resolved on 
business rescue if the company is indeed financially distressed.  
 
It has already been noted that secured creditors are unlikely to view business rescue favourably, 
since it will not improve their position and may deplete the reservoir of funds from which their 
claims will be paid if the company was simply liquidated..652  
 
Corporate rescue regimes that are debtor-oriented stand a better chance of reviving an ailing 
company than those that are creditor oriented and which consequently resort to liquidation 
more readily.653  
 
Business rescue legislation that downplays creditors’ rights, and relentlessly emphasises the 
salvation of financially distressed companies can have a dampening effect on the national 
economy.654 The corporate rescue system in the UK is creditor-oriented and the literature 
suggests that significant numbers of companies have migrated to England when they intend to 
implement some restructuring so as to ease their financial situation.655 Many companies 
apparently seek to fall under the jurisdiction of English law by establishing their head offices 
                                                          
652 Creditors (at best) suffer a delay in the payment of their claims if a company commences business rescue. 
Their interests are to some extent protected by section 134 (3) of the 2008 Act which states that: 
“If, during a company`s business rescue proceedings, the company wishes to dispose of any property 
over which another person has any security or title interest, the company must: 
(a) Obtain the prior consent of that other person, unless the proceeds of the disposal would be 
sufficient to fully discharge the indebtedness protected by that person`s security or title interest; and  
(b) Promptly: 
(i) pay to that other person the sale proceeds attributed to that property up to the amount of the 
company`s indebtedness to that other person; or 
(ii) provide security for the amount of those proceeds, to the reasonable satisfaction of that other 
person” 
653 Harmer, ‘Comparison of Trends’, page 147-148. 
654 Qian, J. and Strahan, P.E., ‘How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Banks Loans,’ 62 
(6), The Journal of Finance, (2007), page 2804 states that creditors tend to provide loans with lower interest 
rates, longer maturity and concentrated ownership where they are protected by the laws of the country. Under 
these circumstances, creditors are willing to provide loans on more favourable terms than in countries with 
stronger debtor protection. 
655Becht, M. and others, `Corporate Mobility Comes to Europe,’ University of Brussels Working Paper, 2005, a 




in the UK.656 Access to loan finance is predictably easier in jurisdictions that offer strong 
creditor protection,657 and this is a drawcard for international investors. 658  
 
The philosophy of corporate rescue has gained wide acceptance internationally and creditors 
have become more confident that their rights enjoy reasonable protection,659 even though many 
other interested parties have a voice in the process, with the court having the final say in key 
respects.660  
 
6.6 Operation of Business Rescue Proceedings 
After the commencement of business rescue, overall control of the company is in the hands of 
the business rescue practitioner.661 Where the practitioner was appointed by the board, there is 
a significant risk that he or she will not have the support of creditors and other interested parties 
who may then apply to court for the appointment to be set aside, and another person 
appointed.662 In this regard, creditors of course want to be sure that the appointee will protect 
their interests. The incumbent board of directors remains in office – again a feature that marks 
South Africa’s business rescue regime as debtor-friendly.663  
 
The creditors’ right to apply for the setting aside of the appointment of the business rescue 
practitioner, and the appointment of another person, provides an opportunity for the creditors 
to attempt to gain indirect control of, or at least a significant influence over, the business rescue 
                                                          
656 In Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), the English High Court said that 
companies migrate to that country so as to take advantage of more beneficial restructuring practices. In 
particular, pre-packing sales effected in the context of the administration proceeding offers benefits to 
financially distressed companies.  
657 Loan terms tend to be tighter in weaker judicial system than in stronger ones; see Galindo, A. J. and Micco, 
A., Creditor Protection and Credit Response to Shock, World Bank Economic Review, 21 (3), (2007), page 417. 
658 Qian, J. and Straha, P.E., How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Banks Loans, 62 
(6), The Journal of Finance, (2007), page 2803. 
659 In Baird, D. and Rasmussen, R., `Chapter 11 at Twilight,’ (2003), 56, SLR, page 103 it is said that in the United 
States of America, where a company undergoes reorganisation, it is the creditors who decide whether to sell 
the company or make a prearranged deal. On pages 675-685 the authors discuss the consequences of the sale 
of the company from the viewpoint of the shareholders, the directors and the employees. 
660 Such as the power, on application by an affected person, to set aside; the power to set aside the appiotnment 
of the business rescue practitioner; the power to set aside the result of a vote by creditors as being 
inappropriate; granting extensions of time for various steps in the process;; terminating the business rescue 
proceedings; and determining the value of an interest that is the subject of a binding offer. 
661 Among the significant powers granted to the business rescue practitioner is the sale of the company`s assets, 
where affirmed by court order. Encumbered assets can be sold only with the consent of the relevant creditor. 
662 See, above, Chapter 3.4. 
663Bradstreet, R ‘The Leak in the Chapter 6 lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of Business Rescue Practitioners may 
Adversely Affect Lenders’ Willingness and Growth of the Economy’ (2010) 22 SA Merc L.J., page 198;  the author 
is of the view that leaving the incumbent management in office facilitates the revival of the company. 
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process.664 The business rescue practitioner is as an officer of the court and is under a duty to 
act independently and impartially, but the potential and tacit influence of the creditors who 
secured his or her appointment cannot be gainsaid.665  
 
The creditors have the right to form a creditors’ committee, inter alia to ensure that their 
interests are respected.666 Such a committee is expected to act as an intermediary between the 
creditors and the business rescue practitioner. The composition of the creditors’ committee can 
be an awkward issue, given the divergent interests, and perhaps conflicting class interests, of 
the creditors.667  
 
The creditors will be consulted by the business rescue practitioner when the latter prepares a 
business rescue plan.668 The consultation can either be done formally, via creditors’ committee 
meetings, or informal proposals can be made by the committee or by individual creditors in 
regard to a proposed business rescue plan;669 but the practitioner is expected to bring an 
independent mind to bear in this regard, and of course the final decision will be made in a 
voting process. 
 
The divergent influences that are brought to bear in the formulation of a proposed business plan 
may affect whether its final form is a pro-debtor – that is to say, favouring the interests of the 
company and its employees– or pro-creditor, that is to say, favouring the interests of the 
creditors.670  
 
The creditors’ influence extends through to the voting on the proposed rescue plan. Even 
though the business rescue practitioner is required to notify voters where the terms of the draft 
rescue plan have been suggested by the creditors (and presumably are slanted in their favour), 
and it will then be clear that the plan will be supported by the creditors.671 Controversy 
                                                          
664 See Chapter 3.4. 
665 See Chapter 3.4 
666 Section 145 (3) of the 2008 Act. 
667 See Chapter 4.3. 
668, Section 145 (1) (d) of the 2008 Act. 
669See Chapter 4.4. 
670McCormarck, G., Corporate Rescue Law- An Anglo-American Perspective, Edward Elgal Publishing Ltd., 
(2008), page 293. 
671 See, above, Chapter 4.4. 
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regarding the terms of the business plan is likely where the creditors fall into different classes, 
with competing interests.672  
 
The influence of the company’s creditors on the terms of the proposed business plan can be 
balanced by the power of the court to set aside the voting on the plan as inappropriate.673  
 
In the legislative drafting of the business rescue provisions, it seems that the generally negative 
experience of judicial management, which was a process in which the interests of creditors 
were overwhelming, was a considerable influence, given that secured creditors will almost 
always favour immediate liquidation,674 to the potential prejudice of other interested parties 
and the company itself. 
 
The courts have shown an appreciation of the important role played by creditors in business 
rescue and the respect that their interests deserve where the terms of a business rescue plan are 
contentious. In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others,675 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal said that creditors have the right to oppose the plan and their intentions in this regard 
should be respected by other stakeholders in business rescue proceedings. The court went on 
to say that – 
 
“If the statement is intended to convey that the declared intent to oppose by the 
majority creditors should in principle be ignored in considering business rescue, I 
do not agree. As I see it, the applicant for business rescue is bound to establish 
reasonable grounds for the prospect of rescuing the company. If the majority 
creditors declare that they will oppose any business rescue scheme based on those 
grounds, I see no reason why that proclaimed opposition should be ignored. Unless, 
of course, that attitude can be said to be unreasonable or mala fide…” [Emphasis 
supplied]. 
 
                                                          
672 La Porta, Law and Finance, page 1134 notes that an excessive focus on a particular group of creditors may 
compromise the interests of other groups. 
673 Section 153 (1) (b) (bb) of the2008 Act. 
674 See Pretorius, M., “Addressing Principal-Agent Conflict in Business Rescue” in Goldman, G.A and Others (eds) 
Contemporary Management in Theory and Practice (2014) at page 321 where it is noted that secured creditors 
such as banks naturally prefer liquidation and have the financial resources to press for this outcome.  
675 (609/2012) [2013] ZASCA 68; para 38. 
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This dictum suggests that the creditors’ opposition to business rescue must be based on the 
prospects of a successful rescue and not on other considerations.676  
 
A duly approved rescue plan, where the vote is not later set aside by the court as inappropriate, 
binds all the creditors, including those who voted against it677 and the rescue practitioner is 
then obliged to implement the plan according to its terms. Implicitly, the plan will give 
appropriate benefits to all parties, otherwise the voting result would not have been 
appropriate.678 
 
The need for the legislation to include “binding offer” provisions to enable a business rescue 
plan to gain the requisite voting majority has been questioned.679 The rationale of the binding 
offer provisions was to allow disgruntled creditors to opt out of the business rescue process and 
leave it in the hands of those who want to adhere to it and try to make it succeed. But a disputed 
binding offer results in delays and escalates the legal costs of the process, particularly in 
relation to invoking expert opinion on issues of valuation.680  
 
The automatic statutory moratorium on claims against the company, and on enforcement 
action, that endures from commencement to termination of the business rescue process is 
central to the legislative scheme.681  
 
The statutory moratorium is not absolute and all-encompassing, and this flexibility is intended 
to be a positive feature of the process. The protection extends to the situation where the 
company has bound itself as surety.682 The legislation is however silent in regard to the legal 
position of a person who has bound himself as surety for a company that has later entered into 
business rescue..683 The judiciary have interpreted this issue inconsistently. Some judgments 
have applied the common law principle that where a principal debtor has been discharged, the 
surety is automatically released.684 Others judgments have viewed the legislation as granting 
                                                          
676 Section 153 (7) of the 2008 Act. 
677 Section 152 (4) of the 2008 Act. 
678 See Chapter 4.5.1. 
679 Section 153 (b) (ii) of the 2008 Act. 
680 See Chapter 5.5. 
681 Section 133 of the2008 Act. 
682 Section 133 (2) of the 2008 Act. 
683 See, Chapter 5.3. 
684Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd T/A Balanced Audio  [2014] 3 All SA 50 (WCC) para 14 and Absa Bank Limited v Du Toit 
and Others [2013] ZAWCHC 194. 
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protection only to the company and not to a surety for the company, leaving the creditor free 
to enforce the suretyship.685  
 
This study has suggested amendments to the legislation in this regard that will be in harmony 
with the objectives of the business rescue process.686 
 
The business rescue legislation accords priority to the unpaid claims of the employees after the 
costs and expenses of the business rescue practitioner have been settled.687 In this respect the 
legislation takes account of the positive socio-economic aspects of business rescue.688 Such 
prioritisation of course impacts negatively on unsecured creditors and unsecured post-
commencement financiers, and the impact of such prioritisation is felt acutely if the attempted 
rescue fails and the company is liquidated. 
 
This study has proposed an amendment to Chapter 6 of the legislation in regard to the ranking 
of creditors’ claims.689  
 
6.7 Regime and Company Size 
The literature suggests that the efficiency of pro-debtor or pro-creditor corporate rescue 
regimes differs according to the size of the enterprise in question..690 In South Africa, business 
rescue is available to close corporations registered in terms of the Close Corporations Act 69 
of 1984. By contrast, judicial management was available only to companies.691  
                                                          
685Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns 2012 (5) SA 430 (WCC) para 25and Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and 
Others2013 (6) SA 471 paras 68-73 
686 See, Chapter 5.3. 
687 Section 135 of the 2008 Act. 
688 This concern was also raised in Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd v Spar Group Limited and Another[2014] 
ZAGPPHC 688 para 36 where the High Court considered the problem of unemployment in the country when 
justifying the reason not to put a company under liquidation which will result to more than 52 workers to lose 
their jobs. Also the welfare of employees in corporate restructuring was also considered in India as it was feared 
that the severe entrenchment of workers might have an impact on the national political election, in Vig, V., 
Creditors Rights and Corporate Debt Structure, (2011), page 9 available at 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb...files/Collateral_Vig_HEcon.pdf accessed on 11.05.2015  
689See Chapter 5.4.1. 
690Franken, S., ‘Creditor- and Debtor-Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited,’ (2004), 4, European 
Business Organization Law Review, page 675. 
691 South Africa is as described as an emerging economy dominated by small and medium businesses which all 
need to be promoted in order to grow, see Stein, C. and Everingham, G., The New Companies Act Unlocked, Cape 
Town, Siber Ink, (2011), page 409-411. Consequently, the dominance of debtor corporate rescue features would 
seem to be an inevitable result. Le Roux, I. & Duncan, K., ‘The naked truth: Creditor understanding of business 
rescue. A small business perspective’,2013, SAJESBM, 6, pages 57-74, the authors, however, found out that in 




The literature suggests that corporate rescue systems that are debtor-oriented are particularly 
effective in saving small enterprises from liquidation.692. 
 
6.8 Judiciary in Business Rescue Proceedings 
The judiciary plays a key role in the functioning and development of a statutory corporate 
rescue regime.693 The role of the judiciary is particularly important in the protection of the 
company’s creditors, by ensuring that companies that are unsalvageable cannot gain shelter, 
albeit temporarily, within the business rescue regime. 
 
The interpretation of the business rescue legislation, which in South Africa is not in all respects 
a model of clarity, is of course a matter for the judiciary, and judges need to look beyond the 
literal words of the legislation and take account, inter alia, of the broad policy objectives of the 
legislation, whilst giving effect to the legal rights of all affected parties. It has been said 
however, that the consistent enforcement of the law is more important than the quality of the 
law.694  
 
                                                          
to embark on in time of financial distress. The discovery of this ignorance is a result of the empirical investigation 
that led to publication of their study. However it should be noted that this study was done a short time after the 
statute came to force. 
692 Padilla, J.A. and Requejo, A., `The Costs and Benefits of the Strict Protection of Creditor Rights: Theory and 
Evidence,’ Latin America Research Network, Research Network Working Paper No R-384, (2000) page 1. 
693 The Supreme Court of Appeal showed concerned on the development of the business rescue proceedings in 
South Africa in FirstRand Bank Ltd v KJ Foods CC (In business rescue) (734/2015) [2017] ZASCA 50 para 44. In this 
case the court was called upon to determine whether a vote by a creditor against the adoption of a proposed 
business rescue plan was inappropriate and hence be set aside. Before the court made a decision the parties 
were able to amicably settle their differences. However, a councillor argued on behalf of both parties that “the 
industry can greatly benefit from a judgement dealing with section 153 (1) read with section 153 (7) of the Act, 
the Honourable Court with the greatest respect requested to, notwithstanding the settlement reached, deliver 
judgement in the matter…”. The court agreed to the request and delivered judgement despite of the existed 
settlement agreement. 
The credits should not only be given to the judiciary but also the stakeholders in this case lawyers and parties to 
the dispute who together wished to see the existing controversy on the concept of inappropriateness is solved 
by the supreme court of the land for the betterment of the corporate rescue industry. With the existing lacuna 
surrounding Chapter 6 of the legislation this kind of cooperation among stakeholders is of vital importance. 
694 Berkowitz, D., Katharina, P. and Jen-Francois, R., Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 
(Forthcoming in the European Economic Review) (2002), they commented that what matters is the enforcement 
of the laws and not the quality of law that has been put in place. 
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The judiciary in South Africa has had to change its mind-set from a previously rigid bias in 
favour of creditors and their rights, and to now take a broader perspective.695 
 
An efficient judicial system inculcates confidence in both creditors and debtors inrelying on 
the courts when settling their disputes.696 Claessens and Klapper say that a weak judicial system 
can be a catalyst in accelerating out of court settlements, particularly where distressed 
companies believe that the court will favour creditors rather than debtors in matters of business 
rescue.697 The literature indicates that even in flagship jurisdictions for business rescue, 
informal arrangements predominate over those arrived in a formal setting. 
 
For example, the corporate restructuring provisions of the English Insolvency Act 1984 and 
Chapter 11 in the USA are known to have inspired the legislation of other jurisdictions, and 
the legal enforcement processes of these jurisdictions are regarded as of the highest standard. 
Nonetheless, the literature suggests that informal arrangements for corporate rescue 
predominate in these jurisdictions. This suggests that effective corporate rescue is not solely 
determined by the letter of the law.698  
 
Potentially, business rescue may involve applications to court of various kinds, seeking 
different forms of relief. 
 
This study has suggested that a specialist commercial court should be assigned the adjudication 
of business rescue litigation,699 particularly since many business rescue applications are 
brought on an urgent basis in which judgment must be given very quickly. An argument can 
thus be made for the establishment of a specialist division of the High Court to adjudicate in 
                                                          
695Froute, P., Theoretical Foundation for a Debtor Friendly Bankruptcy Law in Favour of Creditors, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, (24)(2007), page 201-214; and Finch, V., Corporate Insolvency Law: Principles and 
Perspectives, 2nd Edition, CUP (2009) page 227 provided that the court is an organ that should to analyse the 
fairness of the proceeding with consideration of the particular material facts 
696Claessens, S. and Klapper, L.F., ‘Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865, page 8 
697Claessens, S. and Klapper, L.F., ‘Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its Relative Use,’ (2002), World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2865, page 11. Also the outcome of this method is likely to provide 
advantage to creditors, as they are now more likely to be in control of the business decisions of the company. 
698 It was stated the act of labelling an insolvency procedure to be either a debtor or creditor oriented regime 
with reference to what the legislation provides is not sufficient enough,  Franken, S., ‘Creditor- and Debtor-
Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited,’ (2004), 4, European Business Organization Law Review, page 
672. 
699 These specialised courts should also have judges who are specialist in corporate restructuring. 
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such matters,700 as this would ensure that the presiding judge has specialist knowledge in this 
area of the law.701 
 
6.9 Proposed Law Reform to Enhance the Protection of Creditors Rights in Business 
Rescue Proceedings under Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
 
This study proposes the following amendments to Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008. 
 
Key: Deleted Text is in square brackets and insertions are underlined  
Section 128. Application and definitions applicable to Chapter 
(1)(b) (iii)  the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the 
company by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity 
in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company continuing in existence on a 
solvent basis or [,if it is not possible for the company to so continue in existence,] results in 
a better return for the company`s creditors or shareholders than would result from the 
immediate liquidation of the company; 
(1)(e) “courts”, depending on the context, means either-  
(i) the Division of the High Court that has jurisdiction over personal and commercial 
insolvency and business rescue matters; or  
(ii) either-  
(aa) a designated judge of the aforesaid Division, if the Judge President has designated any 
judges in terms of subsection (3); or  
(bb) a judge of the aforesaid Division, as assigned by the Judge President to hear the 
particular matter, if the Judge President has not designated any judges in terms of subsection 
(3); 
                                                          
700 For instance what is exercised in USA where original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases arising under the 
Bankruptcy Code is held by specialist United States bankruptcy courts, these are created under Article I of the 
United States Constitution and function as units of the United States district courts. 
701This special court can be given power to handle all the matters regarding insolvency proceedings from 
corporate rescue to winding up of companies. Moreover, the court can entertain issues involving individual 
sequestration since there a number of provisions available under Insolvency Act are applied when liquidating a 
company. Even in number of time courts have referred to sequestration cases when adjudicating liquidation 
proceedings.   
Moreover, M. Pretorius, page 74 in dealing with the limited time provided by the statute in business rescue 




(1)(h) “rescuing the company” means achieving  either one or  both of the goals set out in 
the definition of “business rescue” in paragraph (b); 
(3) For the purposes contemplated in subsection (1)(e) or in any other law, the Judge 
President of a High Court may designate any judge of that court generally as a specialist to 
determine issues relating to [commercial matters,] personal and commercial insolvencies and 
business rescue in that division of the High Court 
. 
Section 129. Company resolution to begin business rescue proceedings 
(2) (b) has no force or effect until it has been filed and approved by the Commission. 
Section 130. Objections to company resolution 
(5) (b)  afford an independent expert [the practitioner] sufficient time to form an opinion 
whether or not- 
Section 131 Court order to begin business rescue proceedings  
(4) After considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the court may-  
(a) make an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue 
proceedings, if the court is satisfied that-  
(i) the company is financially distressed;  
(ii) the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation under or in 
terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to employment-related matters; [or] 
and 
(iii) it is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons, and there is a 
reasonable prospect for rescuing the company; 
 
Section 133. General moratorium on legal proceedings against company 
(4) A creditor may only enforce a remaining balance of the principal debt to be upon the 
implementation of the business rescue plan against a surety who favoured a company in 
business rescue proceedings. 
Section 135. Post-commencement finance 
(2) (a) may be secured to the lender by utilising any asset of the company to the extent that 
it is not otherwise fully encumbered; and 
(3) After payment of the practitioner`s remuneration and expenses referred to in section 143, 
[and] other claims arising out of the costs of the business rescue proceedings, and pre-petition 
secured creditors all claims contemplated- 
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Section 136. Effect of business rescue on employees and contracts 
(4) If liquidation proceedings have been converted into business rescue proceedings, the 
liquidator is a preferred unsecured creditor of the company to the extent of any outstanding 
claim by the liquidator for any remuneration due for work performed, or compensation for 
expenses incurred, before the business rescue proceedings began. 
 
Section 139. Removal and replacement of practitioner 
(3)The company, or the creditor who appointed or nominated the practitioner, as the case 
may be, must appoint a new practitioner if a practitioner dies or resigns [or is removed from 
office], subject to the right of an affected person to bring a fresh application in terms of 
section 130(1) (b) to set aside that new appointment. 
(4) The creditor other than the creditor who nominated the practitioner, as the case may be, 
must appoint a new practitioner, if a practitioner is removed from office, subject to the right 
of an affected person to bring a fresh application in terms of section 130(1) (b) to set aside 
that new appointment. 
 
Section 146. Participation by holders of company`s securities 
(f) The holders of company`s securities are entitled to form a holders of company`s securities 
committee, and through that committee are entitled to be consulted by the practitioner during 
the development of the business rescue plan. 
 
Section 146 (A). First meeting of holders of company`s securities 
(1) Within 10 business days after being appointed, the practitioner must convene, and preside 
over, a first meeting of holders of company`s securities, at which- 
(a) the practitioner- 
(i) must inform the holders of company`s securities whether the practitioner believes that 
there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company; and 
(ii) may receive proof of claims by creditors; and 
(b) the holders of company`s securities may determine whether or not a committee of holders 
of company`s securities should be appointed and, if so, may appoint the members of the 
committee. 
(2) The practitioner must give notice in a prescribed manner of the first meeting of holders 
of company`s securities to every holders of company`s securities, setting out the- 
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(a) date, time and place of the meeting; and 
(b) agenda for the meeting. 
 
Section 149. Functions, duties and membership of committees of affected persons 
(1) A committee of employees, or of creditors, or of holders of company`s securities 
appointed in terms of section 146, 147 or 148, respectively-  
(b) may, on behalf of the general body of creditors, holders of company`s securities or 
employees, respectively, receive and consider reports relating to the business rescue 
proceedings; and  
(c) must act independently of the practitioner to ensure fair and unbiased representation of 
creditors`, holders of company`s securities or employees` interests.  
(2) A person may be a member of a committee of creditors, holders of company`s securities 
or employees, respectively, only if the person is-  
(a) an independent creditor, holder of company`s securities or an employee, of the company;  
(b) an agent, proxy or attorney of an independent creditor, holder of company`s securities or 
employee, or other person acting under a general power of attorney; or  
(c) authorised in writing by an independent creditor, holders of company`s securities or 
employee to be a member. 
(3) Composition of a committee of holders of company`s securities, or employees, or of 
creditors- 
(a) Employees committee should be composed of uneven number of members  
(b) Holders of company`s securities committee should be composed of uneven number of 
members 
(c) Creditors committee members should represent each class of creditors 
 
Section 152. Consideration of business rescue plan  
(8) When the business rescue plan has been [substantially] fully implemented, the 
practitioner must file a notice of the [substantial] fully implementation of the business rescue 
plan in a prescribed manner to every affected person, including with the notice a sworn 
statement of the facts relevant regarding the rescue of the company. 
 
Section 153. Failure to adopt business rescue plan 
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[(1) (b) (ii) any affected person, or combination of affected persons, may make a binding 
offer to purchase the voting interests of one or more persons who opposed adoption of the 
business rescue plan, at a value independently and expertly determined, on the request of the 
practitioner, to be a fair and reasonable estimate of the return to that person, or those persons, 
if the company were to be liquidated.] 
[(4) If an affected person makes an offer contemplated in subsection (1)(b)(ii), the 
practitioner must-  
(a) adjourn the meeting for no more than five business days, as necessary to afford the 
practitioner an opportunity to make any necessary revisions to the business rescue plan to 
appropriately reflect the results of the offer; and  
(b) set a date for resumption of the meeting, without further notice, at which the provisions 
of section 152 and this section will apply afresh.] 
[(6) A holder of a voting interest, or a person acquiring that interest in terms of a binding 
offer, may apply to a court to review, re-appraise and re-value a determination by an 
independent expert in terms of subsection (1)(b)(ii).] 
 
Section 154. Discharge of debts and claims 
[(1) A business rescue plan may provide that, if it is implemented in accordance with its 
terms and conditions, a creditor who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of a 
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